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Abstract
Adopting the framework of Benjamin’s 1936 essay ‘The Work of Art in the Age of Mechan-
ical Reproduction’ (1999, 2008), and thinking through central themes of value, context and
circulation, this thesis examines how language moves through digital space. Concentrating
on Google’s search and advertising platforms, the thesis explores the concept of ‘linguistic
capitalism’ (Kaplan 2014), arguing that the ongoing effects on digitally mediated language
are both linguistic and political. Indeed, the politics and power which lurk behind these
technologies are often obscured, or normalised, by their ubiquity and aesthetics, a process
which, following Benjamin, can perhaps only be exposed by the repoliticisation of language
through art. Using poetry and classic texts such as Orwell’s ‘Nineteen Eighty-Four’, as
well as existing and experimental writing, the thesis harnesses the power of language and
literature to critique and resist the technologies that exploit it in today’s digital economy.
Adopting what I am calling a post-digital (auto)ethnographic approach, the thesis offers
an innovative new method in order to make visible the workings and effects of linguistic
capitalism, using data gathered from Google AdWords for both quantitative and qualita-
tive analysis, as well as introducing and documenting the development and reception of my
own piece of ‘political’ art in the form of a critical creative intervention called {poem}.py.
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PART ONE : FRAMING / THEORY
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
This was not my intended thesis. This thesis began life as a Google search relating to my
old thesis, which was about military geographies. It happened like this:
Five years ago I was sitting in the library of military history at the Royal United Services
Institute (RUSI) in London, listening to a presentation about how the spread of social
media use amongst military personnel and their friends and family might pose a threat
to operational and national security. It was an academic presentation, but was attended
by a mixture of serving and retired military personnel, and various RUSI defence and
security experts. The audience was predominantly male; the significance of which be-
came strikingly apparent to me when several participants began substituting the phrase
‘friends and family’ for ‘wives and girlfriends’; a semantic irrelevance perhaps, but one
that seemed so unrepresentative, culturally loaded, and even a little patronising, that it
bothered me enough to research it afterwards. So later that day I sat down at my desk
and typed the phrase ‘wives and girlfriends sexist’ into Google, expecting to find some
cultural criticism about the portrayal of footballer’s wives in the press and media, or even
some more nuanced critique of the sexual semantics of the phrase - something along the
lines of Cynthia Enloe’s ‘womenandchildren’ (1990), which cleverly conveys the frustrating
removal of agency and personhood embodied by such a conflation (Sjoberg 2006, 2007).
What I was not expecting was for Google’s search algorithm to ‘correct’ the word sexist to
sexiest (see Figure 1.1) and present me with a page of the top ranking sexiest and hottest
WAGs in its index.
It seemed at first that the search engine had ‘decided’ that it was more likely that the
typical Google user had meant to search for sexy, as opposed to sexist women, and had
18
Figure 1.1: Google search for ‘wives and girlfriends sexist’, February 2014. Screenshot:
author’s own.
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simply made a typographic error. While this may (arguably) seem like a fair assumption,
the more I researched how Google and other search engines operate, it became apparent
that algorithmic decisions such as this are not based on any cultural or semantic knowl-
edge as such, but purely on the mathematical logics of search technologies, on vectors, on
marked up, decontextualised language, and on the analysis of big data by ‘keyness and
co-location’, a method of corpus linguistics which in the field of Critical Data Analysis
has been criticised because it ‘omits essential qualities of actual language use’ (Fairclough
2013: 20). In the pool of data in which the algorithm works, the word sexiest is simply
statistically more likely to be linked to the phrase wives and girlfriends than the word sex-
ist ; the associations perhaps compounded by the disproportionate volume of sexualised
content or sensationalised news copy in the database, by algorithmic reproduction of er-
roneous typos or synonyms, and by the machinations of the linguistic marketplace and
digital advertising. Words in this sense have become reduced to data; their proximity to
one another based not on what we might call a cognitive narrative (Hayles 2012: 179),
but a logic of mathematics that codifies and magnifies incomplete or biased data. ‘At this
point’, as Fuller and Goffey suggest, ‘semantics is largely irrelevant’ (2009: 156).
But if digital technology has made semantics irrelevant, then what is the fate of language
when our means of communication and the dissemination of information has become in-
creasingly digitised and algorithmically processed, and therefore always already affected
by factors and logics out of our control? What does it mean that a search engine gets to
decide who or what can be sexy, as opposed to sexist, and why does this matter? It mat-
ters because it is not just sexist/sexiest results that get conflated in this way. Every word
we enter into the portal of the search bar goes on a quite a journey before it comes back
out again. And that is how I conceptualise this thesis. It is about how words (as datafied
commodities) move through the structures and processes of the web, and what happens to
them on the way. It is therefore about context (in a material and literal sense), value (in
an economic and artistic sense), and circulation (in a material and economic sense). These
are themes which run through the thesis, and are also the themes I draw from the Walter
Benjamin text which inspired my title, and upon whose framework the thesis hangs.
1.1 Benjamin’s ‘Work of Art’ essay
As I will go on explain further in Chapter 5, the title of the thesis is a play on Walter
Benjamin’s 1936 The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction, and as such
20
1.1 Benjamin’s ‘Work of Art’ essay
uses the essay as a theoretical frame on which to hang my arguments. Benjamin’s essay is
a staple text in the disciplines of art history, culture and media studies, and more recently
has also been used to shine light on how new digital technologies affect those areas of
study. The ‘Work of Art’ essay (1999, 2008) can perhaps be simply described as a Marxist
analysis of the means of artistic production, and indeed that is how Benjamin frames his
text from the start, arguing that technologically enhanced mass reproduction of art and
artefacts is a process of alienation and distantiation of the work of art from its original
‘presence in time and space’, a process in which the work of art loses what Benjamin calls
its ‘aura’. Using examples such as coin stamping, woodcutting and engraving to illustrate
early reproductions of art, and then the advent of the printing press and photography,
Benjamin acknowledges that the work of art has always been reproducible, but points
to the significant political and cultural effects that result from advances in technology,
from the mechanically facilitated speeding up of this means of reproduction, and from its
greater means of dissemination and consumption. Indeed, the essay identifies that the
reproducibility of art is ‘connected with the contemporary mass movements’. The ‘with-
ering’ of the aura of the work of art in the age of mechanical reproduction is therefore
not necessarily mourned by Benjamin. He sees mass produced art as having been ‘eman-
cipated’ from its ritualistic origins, having entered the market place, and therefore the
realm of the political, with all its emancipatory potential.
The other important point Benjamin makes is that although ancient artworks such as re-
ligious effigies or texts are reproducible, they are only reproducible by ‘other men’, rather
than by means of mechanical reproduction, which is one of the main reasons I see the text
as a useful starting point for the analysis of words being processed and reproduced by
algorithms rather than humans today. Benjamin’s description of the aura is not without
its critics, and when it relates to language and literature, can easily be challenged with
deconstructionist theories of language as being in a constant state of deferral of meaning
depending on its context (Derrida 1976, also Chapter 4 in this thesis). In this way language
has never had an essence, an authority or an aura which might be ruined by mechanical,
or indeed algorithmic reproduction. While I acknowledge, and indeed embrace parts of
this critique, I still think there is value in using it in relation to algorithmically reproduced
language, as the words which flow through digital spaces are - like Benjamins ‘Work of
Art’ automatically enrolled in a complicated and pervasive political and cultural economy
enabled by the ubiquity of digital communication in modern society. My use of Benjamin’s
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text in this way is based more on the idea of the movement of words through the search bar,
imaging them as commodities, as pieces of raw data, moved further away from the context
in which they were inputted into the search engine by algorithmic reproduction of the
search engine and its complicated market influences. Thus, any authenticity of language
relates more to the intention of the search engine user, and how that intent becomes sec-
ondary to economic and algorithmic logics as words are processed and reproduced, rather
than to any claimed aura of language itself. This idea of the movement of words through
digital spaces as commodities has particular resonance in the age of digital technology,
when advertising and information can be said to have taken over from heavy industry as
a major accumulator of wealth and influence. Thus today, proprietary algorithms have
taken over as the facilitators of the movement of raw materials and commodities (in this
case raw data or text instead of coal or steel) for capital (re)production. Algorithms are
therefore in effect ‘do[ing] for information systems what canals did for mercantilism’ (Poon
2013), and making their owners extremely rich and powerful in the process.
Although Benjamin’s essay is perhaps best known for its musings on the advent of mass
produced photography and film, it contains many fascinating insights into language in the
digital age, indeed it is a passage about the distinction between the painter and the pho-
tographer that highlights another key concept in my thesis. According to Benjamin, there
is a distinct distance between a painting and ‘reality’. The painter sees the picture in its
totality, as a whole, and at a distance, whereas the picture created by the cameraman in a
photograph ‘consists of multiple fragments which are assembled under a new law’ (1999:
229). The photograph is therefore a ‘web’ of different components that can be analysed
and dissected to pull apart the various fragments, laws and influences that make up its
production. The idea of the re-assembly of fragments in this way is a great description of
the process of deconstruction and reconstruction of text as it flows through digital plat-
forms and portals as data. Like Benjamin’s photograph, the words re-assembled through
the search engine cannot be viewed from a distance without appreciating the fragmentary
process of their reproduction. Referring in particular to the film and its capacity for close
ups, slow motion and still frames, Benjamin calls this new mechanically enhanced artistic
medium ‘the mutual penetration of art and science’, and likens the process to Freud’s
relatively recent method of psychoanalysis which he says ‘isolated and made analyzable
things which had heretofore floated along unnoticed in the broad stream of perception’
(1999: 229).
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As I discuss more in chapter 5, Benjamin saw the avant-garde and anti-capitalist Dadaist
movement as an extension of this revolutionary means of dissection and perception, for
example in the way they chopped up words and phrases into ‘word salad’ to create poetry,
and made art from old buttons and tickets (1999: 231). By deconstructing, reconstructing
and repurposing text and objects, the Dadaists were using the very means of production
as art in itself, which meant that the works of art themselves were always already re-
productions rather than originals with any self-contained authenticity or aura. It might
then make sense to suggest that the decontextualisation and deconstruction of language
in the process of its algorithmic reproduction is therefore some kind of radical statement.
Indeed, many poets and authors do use snippets and fragments from Google search results
or autocompletes to create ‘digital art’. However, as I argue in the thesis, these types of
work run the risk of under-awareness and under-analysis of their means of production and
indeed their dissemination, which makes any intended radical creativity or subversion at
risk of co-option back into the systems of digital capitalism and algorithmic governance
that increasingly control every aspect of modern-day life, which I talk about in chapter 6.
And this is perhaps the starkest, but also perhaps the most controversial parallel I draw
between Benjamin’s essay and the systems of digital linguistic capitalism that mediate
online communication and the flow of information today. Benjamin recognised that tech-
nological advancements were giving more and more people access to art and culture, and
that this increasing feeling of participation and agency had become a means of control
over the masses. He was writing in the 1930s when Fascism was on the rise in Europe
and particularly in his native Germany, and saw in the martial spectacle of Nazism a
certain aesthetic which had the effect of appeasing the masses by means of including them
in this cultural phenomena, while at the same time obfuscating the politics behind it.
Benjamin sees this as politics rendered aesthetic (1999: 234), concluding that ‘Fascism
sees its salvation in giving these masses not their right, but instead a chance to express
themselves’ (1999: 234). According to Benjamin, this aestheticisation of politics can only
lead to a violent outcome, i.e. war. When I began writing this thesis, my comparison of
the political backdrop of when Benjamin was writing and the contemporary sphere was
questioned by reviewers of an early paper. Benjamin was after all writing in the politically
polarised and increasingly violent era of the 1930s, when fascism was growing more popu-
lar despite communist uprisings elsewhere. But as global politics grows ever more unstable
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and swings further towards the right, it is becoming increasingly easy (and more common)
to extend the comparison to the power and influence of modern-day tech companies such
as Google and Facebook, and the politics they practise and facilitate. Social media plat-
forms, the fake news phenomena and micro-targeted advertising are all part of a network
of communication and participation which, while giving users the sense of expression and
agency, at the same time obscures the politics behind its means of production and capital
accumulation.
But the politics and neoliberal logics which lurk beneath Google’s empire are often hidden,
or normalised by the ubiquity and aesthetics of the near mandatory networked technolo-
gies such as Google search and its connected platforms. These are technologies that have
become so embedded in our everyday lives that it becomes not only impossible, but also
undesirable to opt out or overthrow them. My thesis argues that this is a digitally enabled
contemporary instantiation of a Benjaminian aestheticisation of politics, and that the al-
gorithmic reproduction of language through these technological systems not only enacts
authoritarian power over its masses of participants, but is also facilitating the spread of
fascistic politics we can see proliferating in modern society today. Just like art in the age
of mechanical reproduction, language in the age of algorithmic reproduction is therefore
part of a process of distancing, decontextualisation and monetisation that has profound
political and social consequences.
But as well as its technological causes, in the mass reproduction of art Benjamin also
identified a potential cure. While he warned that mass reproduction leads to ‘uncon-
trolled (and at present almost uncontrollable)... processing of data in the Fascist sense’
(1999: 212), he also saw a redemptive use for such fascistic reproduction of art, which he
identified as being ‘useful for the formulation of revolutionary demands in the politics of
art’ (1999: 212). Quoting the Italian Futurist Marinetti’s impassioned plea to poets and
artists of the future to be aware of the dangers of fascist aesthetics, Benjamin’s solution
to the aestheticisation of politics is to ‘politicise art’ (1999: 235), a provocation which I
interpret as a call to expose and resist the forces of digital linguistic capitalism through the
repoliticisation of language through my own creative intervention and acts of resistance (as
detailed in chapters 8 and 9), thus reclaiming language from the algorithmic marketplace,
and returning it to art.
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This thesis is born of a love of language; of Stafford’s poetry, Orwell’s prose, and of the
lyrics that define lives. But language is so much more than literature. Language is commu-
nication, it is community, it is wealth, politics, and it is power over both people and places
(Bourdieu 1991; Foucault 1972, 1990, 2012; Derrida 1976, 1988; Fairclough 2001, 2013).
It builds societies and it subjugates them (Anderson 2006; Ji 2004). While this critique
of linguistic power may not be new, what is new today is that in an age of digital capi-
talism and big tech monopolies, words have become commodities which gain in economic
value the more and the faster they circulate through digital spaces. Whether scraped
from the text of emails (Cabell and Huff 2013), algorithmically policed for plagiarism and
other criminal activities (Introna 2016, Gillespie 2014), corrupted as spam (Brunton 2013,
Fuller and Goffey 2009), commodified as keywords for digital advertising (Kaplan 2014)
or optimised so that search algorithms can read them (Gillespie 2014), the words that flow
through the platforms and portals of the Web are all in someway caught up in a system of
what Frederic Kaplan (2014) has called ‘linguistic capitalism’. Words have become data.
And like data, they have become a valuable and powerful commodity. This is perhaps
most apparent in the way Google monetises the language that flows through the search
engine via its AdWords platform, which is the main source of the company’s wealth. As
Kaplan explains in his 2014 article ‘Linguistic Capitalism and Algorithmic Regulation’,
each Google search triggers an auction for the words contained in the search query, with
advertisers bidding for particular keywords in order to obtain the most prominent positions
on the results page. Indeed, with the near ubiquity of Google’s platforms and advertising
empire, which in effect strip narrative context from the words we use while at the same
time loading them with dissonant capital, it has become almost impossible to critique the
system without adding to its economic value. The text of Emails, blogs, news, search
queries and literature has all in some way become data, generating capital for one private,
opaque and ultimately unchallengeable company. This is a neoliberalisation of discourse
at a fundamental and systemic level. But language; the way we, as humans, communicate,
and the way information is disseminated, is fundamental to how human society functions,
and to how culture, politics and society is constructed and mediated. And more than this,
language is art; it displays, conveys, and indeed provokes human emotion. It is so much
more (or so much less) than data.
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Yet what is to be done about this from within the system? As scholars and researchers
have shown (Kitchin 2017, Pasquale 2015), attempting to critique or explain any system or
platform that functions with the use of proprietary algorithms is difficult and problematic.
The workings of capital generating algorithmic systems such as Facebook and Google are
closely guarded ‘black-boxed’ trade secrets. In addition to this, tweaks, a/b testing, and
other personalisations such as geolocation (Zook and Graham 2007), can also make it hard
to research objectively. It is today surely almost impossible to conduct critical research
into, or with the help of digital technology without somehow utilising - consciously or
unconsciously - the very structures we seek to critique.
This thesis acknowledges these methodical hurdles, and instead takes a different approach
in order to make visible the workings and politics of the algorithmic systems of linguistic
capitalism through provocation and artistic intervention. As Louise Amoore points out,
we should ‘be sceptical of claims about ‘opening the black box’ of the algorithm in or-
der to have some kind of accountability... we must begin instead from notions of opacity
and partiality’ (2018). Citing Donna Haraway’s call to ‘stay with the trouble’, Amoore
suggests that the opacity of algorithmic forms of governing might best be punctured with
‘partial accounts’ (Haraway 2016, Amoore 2017). Haraway’s concept of ‘situated knowl-
edge’ (1988) is a theme I explore further in relation to the political economy of Google
Adwords and alongside Freidrich Hayek’s ‘knowledge problem’ in Chapter 6.
Acknowledging the value of ‘situated’ and ‘partial’ accounts, I am therefore purposefully
making my critical stance from within the master’s house (Lorde 2012). As Audre Lorde’s
famous feminist provocation goes, ‘the master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s
house’, a metaphor that brilliantly conveys the frustrations of resistance from within a
racist and patriarchal society, and which I think illuminates some of the problems of resis-
tance and agency within today’s systems of digital capitalism. If the only tools available
for critique and resistance (and tools can mean anything from actions, to theories and
words), belong to whatever system of control or governance you are trying to resist, then
they are in effect useless, or dis-armed; ineffective at breaking down the systems and
structures to which they belong. And further to this, anything you do construct with
those tools will necessarily become part of those same structures of power; vulnerable to
co-option and re-enrollment into the very systems you were trying to dismantle. My ap-
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proach to this paradox of resistance is to overtly work from within the system, exploiting
Google’s platforms as much as possible (in unofficial harvesting of data from Google’s
AdWords platform), acknowledging my own part in the process, and ultimately trying to
turn the system and its algorithms back on itself, or as Mahnke and Uprichard suggest,
‘algorithming the algorithm’ (2014). As explained in Chapter 3, this is a method I have
called a ‘post-digital auto-ethnography’. My project thus seeks to explore the power and
influence that Google has over the tools we are increasingly coerced and drawn into using
in order to communicate and function, and to expose the potentially serious consequences
this linguistic power has within society and the wider discourse. In doing so, I plan to
chip away at the master’s house from within, hoping that the more people who see and
understand the structural problems it has, the more people will choose not to visit it, or at
least will do so with a heightened awareness of the political and cultural power embedded
in its foundations.
As already mentioned, there are broad conceptual themes that thread through this project,
those of context, value, and circulation. Before I move on to my research questions, I want
to briefly set out what I mean by these terms, and what work I see them doing in work-
ing towards a theoretical and practical conclusion to the thesis. ‘Context’ in this sense
is deployed as both a linguistic device which might alter or construct broader narratives
poetically or politically, but also in a more physical sense, as in the way data (and in
particular the data that represents language, which I refer to as linguistic data) is sorted,
moved and constructed in digital spaces. ‘Circulation’ thus refers to the actual movement
of this linguistic data around these spaces, be it a word going into a search bar, or an email
being sent and received. As the thesis argues, the circulation of linguistic data is both a
political, and an economic issue. The movement of words around the web (be it search
results, spam, or news stories) is the main driver of success in an age of digital capitalism,
so circulation in this way also refers to the movement of linguistic data as commodities
embedded within new political economies. Circulation and context are then intrinsically
linked, and in the context of this project combine to determine the ‘value’ of language
within the new political economy of digital - or more specifically - linguistic capitalism.
The thesis therefore rests on the tension between the value of language as a data-ised and
movable commodity, and the value of language as a means of artistic expression, emotion,
or human narrative and communicative agency. It is not my intention in this thesis to
valorise artistic, or poetic language, or indeed any particular form of language above an-
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other, but instead to make visible how in an age of algorithmic reproduction, the economic
value of language has become the overriding mediator of the flow of digital information,
which has potentially detrimental effects on other types of linguistic value. As I argue in
the thesis, when these different types of value clash, there are significant social, political
and economic consequences.
Having explained the central themes and frameworks, I now want to set out the 3 main
research questions they will help to focus on answering in the thesis:
1. How is language affected by digitisation/datafication, monetisation and algorithmic
processing (broadly speaking the system of linguistic capitalism), and what social and
political effects/consequences does that have?
2. What are the difficulties of studying/critiquing language mediated by digital technolo-
gies?
3. What can be done to expose, mitigate, or resist the effects of linguistic capitalism? Is
it possible to resist/intervene?
1.4 Thesis outline
With the motives and aims of this thesis outlined in Chapter 1, in Chapter 2 I conduct
a wide-reaching review of the literature relating to language in the age of algorithmic
reproduction. Because of the interdisciplinary nature of the subject, this review ranges
from geography, political economy and the social sciences, to media studies and the digital
humanities. Following on from that, Chapter 3 will detail the methods I have used, but
as the intervention part of my thesis has been somewhat of an adventure and has relied
upon both ethnographic and auto-ethnographic approaches and interactivity with audi-
ences and colleagues, the chapter also draws insight from the methods I chose not to use,
or indeed, accidentally stumbled upon. The ethnographic method and the subjectivities
of researching digital technology is further complicated by its entanglement with binaries
such as the digital and the analogue, human and machine. It is with these critical and
existential subjectivities in mind, that I set out the overall rationale for my methodology,
which I am calling a ‘post-digital (auto)ethnography’ of the lived experiences and agencies
of language in the age of algorithmic reproduction.
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Chapter 4 puts forward the concept of ‘Geographies of (con)text’ to explain and critique
the effects of the physical constructs and constraints of language on the web. Imagining a
landscape of words as opposed to a landscape of code (Thrift & French, 2002), language-
as-data becomes material in ways very different from both print and spoken word; its
physicality represented in bits, bytes and circuitry, and its limits and variations mediated
and governed by the processes which order, sort, move and index it. I argue that because
of their reproducibility and enhanced means of dissemination, digitised words can have
paratextual - and often political - agencies and excesses beyond their linguistic function.
The chapter uses examples of online search, dictionaries and digital translation to show
the wider impact and consequences of how language is (de)constructed on the web, also
drawing on (post)structuralist theories of language and information.
In Chapter 5 I will be exploring what exactly ‘Language in the Age of Algorithmic Repro-
duction’ is, asking questions such as who/what reads and writes the words we find online,
how and why is content created, and in particular, what is the role Google and the Search
Engine industry has in mediating language. The chapter draws on research conducted on
an SEO training course, and uses Walter Benjamin’s ‘Work of Art’ essay as a theoretical
lens through which to examine how language has changed in the face of digital technology,
arguing that there is a hidden politics and power behind algorithmically reproduced lan-
guage which has been aestheticised (following Benjamin) by Google’s ubiquity and reach
within the digital economy.
Chapter 6 examines the ‘Political Economy of Google AdWords’, critiquing the economic
assumptions and credentials of the system of linguistic capitalism as described by Ka-
plan (2014), which are often adopted by Google itself as justifications for its workings.
Questioning the capitalist ideologies and credentials of the term, and the algorithmic and
market-based logics that purport to drive it, the chapter enrols Friedrich Hayek’s theories
of market governance to unravel the complicated political economy of Google’s AdWords
market, arguing that algorithmic price mechanisms cannot produce the information needed
for the efficient market governance, but rather that they have initiated a new form of al-
gorithmic governance. The chapter also draws on empirical data I have gathered from
Google AdWords and examines how ‘linguistic capitalism’ (Kaplan 2014) impacts on the
political sphere.
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Putting forward political and literary provocations and potential methods of intervention
and resistance, Chapters 7 (provocation & intervention) and 8 (resistance) draw together
all the strands presented thus far about the value gained and lost by language as it circu-
lates through digital spaces and between changing contexts. Drawing on literary sources
which have provided fictional warnings about the authoritarian restriction of language,
in particular George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four, this pair of chapters foreground my
approach to a critical digital humanities, in that it reverses the power dynamic inherent
in much digital critique, harnessing the power of language and literature to analyse digital
technology, rather than the other way around.
Chapter 7 introduces and documents the development of my own artistic intervention,
called {poem}.py, which uses code, poetry and data gathered from Google AdWords to
calculate the price of poems fed through the Google keyword planner. The monetised
poems are then printed out as analogue receipts and displayed as art, thus destabilising
the market logics of digitised language, reclaiming it from the algorithmic marketplace,
repoliticising it (following Benjamin), and returning it to art. The chapter thus aims
to expose and make visible the workings of linguistic capitalism, while also asking wider
questions around language, art and critique in a digital age.
Chapter 8 continues the discussion of my {poem}.py intervention, but specifically doc-
uments the difficulties, hurdles and resistant technologies I encountered along the way.
The chapter thus explores how linguistic capitalism resists examination, but also how it
can itself be resisted by artistic and theoretical critique and intervention. Inspired by the
creative power of literature, the chapter also puts forward the concept of ‘Subprime Lan-
guage’ as a way to theorise language in the age of algorithmic reproduction, and includes
an original piece of speculative fiction which imagines a world in which the unfettered
circulation of monetised language has catastrophic consequences for its value and context
within human society.
In chapter 9, I will conclude by drawing together the threads from each chapter, addressing
my research questions, and detailing some ideas for future work.
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Chapter 2
POSITIONING LANGUAGE IN
THE AGE OF ALGORITHMIC
REPRODUCTION
2.1 Introduction
This chapter reviews the existing literature relating to an examination of language in
the age of algorithmic reproduction. The review necessarily spans, and links together, a
expansive array of disciplinary fields, from software studies, critical data and algorithm
studies, political, human and digital geographies, linguistics and economics, to computer
and data science and new media, E-Literature, literary theory and digital humanities.
Much of the literature I review (especially the work on digital technologies), is cross
disciplinary in nature, so I will organise the next section into four groupings: Language
& Capital, Critiques of Google, The Politics and Geographies of Big Data & Algorithms,
and New Media & Digital Humanities.
2.2 Language
Weaponised by centuries of successive invasions and colonisations, and manipulated by re-
pressive regimes or systems of governance (Ji 2004; Golumbia 2009), language has always
been a tool of power (Joseph 2006; Fairclough 2001, 2013). Language in this way is always
capable of potentially devastating political and societal physical and discursive effects,
which gives an extraordinary amount of power to those who have control over it. While
this critique of linguistic power is not new, especially in as relates to post-structuralist
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and post-modernist theory and feminist literary criticism (Lyotard 1984; Jameson 1974;
Cixous 1976; Derrida 1976; Foucault 1972, 2012; Haraway 1991; Bourdieu 1991), what is
new in today’s digital age is the manner in which language is processed by algorithms, as
monetisable data, and exploited by the big tech monopolies that control the Web and act
as the gatekeepers of the world’s information.
Changing technologies have of course always had an affect on language in terms of the
manner of dissemination of the written word, which, as Walter Benjamin’s ‘Work of Art’
essay demonstrates, can take a piece of art (be it an inscription, painting or sculpture),
and facilitate its movement into both the economic and the political sphere. As Benjamin
notes, the advent of the printing press, and the subsequent logistical advancements that
facilitated the spread of the written word around the world (or at least the Empire), had
significant effects on society in terms of the public’s ability to consume and to contribute
to popular discourse. The printing press really was an ‘agent of change’ in political and
scientific terms since the fifteenth century (Eisenstein 1980), and indeed for Benedict An-
derson, print capitalism was a major factor in the creation of ‘imagined communities’ and
the rise of nationalism (Anderson 2006).
But moving on from the printing press, digital technology has delivered another seismic
shift in how language is used and the effects it can have, as addressed by work in linguistic
anthropology (Kockelman 2010, 2014) and the philosophy of technology (Stiegler 2015,
Coeckelbergh 2017). The algorithmic reproduction of language by reduction and recon-
struction through binary code has consequences for the integrity and evolution of language
and discourse which reach far beyond the relative stability of a printing press cliche´. Print
capitalism may, as Anderson wrote, have given ‘a new fixity to language’ (2006: 46), but
digitised language is far more lucrative, and far less stable, and it is in this flux of money
and words that new forms of power and influence flourish (see also Lyotard 1984). Mer-
cedes Bunz draws on Habermas to call this new environment a digital public sphere (2013).
The viral spreading of Fake News in the run up to the US Presidential election in 2016 was
largely funded by digital advertising systems (Graham 2017), and is a clear example of the
impact the language disseminated online can have, as are the ‘nudging’ effects of Facebook
newsfeeds on voting behaviours (Tufekci 2015). Likewise, stereotypes and prejudices are
compounded by confirmation bias in auto-completions and auto-predictions, and as the
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minds of criminals are moulded by what they see on a Google search results page (Noble
2018; Baker & Potts 2013), or on social media (Tufekci 2015). The actionable effects of the
words disseminated online through platforms such as Google and Facebook are now taken
so seriously that both companies have been under considerable governmental pressure to
combat fake news and hate speech, which I elaborate on in more detail in Chapter 6.
2.2.1 Language and capital
In terms of the history of the phrase ‘linguistic capitalism’ itself, Frederic Kaplan did not
coin it with his critique AdWords’ effect on language. Indeed, it was used as far back
as the 1970s to push back against the corruption of language through advertising. In
his book ‘Words in Time: a Social History of the English Vocabulary’ (1989), Geoffrey
Hughes in particular refers to the advertising industry’s effect on language as ‘verbicidal
massacre’ (1989: 177), noting how certain words could be appropriated as brand names
for advertising purposes, and could be exploited by either their removal from their orig-
inal context, or their forcible insertion in to another (see also Ding 2017; Jhally 2014) .
Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of Linguistic Capital (1991), while it does not refer directly to
advertising, recognised that linguistic privilege through, for example, knowledge of foreign
languages, is directly linked to political economy through systems of education (1991: 57).
In the 1990s, the Italian post-Fordist school of philosophers of technology and economics
highlighted the links between language and capital in the post-industrial workplace. Schol-
ars such as Christian Marazzi and Franco ‘Bifo’ Berardi began to recognise the new role of
communication on the production line and in the market place, and the direct link between
language and labour (Marazzi 2008, 2011; Berardi 2012). Meanwhile, Matteo Pasquinelli
developed ideas on language and capital in relation to emerging digital technologies such
as Google in what he called ‘cognitive capitalism’ (2009; see also Moulier Boutang 2011).
Pasquinelli saw that in an era of digital advertising, we, as users of these new technolo-
gies, our data, our attention and our labour had all in some way become commodities
(Pasquinelli 2009, see also Mager 2012; , Nixon 2016). In a direct link to the 2008 Global
Financial Crisis, Appadurai’s ‘Banking on Words’ (2015) argues that the 2008 crash was
a ‘failure of language’ facilitated by the new role of language in the marketplace. By this,
Appadurai was talking about language of finance, and the words used to perform finance,
as having derivative value (see also Martin 2013; Amoore 2011; Wark 2017). In such a
way words become promissory notes, or contracts, which he says systematically and conta-
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giously failed to deliver. The Global Financial Crisis was also the catalyst for Franco ‘Bifo’
Berardi’s provocations in his book ‘The Uprising: On Poetry and Finance’ (2012). Berardi
uses Kaplan’s ideas on linguistic capitalism and Google AdWords to claim that ‘the econ-
omy is the new universal grammar’, and suggests that in an era of financial insolvency,
an insistence on linguistic insolvency is the only way to counter these forces of capitalised
technologies; an idea which resonates with the artistic intervention part of my own thesis.
The concept of linguistic capitalism is also explored by Bernard Steigler in relation to
wider questions around algorithmic governmentality and the ‘automatic society’ (2015),
and by Warren Sack in relation to the spatial make up of digital text (2017), which are
areas I engage with in more detail in Chapters 6 and 4 respectively. Other academic liter-
ature that directly addresses linguistic capitalism and Google AdWords, includes Richard
Graham’s (2017) recent article in which he stresses the epistemic importance of Google’s
role in mediating online discourse, and particularly in light of the fake news debate, but
is theoretically derivative of the Post-Fordist approach to digital capitalism. Some of the
most incisive critiques of the social and political power of Google AdWords come from
the artist and academic Christophe Bruno, whose work has been a great influence to me.
Bruno’s interventions into what he called ‘generalized semantic capitalism’ were a very
early - and accurate - warning of the power inherent in Google’s monetisation of language.
On the website of his 2002 ‘AdWords Happening’, in which he made up poems as adverts
to try to subvert the advertising system, Bruno warned readers to ‘imagine the day when
a search engine will rule the whole textual content of the web, in which the memory of
mankind will be stored. Think of the power in their hands.’
In a chapter on ‘Google: Words Beyond Grammar’, art critic and philosopher Boris Groys
describes the Google search engine as a ‘philosophical machine’ which has become the
primary mediator of ‘our dialogue with the world’ (2016: 147). While I would agree with
Google’s dialogical role, Groys sees the way the search engine processes and decontextu-
alises language as a quasi-utopian liberation from the constraints of grammar: ‘Google
dissolves all discourses by turning them into the word clouds which function as collections
of words beyond grammar’ (2016: 149). What Groys’ analysis of Google fails to recognise
is that, far from enjoying ‘extragrammatical freedom’, language as processed by Google
is constrained and quantified by other grammars, i.e. what Berardi calls the ‘grammar of
the digital economy’ (see above). Groys also sees in the linguistic melting pot of the search
engine a kind of philosophical short cut to knowledge: ‘Accordingly, true knowledge as
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such is understood as a sum of all the occurrences of all the words of all the languages
through which humankind currently operates’ (2016: 148). Not only does this approach
not take into account the hidden market forces and other ranking and censorship factors
that affect search engine results, but it also credits Google with some of the knowledge
producing ability I discuss in Chapter 6. It is this optimistic view of Google as a ‘philo-
sophical machine’ that Rebecca Goldstein so brilliantly critiques in her pastiche ‘Plato at
the Googleplex’, where she imagines Plato coming back from the past for an author’s talk
at the Googleplex in Mountain View. Still in his toga, and oblivious to any of the new
technologies around him, Plato is at first in awe of the search engine as the sum of all
knowledge, before being horrified that this knowledge engine, which he thinks holds the
keys for the answers of so many philosophical dilemmas is in fact used ‘for the insignificant
aim of making money’ (2014: 72), leading him to conclude that it is not ‘knowledge’ at all
that can be gleaned from the search engine, but merely information. These are questions
I address in detail in Chapter 6, with reference to Freidrich Hayek’s knowledge problem
and market governance (1945), and also Donna Haraway’s concept of situated knowledge
(1988).
The political economy of search engines has also been a direct subject of research in work
from Van Couvering (2004), Fuchs (2011), and Feuz e.al (2011). Rather than ‘linguistic
capitalism’, however, Feuz et al.’s paper on ‘Semantic Capitalism’ (2011) is an experiment
with personalisation and Google search, which, although not directly concerned with Ad-
Words, explores the epistemic effects of the capitalisation of the search engine.
More generally, several scholars have engaged with the wider effects of emerging digital
economies not limited to Google or indeed language. McKenzie Wark’s ‘Hacker Manifesto’
(2004) is an early warning cry about the power held by what he calls the ‘vectoralists’; the
technologically privileged classes who control and commodify the flow of information on
the Web. Nick Srnicek’s more recent book on ‘Platform Capitalism’ (2016) (see also Lang-
ley 2017) provides a solid overview of a range of technologies and their political economies,
as do Christian Fuchs & Vincent Mosco in ‘Marx in the age of digital capitalism’ (2015),
and Ezrachi, & Stucke in ‘Virtual Competition’ (2016) (see also Bratton 2016 and Pasquale
2015 for further critiques of the governing structural and economic architectures of the
Web). Mark Poster’s early work in internet studies also exposed the political implications
of language and culture subjected to economically driven digital technologies. In his 2001
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book ‘What’s the Matter with the Internet’, Poster suggested that capitalism had taken
a ‘linguistic turn’, with language becoming private property, and information no longer
free: ‘What was previously celebrated as spirit, the highest human aspiration, is now for
sale as ı¨ntellectual property”’ (2001: 39-40).
2.3 Critiques of Google
Since Google first launched in 1998 it has spawned an enormous amount of academic lit-
erature in fields such as marketing and business studies (Jansen 2008; Turnbull & Bright
2008) ,legal studies (Grimmelmann 2008; Tan 2009) and computer science (Mehta et al.
2007; Langville & Meyer 2011; Ferragina & Venturini 2013; Bolukbasi et al. 2016; Caliskan
et al. 2017) , as well as the raft of popular literature either warning the public about (Bat-
telle 2011; Pariser 2011; Vaidhyanathan 2012; Rushkoff 2016), or promoting the virtues of
the magnitude of Google’s achievements and enterprise (Levy 2011; Schmidt & Rosenberg
2014) . In addition to this are the thousands of popular books and articles that prop
up the Search Engine Optimisation (SEO) industry, and are indeed critical in informing
the public discourse and perceived opinion about the workings of Google, a phenomena I
explore in greater depth in Chapters 5 and 6.
In terms of critical academic research specifically into the power and effects of Google’s
search engine, one of the first responses was Introna and Nissenbaum’s prescient paper on
the politics of search engines (2000) in which they tried to make sense of the then rapidly
emerging phenomena of the search engine, stressing the crucial importance of maintaining
some kind of control over its already visible power and influence. They anticipated the
commodification of information which online search effected, and also its situatedness in
and power over the market, and called for public oversight of search engine operation (see
also Hinman 2008 ) and transparency and disclosure of the algorithms. Elizabeth Van
Couvering’s PhD research (2004, 2007, 2010) on search engine bias was also an important
early examination of the field. But what these early researchers of search technology did
not anticipate was that one search engine would quickly gain a monopoly, not only of
search, but of the market forces and political weight inscribed within it. In 2018, Google
had a search engine market share of 92.51% in the UK, 88.6% in the US, and 93.65% in
Europe (Statcounter 2019), and with its ever growing portfolio of interconnected platforms
such as Google+, GMail, AdWords and AdSense, it is now one of the most dominant play-
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ers in the global digital economy.
Since Introna and Nissenbaum’s paper, the verb ‘to Google’ has entered the vernacular,
Google apps, schemes and projects have expanded to mapping the world, digitising its lit-
erature, keeping its secrets, anticipating its questions, and even driving its cars. Google has
become indispensable, and all of this with a lack of transparency so subtle that most people
don’t care or think to question its motives, accuracy or objectivity, let alone its political
implications or the potential effects it is having on wider society (Ko¨nig & Rasch 2014;
Fuchs 2015; Halavais 2017). If in the past there was a certain degree of apathy towards
the purely commercial nature of potential search engine bias in industry and academia
(Van Couvering 2010), the prominence of the search engine in social, cultural, ontological
and epistemological ways, as well as a producer of opinion, has certainly changed that and
has galvanised the academy into critical exploration.
2.3.1 Stop searching, start questioning
The bias within Google Search is well documented (Introna & Nissenbaum 2000; Granka
2010; Stalder & Mayer 2009; Van Couvering 2010; Gillespie 2014; Noble 2013, 2018), as
is the power the company holds (Diaz 2008; Fuchs 2011; Shaw & Graham 2017; Mager
2012; Rogers 2009). Many of the early critiques of web search (some of which have
already featured in this review individually) are to be found in Spink & Zimmer’s Web
Search: Interdisciplinary Perspectives (2008), in Becker & Stalder’s 2009 edited collection
‘Deep search: The Politics of Search Engines beyond Google’ and in Hillis, Jarrett, &
Petit’s ‘Google and the Culture of Search’ (2013). All of these collections were important
critical interventions into the emerging power and politics of web search in general, and in
particular, Google’s growing search empire. In a similar vein, but drawing out more of the
underlying economics behind Google, the Institute of Network Cultures’ edited reader ‘The
Society of the Query’ (2014), is based around papers given at an eponymous conference
in 2009 which was given the tagline ‘Stop searching, start questioning’. The book draws
theoretically on Guy Debord’s 1967 Situationist critique of the capitalist spectacle (2016),
and pulls together critical and creative work on Google, as well as potential solutions,
interventions and alternatives. Although she does not focus on the economies of advertising
that fuel and fund the search engine, or indeed the more technical side, Safiya Umoji
Noble’s more recent book ‘Algorithms of Oppression’ (2018) is an important study of the
gendered and racialised stereotypes embedded within Google search results (see also Noble
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2013; Baker & Potts 2013; Olofsson 2015; Jobin & Glassey 2014).
2.4 The politics and geographies of big data & algorithms
Since the early studies of Google and its political side effects and biases, there has been a
huge amount of research into the digital technologies on which companies like Google and
Facebook operate, in particular the concepts of (big) data, and the algorithm.
2.4.1 Data
My thesis asks what are the consequences of turning words into data, and more specifi-
cally, what are the consequences of turning words into data when data is, as many have
suggested, a highly lucrative new raw material of the digital age, which generates captial
as it moves through digital spaces. Data is (arguably) the new oil (The Economist 2017;
BBC News 2017); ready to be mined, extracted, processed and monetised. And just like
those who control the extraction and circulation of raw materials like coal and oil are
in possession of huge wealth and power, the companies that control data today, such as
Google, Amazon, and Apple, are also the wealthiest and most powerful companies in the
world, providing services on which we become more dependant every day. Not only is
this a worrying geographic distribution of power which mirrors historic colonial western
dominance of trade and information (Thatcher et al. 2016), but the power which comes
with the ownership and exploitation of data becomes critically important when it comes
to precisely what that data represents. Much of it is highly valuable personal data, har-
vested from search queries, browsing habits, online purchases, social media interactions,
email communications and geolocations, for example, often without the users knowledge,
or at the very least wrapped up as the negligible and normalised consequences of free
software packages, tools, apps or platforms. When data represents such personal details,
the control over it becomes a political and social issue.
The merits and perils of big data, perhaps first articulated on a popular level by Chris
Anderson in his 2008 Wired piece ‘The End of Theory: The Data Deluge makes Scientific
Method Obsolete’, have been areas of intense academic interest in recent years, across
the disciplines. Kate Crawford’s work on ‘The Hidden Biases in Big Data’ (2013), is par-
ticularly important in highlighting the social inequalities and lacunae within harvested
datasets (see also boyd & Crawford 2012 and Thatcher & Dalton’s call for Critical Data
Studies 2014). Providing a critical exploration of the politics and ethics of data and data
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infrastructures, Rob Kitchin’s book ‘The Data Revolution’ (2014), conceptualises a critical
framework for understanding and researching the rapidly increasing amount of data avail-
able in today’s society, while others seek to address the ethics of information and data
from broader philosophical (Floridi 1999, 2001), and scientific (Floridi & Taddeo 2016,
Mittelstadt & Floridi 2016) angles. As well as posing significant questions in relation to
security (de Goede 2018; Aradau & Blanke 2015, 2017; Amoore 2006, 2014, 2017; Amoore
& de Goede 2012; Crampton 2015; Leszczynski & Crampton 2016) and privacy (Powles
2017; de Goede 2014; Graham & Wood 2003, Wood & Graham 2006; Zuboff 2016), the ac-
cumulation and analysis of big data can also affect the way we perceive the world (Halpern
2015, Amoore 2016), reflecting hidden colonial legacies (Thatcher et al. 2016), and tech-
nological (Kwan 2016; O’Neill 2017), social (Tufekci 2014) and geographical inequalities
(Wilmott 2016; Wilson 2011).
2.4.2 Algorithms
In terms of the literature surrounding algorithms, as Thatcher and Dalton’s call for ‘Criti-
cal Algorithm Studies’ (2014) states, algorithms need to be studied as best and as critically
as we can, not just as technical, but as political, cultural and social issues. The power
embedded in the algorithmic processing of data has been a widely explored topic across
the disciplines. Drawing on Scott Lash’s work on ‘Power after Hegemony’ (2007), soci-
ologist David Beer was amongst the first to critically question the inherent power of the
algorithm, and the apparent democratising, empowering, and inclusive rhetoric of Web
2.0 technologies and social media (Beer 2009; see also Goffey 2008; Neyland 2014). A
2013 conference in New York on ‘Governing Algorithms’ spawned a large amount of work
on the emerging issue of the algorithm from a wide range of disciplinary perspectives.
Many of the papers and the articles which resulted from that conference feature in this
review, but particularly pertinent reflections on algorithms and their industrial logistical
heritage (Poon 2013), and the affect of algorithms on language (Gitelman 2013), were
contained in responses given to those papers, and were an important and formative part
of my own early thinking on this thesis. It was Poon’s concept of the algorithm as the
modern transporter of raw material/data, combined with Gitelman’s reflections on how
linguistic data is constructed/written with algorithmic, rather than human logics in mind,
that first brought to my mind Walter Benjamin’s ‘Work of Art’ essay, with its questions
about the mobility of art and literature in new economic markets and political spheres.
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The authoritarian and controlling potential of algorithmic systems has now been given
its own terminology, referred to across the disciplines as ‘algorithmic governance’ (Just &
Latzer 2017; Yeung 2018; Halavais 2017), ‘algorithmic governmentality’ (Rouvroy 2013), or
as ‘algocracy’ (Danaher 2016, see also Aneesh 2006, 2009), while the wider power in quan-
tification through computational and statistical methods has been thoroughly researched
by Golumbia (2009); Beer (2016), Totaro & Ninno (2014) and Cathy O’Neill (2017). Paul
Dourish (2016), Ted Striphas (2015) and Nick Seaver (2017) have highlighted the impact
of algorithms on (and as) culture , while Ananny (2016), Mittelstadt et al. (2016) have
turned their attention towards the ethics of algorithms. It is to these newly identified
critiques of the governing power and potential of algorithmically processed data that I
will be turning in my own critique, but with the explicit focus on linguistic data and on
the algorithms that facilitate Google’s search and advertising technologies. Although, as
I have shown, much work has been done in relation ‘the Google algorithm’, but my thesis
goes deeper in its exploration of the granular structuring and capitalisation of linguistic
data by these algorithmic systems of governance.
2.4.3 Digital geographies
In the discipline of Geography, the work on all things ‘digital’, broadly defined under the
auspices of ‘digital geographies’ (Ash et al. (2016); Wilson 2018), does not only cover the
impact that technologies have had on physical space, place and society (Zook & Graham
2007, Leszczynski & Crampton 2016), but is also amongst some of the earliest academic
literature in the social sciences to explore concepts such as ‘virtual’ and ‘cyber’ spaces
(Crampton 2002, 2003; Zook & Graham 2007), and the materialities of digital technolo-
gies (Kinsley 2013). The geographical approach has also facilitated a wide range of research
into the spaces of computation themselves (Amoore 2016; also Straube 2016 on topological
space), and their co-constitution with physical spaces (Kitchin & Dodge 2011; Graham et
al. 2015; Thrift & French 2002; Shaw & Graham 2017), which links in with other archival
approaches to digital technologies such as Media Archaeology (Parikka 2013) and digi-
tal architectures (Carpo 2011). Warren Sack’s article ‘Out of Bounds: Language limits,
language planning, and the definition of distance in the new spaces of linguistic capi-
talism’ (2017) provides a semi-technical exploration of the ‘language spaces’ of digitised
text. Although Sack’s article is an exploration of language in terms of the differences
and distances between form and meaning, or as Sack writes, ‘the concerns of syntax from
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those of semantics’ and also draws on Kaplan’s concept of Google’s linguistic capitalism,
it is more concerned with the intricacies of Chomskyan linguistics and pedagogy than with
what the political and social consequences of linguistic capitalism might be. The crossover
between software studies and geography is a set of literature that has been particularly
useful in developing the concepts of context and reproduction in my thesis, but which I
address specifically in terms of the physical and discursive constructs and consequences of
language in a digital age.
2.5 New media and digital humanities
While the economics and politics of algorithms, data and digital technology might gen-
erally be thought of in (social) scientific terms, with more technical work in the fields
of Computational Social Science, Software Studies and Science and Technology Studies
(STS) sitting alongside Digital Sociology, Digital Geographies and Digital Anthropology
(as detailed in previous sections above), there are several strands of scholarship within the
humanities that also provide a range of critical and creative responses. Drawing together
concepts of language and data in a digital age, matters of linguistic structure and context,
and the economics and politics of technology, are the relatively new fields of E-Literature,
New Media, and the Digital Humanities.
2.5.1 (Critical) digital humanities
There are of course other fields of research within data science that cross over into hu-
manities based areas, such as Natural Language Processing (NLP) and Computational
Linguistics. Studies emanating from these fields can be useful in terms of understanding
the mechanics of digital technologies, for example two recent studies on word embeddings
in vector space, which reveal how stereotypes and biases appear in large data sets such as
search engines (Caliskan et al. 2017; Bolukbasi et al. 2016). However, they can often be
frustratingly uncritical of the potential consequences of the manipulation of data, and also
in their treatment of its provenance, as shown by a recent analysis of the Urban Dictionary
by data scientists at the Alan Turing Institute who claimed to ‘make sense’ of the project,
but failed to acknowledge its problematic racial history (Nguyen et al. 2018).
The discipline of the Digital Humanities has to a certain extent grown out of the logics of
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data science and computation, in that many Digital Humanities departments at univer-
sities grew out of need to provide support across the disciplines, and particularly in the
social sciences and humanities, for researchers using new digital methods to enhance the
scope of their work. As such, what we might call the ‘traditional’ Digital Humanities has
drawn criticism from scholars wary of the uncritical use of computational methods when it
comes to trying to make sense of language, for example Lisa Gitelman and Paul Edwards’
edited collection ‘Raw Data is an Oxymoron’ (2013; see also Bowker & Star 2000 on the
power of classification). Likewise, Stephen Marche’s passionate essay ‘Literature is not
Data: Against Digital Humanities’ (2012) insists that ‘insight’ remains the preserve of
humans, not data (see also Kirschenbaum 2014). Some scholars have highlighted the need
for a ‘critical digital humanities’ (Berry 2017, see also Liu 2012), recognising the radical
potential of digital humanities to question power (Posner 2015) and digital capitalism
(Grimshaw 2018). As I will explain in the next chapter, my methodology for this thesis
is very much aligned with the idea of ‘critical’ digital humanities. Instead of using digital
tools and technologies to analyse literature, art, or other creative texts, I turn the emotive
and communicative power of language back around, and use literature and art as a way
of analysing, making visible, and pushing back against the political power of digital tools
and technologies.
2.5.2 (New) media
Although studies of media, information and communication reach back to classical times,
they necessarily update with changes and advances in technology (Kittler 1999; Stiegler
1998; Manovich 2001; Gitelman 2006; Berry & Dieter 2015). As the title of my thesis
suggests, ‘algorithmic reproduction’ of language, can be seen as the next step on from the
‘mechanical reproduction’ of language and art that Benjamin, Adorno and other members
of the Frankfurt School were examining in their critiques of culture and politics in the
1930s (Adorno 2005). The title of the thesis is a deliberate play on Walter Benjamin’s
The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction, and as such uses the essay as
a theoretical frame on which to hang my arguments about the digital and algorithmic
processing of language, and about potential ways to mitigate the linguistic and political
consequences of this new mediation by harnessing the power of creativity and art.
Examination, and indeed production of ‘new’ media today, is fairly variable in the extent
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to which it engages with the politics and economics of digital technology. Just as with
Digital Humanities projects, aspects of digital art and E-Literature can sometimes be seen
as uncritical of the tools and methods they use, as many have recognised (see O’Gorman
2006 on E-Crit; also Hoy 2006; Liu 2012; Berry 2014; Fuller & Goffey 2009; Berry &
Fagerjord 2017; Bartscherer & Coover 2011; Cayley 2017). More specifically in relation to
language and literature, N. Katherine Hayles provides a helpful balance between the cre-
ative and the critical in Electronic Literature (2008), tempering possibilities of digitally
enabled literature with critical literary theory and software politics. Hayles highlights
the residue of old media structures in the mediation of new languages, both literal and
computational (2010), as well as the foregrounding the relationship between database and
narrative in digital texts, and the importance of the interface in the production of meaning
(2012; see also Manovich 2001; Galloway 2012; Anderson & Pold 2011, 2018 on the agency
of the interface). Flowing through all of Hayles’ work are questions about the place and
agency of the (post)human and the machine in digital media, texts, and information (2008,
2012; see also Braidotti on ‘Posthuman Humanities’ 2013). Fuller & Goffey’s explorations
into ‘Evil Media’ (2009, 2012), Finn Brunton’s work on ‘Spam’ (2013), and Brunton &
Nissenbaum’s call for ‘Obfuscation’ of digital data (2015) also provide interesting studies
into human and machine mediations of digitised language, as do Parikka and Sampson
(eds.) in their exploration into ‘Viruses, Porn, and Other Anomalies from the Dark Side
of Digital Culture’ (2009).
In terms of what actually constitutes art and literature in the digital era, Berry & Dieter’s
edited collection on ‘Postdigital Aesthetics: Art, Computation and Design’ (2015) contains
several contributions that question the nature and enmeshings of pre/post digital media
and art (Cramer 2015), in particular the chapters by Anderson & Pold, and Paul &
Levy (2015), which theorise and question the artist James Bridle’s concept of the ‘New
Aesthetic’ (2011). Bridle’s work suggests that new ways of seeing/reading and being
seen/read in digital and physical spaces as mediated by digital technologies has produced
a new kind of aesthetics (see also Contreras & Mirocha 2016). Trevor Paglan’s artistic
representations into what machines or algorithms see and read also speak to these same
theories of post-digital aesthetics, bringing to the fore the asymmetries of vision, spatial
control and the politics of digital technologies (2016; see also Zach Blas 2016). Artist
and critic Hito Steyerl takes this critique of digital art a step further, presenting the
provocation that with the political, societal and economic inequalities and iniquities of
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the modern age, all art is now compromised by virtue of its immersion in proprietary
technologies. According to Steyerl, art can never be entirely ‘duty free’ (2017), which is
one of the problems my own artistic intervention into digital technology also grapples with
(see also Vanderbeeken et al. 2011 and Mould 2018).
2.6 Conclusion
In the above sections I have attempted to review the literature relating to my thesis across
a range of disciplines from arts and humanities, to the social sciences, digital geography,
economics, linguistics, sociology and politics, and data sciences. I want now to bring back
into focus why I started this project, which was the realisation that although language
has always been a site of asymmetric political, geographic and cultural power, in an age
of algorithmic reproduction, that power, and the inequalities and biases embedded within
it, has been magnified and compounded by innovations in digital technology and connec-
tivity and by the all-consuming influence of the digital economy. Exploring ‘Language
in the Age of Algorithmic Reproduction’ means engaging with many current debates on
(big) data and algorithms, but my thesis takes a distinctly different, and perhaps radical
approach. My thesis posits language, or the representation of language as data (Fuller
& Goffey 2009, 2012; Thornton 2017), and the algorithmic means by which it is pro-
cessed, not only as issues pertinent to aesthetic concepts of literature and culture, but
also as highly political issues, both by virtue of their embeddedness in the contemporary
digital economy and because language is historically such a powerful tool of control of
people and places. I argue that when language becomes algorithmically processed data,
it becomes just as valuable, lucrative and powerful as the other digital data that medi-
ate and increasingly govern, our everyday lives (Pasquale 2015; Lupton 2016; Moore 2017).
The thesis therefore places Google’s digitisation and monetisation of language (primarily
through AdWords and associated platforms) as a critical vulnerability to the stability and
security of society and discourse, also providing a much needed link between more techni-
cal (cyber)security studies, and social science and humanities approaches. Furthermore,
although critiques of data, algorithms, and specifically Google, have already focused on the
economics and politics of digital society, by placing the emphasis on the human readable
words (represented by data) that facilitate the flow of information through and around
digital spaces, my thesis therefore questions the integrity of the very tools and techniques
with which we are increasingly obliged, urged, or forced to communicate, debate, share
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and publish our critiques in an age of ubiquitous digital technology.
Having foregrounded the importance of language in the political economy of digital society,
my thesis also brings something new in bringing the critical theory framework of Walter
Benjamin’s ‘Work of Art’ essay into direct conversation with contemporary mediations of
culture, specifically digital advertising and the search engine. I do not claim to be the
only person to use Benjamin’s theories on culture in a more contemporary context, and
am by no means the first to see the potential in using Benjamin as a means of exploring
and critiquing modern digital technology, whether in terms of critical theory (Berry 2014),
geography (Gilge 2015; 2016a; Kingsbury & Jones, 2009), machine translation (Nabugodi
2014; Littau 1997), big data (Halpern 2015), or in comparison with other theorists of tech-
nology such as Donna Haraway (Franklin 2002). The thesis is also informed by a growing
number of scholars who continue to make insights and inroads into the intricacies of lan-
guage and knowledge when mediated through machines, including N. Katherine Hayles,
Lisa Gitelman and Bernard Steigler. My own research adds to this burgeoning debate
with a hopefully unique mixture of Benjamin’s critical theory and work I have been doing
around Google’s advertising platforms and the commercial Search Engine Optimisation
(SEO) industry. This slightly experimental splicing of Walter Benjamin and Google SEO
tips facilitates an innovative and engaging discussion of the socio-technical, economic and
political nature of search technology, and the effect it is having on language (whether cre-
ative, communicative, or a mixture of both) and the wider discourse, and is particularly
timely in our current age of fake news (Graham 2017) and algorithmic bias (Noble 2018).
My thesis also makes unique contributions in that I put forward the theoretical concepts of
‘Geographies of (con)text’ and ‘Subprime Language’, which I detail in Chapters 4 and 8.
In addition, the thesis also presents a radical artistic intervention in my {poem}.py project
(see chapter 7), and an innovative new method for researching and visualising language in
the age of algorithmic reproduction, which I will explain in the next section.
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Chapter 3
APPROACHING A CRITIQUE
OF LINGUISTIC CAPITALISM
3.1 Introduction
As I mentioned in the introduction, this thesis grew out of a Google search. When I con-
ducted that search for ‘wives and girlfriends sexist’ in February 2014 I had no idea of the
journey it would take me on. Not only did it become the subject of a PhD thesis exploring
and exposing the (geo)politics and economics of the search engine, but in so doing it also
allowed me to indulge in one of my first loves, both academically and personally, and that
is language and literature. That it also led to a creative intervention and art project which
I have presented and exhibited nationally and internationally seems completely unimag-
inable in hindsight. My {poem}.py project calculates the ‘price’ of poetry as the words in
the poem flow through the Google search engine. Using data taken from Google AdWords
and some code, the poems are in effect ‘deconstructed’ by the algorithmic process, before
being reconstructed back into a readable format and printed out as receipts as a critique
of linguistic capitalism. I also gather and analyse AdWords price data for longer term geo-
temporal study of the changing value of language according to Google’s algorithms. In this
chapter I will attempt to explain how this all happened, exploring the methods, processes
and pitfalls I encountered along the way. Part quantitative, part autoethnographic, and
part practise-led, my methodologies are further complicated by their encounter with ‘the
digital’, a prefix always already unbalanced by the weighty traces of human/machine and
analogue/digital binaries, as well as being notoriously difficult to research. With all these
complications, contradictions and subjectivities in mind, the overarching method I have
adopted for the thesis is what am calling a post-digital (auto)ethnography, which has been
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an effective way to develop my research theoretically and creatively.
3.2 Researching digital technologies
In recent years, computational concepts such algorithms, data, code and software, have
become hot topics across the disciplines and are generating increasing amounts of litera-
ture not only in academia, but in the wider media and popular culture. As these topics
touch on every aspect of modern life, it is hardly surprising that their critical study has
been taken up across a range of academic disciplines, which although it has made a thor-
ough review of relevant literature a difficult task, has also opened up many possibilities in
terms of how we approach and research digital technology.
Attempting to research a complicated phenomenon such as Google is, as the literature
review suggests, a rich, but complicated matter, not least because of the difficulties of
separating the components of the algorithmic assemblage. As Gillespie notes, it is im-
portant to differentiate between the database and the algorithm (2014, see also Manovich
2001), a point also made clear by van Couvering (2010) in her research into search engine
bias. Van Couvering separates the operation of a search engine into three categories, all
of which can be biased: the index (by categorisation bias, seed lists and index cleaning),
the algorithm (by its creators, ranking systems and links, relevance etc.) and display re-
sults (largely as result of advertising, bigger results, colour, font etc.). These distinctions
(which are indeed not always all that distinct), are extremely important when it comes to
finding out where the power and agency is situated in technologies such as search engines,
and indeed, how that power can be made visible, regulated or challenged. As Nick Seaver
observes, algorithms are ‘embedded within complex social-technical assemblages made up
of individuals, datasets, objects, apparatus, elements, protocols, standards, laws etc. that
frame their development’ (Seaver 2013, 10).
Rob Kitchin has called for critical study of algorithms from a broad range of complimentary
disciplinary angles which bring into consideration their socio-technical assemblages and
situations. According to Kitchin, technical approaches should be
complemented by perspectives that consider: the discursive logic driving the
propensity to translate practices and systems into computation; how the prac-
tices of coding algorithms are thoroughly social, cultural, political and eco-
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nomic in nature; and how algorithms perform diverse tasks, much of which
raises political, economic and ethical concerns (Kitchin 2014: 7).
Bearing in mind the complicated assemblages of code, data, algorithms, and respecting
their ontological (if not practical) independence, Kitchin’s ‘Thinking critically about and
researching algorithms’ (2017) is an extremely helpful base on which to think about all
aspects of researching digital technology, and in particular the proprietary technology used
by Google in its search and advertising technology, which is of course where my interests
lie. The next section will build on Kitchin’s framework in relation to my own research
methods and practices.
3.3 What’s in the (black) box?: researching proprietary
technologies
As scholars and researchers have shown (Kitchin 2014, 2017; Pasquale 2015; Thatcher
& Dalton 2016; boyd & Crawford 2012), attempting to critique or explain any system or
platform that functions with the use of proprietary algorithms is difficult and problematic.
Rob Kitchin identifies four significant methodological challenges to studying algorithms.
Firstly, issues of access. As mentioned above, many algorithms, especially commercial ones
like Google, are ‘black-boxed’, closely guarded trade secrets. This is both to protect the
revenue stream from imitators or competitors and to limit the ‘gaming’ of the system, for
example by link farms, Googlebombers1, or aggressive SEO or keyword stuffing. Google in
particular are famously secretive about their search algorithm(s). Issues of access could,
of course, be at least partially overcome with the cooperation of the owner of the algo-
rithm, although as Morozov notes, Google’s algorithmic systems may be fundamentally
unstudiable, as they have become technologies over which maybe even the Google coders
and engineers no longer have control (Morozov 2012). Incidentally, this possibility of al-
gorithms being out of control is another challenge to the critique and study of algorithms
Kitchin identifies.
Access to Google data is also a methodological problem, making the researcher reliant on
Application Planning Interfaces (APIs), commercial Search Engine Optimisation (SEO)
material, and the data Google wish to release, although in my own research I did ‘work
around’ this problem by gathering data manually, but it was time consuming and restric-
1http://www.searchenginepeople.com/blog/incredible-google-bombs.html. Accessed 19 October, 2016
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tive. I tried several times in the course of my PhD to gain access to Google for information
about its algorithms, but was ultimately unsuccessful. As well as attempting to contact
Google’s head of research Peter Norvig on several occasions and by several means, I also
had no response from Google’s European press liaison Peter Baron. Aware that several
scholars had managed to gain access to Google, I also tried approaching them, but with
no luck. Ultimately, I devised my own ways to gather data from (and about) Google, and
to make conclusions about how their algorithms work without gaining any privileged (or
indeed paid) access. In hindsight, I am glad it happened in this way, as an important part
of the rationale behind my critique of Google and linguistic capitalism has been to make
sure I make my stance from ‘outside’ the system, as I will elaborate on later.
3.3.1 Performativity and variation
The second issue identified by Kitchin is that algorithms are heterogeneous and embed-
ded, meaning that even if access is gained to algorithms, they are too ‘messy’ to untangle
having been merged, tweaked, corrected so many times over long periods of time and by
different human and non-human actors and factors. Algorithms are also ontogenetic and
performative. They are ‘never fixed but constantly unfolding’, and responsive and reactive
to input. The workings of capital generating algorithmic systems such as Facebook and
Google are constantly altered with tweaks, a/b testing, and dynamic advertising systems,
as well as other personalisations such as geolocation (Zook & Graham 2007), which can
also make them hard to research objectively. Not only can they, and what they produce,
change from minute to minute, place to place, person to person in terms of various levels
of personalisation such as device use, histories and geolocations, their workings can be
altered or tweaked by Google for many reasons and purposes, for quality control, censor-
ship or commercial gain, at any time, with no notification or justification. Richard Rogers
notes how it used to be possible to gather a limited amount of data on Google search
results through a dedicated API, but that several researchers who relied on that method
had projects ruined or cut short when Google decided to withdraw the feature without
warning. As I will explain in more detail in my final chapter describing my intervention, I
came up against similar problems in gathering AdWords data, when Google changed de-
tails such as search volumes, how the keyword planner uses synonyms and the formatting
of data outputs. These were significant obstacles in my research, and, much like a coder
spends a significant amount of time ‘de-bugging’ a piece of code, all had to be overcome
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by first recognising, diagnosing, and ‘working around’ the problems.
Following on from issues around their performativity, the results of algorithms cannot be
anticipated; they can be unexpected, and affected by factors of which we are unaware. It
is therefore almost impossible to conduct reproducible empirical research on algorithms
and their data as we cannot see when the results are comparable. There is no base line, or
constant, as Feuz, Fuller & Stalder showed with when they tried to engineer the imagined
personalised search engine results of famous philosophers (2011), an intervention I discuss
in greater depth in Chapter 7. Google’s algorithmic systems may indeed be fundamentally
unstudiable, as they have become technologies over which maybe even the Google coders
and engineers no longer have control, as Morozov notes (2012). This possibility of algo-
rithms being out of control is the fourth challenge to the critique and study of algorithms
that Kitchin identifies. My own work recognises challenges such as these, but instead of
letting it become a problem, I instead worked with the instabilities in the system, making
the variabilities and performativities a central part of the critique. That my results are
un-reproducible is therefore perhaps a triumph rather than a hindrance.
Despite these obstacles, however, as my project developed, it became clear that it was the
very performativity of Google’s algorithms that provided the greatest insights into their
hidden logics, especially when thinking about the geographical variations in the output
they produce. When I began collecting data from Google AdWords, in particular the
suggested bid prices of words through the Keyword Planner, I was keen to find out how
much these prices changed in different countries, and areas within countries. I thought
this would provide clues as to how embedded within, or reflected they were of popular
discourse, local and world events on geographical and temporal scales, a process which I
have called ‘Linguistic Geographies’. This is of course a method used to great effect by
Mark Graham and others in work on the localised and often highly political bias within
Wikipedia and Google Maps, for example (2010; 2014).
Some of my own options here might have been to access the AdWords data from differ-
ent geographical areas, using either VPNs or outsourcing the data gathering via personal
networks in different countries or through crowd sourced marketplaces such as Amazon
Mechanical Turk. To have taken any of those options, however, would have added yet an-
other layer of variables to the equation in terms of keeping the data set constant and free
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from issues, such as individual personalisation via device or search history, not to men-
tion the increased labour for myself or colleagues, and the complications of out-sourced
labour (Irani 2015), had I decided to set up several VPNs or simply rely on the goodwill
of international friends. What I ultimately decided to do was to conduct every Keyword
Planner query through the same personal laptop, conducting the same three searches each
day for a year, and, no matter where I was in the world, to always use the Royal Holloway
VPN while gathering the data. The AdWords Keyword Planner allows users to target
geographic markets by selecting different regions on the interface, thus giving potential
advertisers an indication of how expensive their ad campaigns might be in a global mar-
ket, or if they are advertising a regional service or product. While this method may not
have been perfect (and indeed it would be almost impossible to check for skewing or to
reproduce), it meant that at least I had some control over the standardisation of such
volatile and dynamic data. From June 2016 to June 2017 I gathered the price data of
1200 words in 3 different geographic areas, the UK and US markets, and finally the whole
of the AdWords market. In keeping with the literary and ludic themes of my project
(explained in more detail below), I wanted to choose the words as culturally produced
corpora, rather than using a dictionary or other more prescriptive and structured method,
so I picked 5 poems, a song lyric and a speech which I thought threw a loose kind of net
around a particular concept or event. Gathering data in this way allowed me not only
to monitor the fluctuating prices of culturally pertinent words and phrases, for example
‘prosperity’ and ‘austerity’ in Billy Bragg’s Between the Wars, or ‘borders’ and ‘maps’ in
Bernadine Evaristo’s Heart of Exile in the context of immigration and the refugee crisis,
but also to calculate the ‘price’ of whole poems and texts over particular periods and
regions, such as Alan Ginsberg’s poem America in the build up and aftermath of the US
Presidential election. I also wanted to monitor some words which did not occur ‘naturally’
in poetic form, such as ‘Trump’, ‘Clinton’, and ‘algorithm’, so I also produced a list of
words I thought might be interesting to study from a geopolitical, as well as cultural angle.
A full analysis of the data gathered in this way will hopefully be part of a further work,
but some of the initial results of this quantitative study, will be elaborated on in Chapter 6.
3.4 Thinking critically about digital technology
Having identified these four methodological challenges, Rob Kitchin suggests six possible
approaches to study and ‘think critically’ about algorithms. Some of Kitchin’s suggestions
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are highly relevant to my own methodological considerations, but others are not so. The
first two approaches, Examining pseudo-code/source code and Reflexively producing code
both involve a degree of technical knowledge far beyond my capabilities and the time
constraints needed to learn them. One of the difficulties in researching digital technology
is the vast disciplinary gap between ‘technical’ and ‘non-technical’ study of digital media,
processes and software. A detailed knowledge of, and interest in, both the maths/computer
science side and the social sciences/humanities is comparatively rare, although historically
such a mix has produced the likes of Donna Haraway, N. Katherine Hayles, and Andrew
Goffey, for example, and more recently a handful of geographers such as Rob Kitchin
and Sam Kinsley, Till Straube, Andrew Dwyer, Louise Amoore have (or are developing)
a more mixed background which has proved productive in recent scholarship. Although
throughout the course of my PhD I have gained a significant (for me) amount of technical
knowledge, the intervention part of my thesis in particular would not have been possible
without collaboration and support from colleagues in the Information Security Group at
Royal Holloway who wrote the code for the {poem}.py project. Indeed, the different per-
spectives and priorities of staff and student colleagues often gave valuable insights into
wider issues of privacy, integrity and pedagogy, as I explain in chapter 7. In this way
my lack of technical knowledge, brought into disciplinary and methodological tension by
collaborations with more technically minded friends and colleagues, has actually been a
productive method in itself.
3.4.1 Reverse engineering
The third of Kitchin’s suggestions, Reverse engineering is more relevant, despite on the
face of it also being a fairly technical method of research. The main problems with reverse
engineering anything reflect the same old problems of access, and the black-boxed nature
of proprietary algorithms. Reverse engineering for my project would involve examining
the input and output of what makes up the algorithmic process to try to determine (or
more likely guess) exactly what happens inside the hidden/secret/opaque part. Even if I
could conduct satisfactory quantitative research using this method, it is still open to huge
problems such as the instability of the data and how Google works. For example, as I have
already mentioned, results will differ depending on the time of day, location, the device
used, personalisation and potential A/B testing which can be happening unbeknownst to
me at any time, and makes any conclusions fairly inconclusive. Kitchin does suggest, how-
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ever that there is methodological potential in qualitative work around reverse engineering
in trying to show how the input data is made ‘algorithm ready’, or in other words how
the data is prepared for processing in terms of being easily structured, read, tagged or
categorised (see also Gillespie 2014 here). Kitchin suggests interviewing marketers, media
strategists, PR firms and following debates on forums. In line with this suggestion, part
of my methodology has been attending a commercial Search Engine Optimisation (SEO)
course to learn motives and techniques of advertisers and their role in the construction of
online language both as adverts and as the digitised text and copy on which search algo-
rithms feed (see Chapter 5). This method was hugely revealing in many ways, giving me
a glimpse into the mindset and motives of an SEO expert, and the somewhat evangelical
regard in which Google and its products appear to be held. In order to better understand
the motives of AdWords users and the political economy of AdWords, I also engaged in
email correspondence with different actors involved in bidding on the term ‘dementia tax’
in the run up to the 2017 UK General Election (see Chapter 6). Despite being limited
by a lack of technical knowledge, and without the access and capabilities to be able to
examine exactly what goes on within the black box of Google’s algorithmic systems, I
can still see what goes in a search engine, and what come out. I also have access to the
same data as Google in terms of the corpus of searchable data on the Web from which
the algorithm extracts results, and I can see how the embedded contexts of the words
and their proximities to other words has an effect on what appears in search results and
autopredictions. This is what I explore in terms of ‘Geographies of (con)text’ in Chapter 4.
Also, as I show in Chapter 8, part of my intervention and resistance into Google search
and advertising has been to ‘reverse engineer’ the algorithms that try to boost keyword
performance in AdWords. One of the functions of the keyword planner in AdWords is
to suggest alternative keywords and phrases that might assist an advertiser in creating a
successful advert and also then securing a successful bid. I re-use (or hack, maybe), this
function to try to make visible the market logics and contexts that are applied to words
as they flow through the search engine and therefore to imagine how language is ‘read’ by
algorithms (see also Chapter 5).
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3.4.2 The socio-technical assemblage
Kitchin’s fourth suggestion, Interviewing designers or conducting an ethnography of a cod-
ing team is something I considered, but due to issues of access and technical restrictions,
decided against. Another approach relevant to my project would have been an ethno-
graphic or autoethnographic study with an academic setting such as a computational
linguistics environment, or within the commercial SEO industry itself, perhaps similar
to Jamie Woodcock’s research in call centres (2017). Ethnographic methods of research
in digital environments have been extremely insightful in recent scholarship, for exam-
ple Taina Bucher’s study on Facebook and the ‘algorithmic imaginary’, which used an
ethnographic approach to try to gauge how people ‘experience algorithms’ in order to
‘understand their social power’ (2017: 30; see also Duggan 2017; Miles 2017; Bonner-
Thompson 2017). Andrew Dwyer’s authoethnographic account of his time training as a
malware analyst (Dwyer 2017) is also a rich and innovative engagement with the com-
plex ecologies within which software, algorithms, code, and of course humans interact. All
these methods might perhaps respond to Rob Kitchin’s fifth suggestion, Unpacking the full
socio-technical assemblage of algorithms. Unpacking the relationship between the social
and the technical, as well as Kitchin’s final suggested method, Examining how algorithms
do work in the world, is perhaps the most pertinent to how my project developed, and form
a base for thinking about ideas of the post-digital and alternative ways of representing the
complex assemblages that make up all digital technologies today.
The nature of my research has led to the development of methods and techniques that
build and expand on Kitchin’s suggestions, and are particularly relevant when thinking
specifically about the proprietary nature of the software I am studying. There have been
several approaches towards what we might call ‘digital methods’ in the last 20 years,
many of which are concerned with the use of digital tools to learn more about a particular
subject or discipline, be that (digital) humanities, (digital) geography, or geotagging and
GIS techniques (Leszczynski 2018). Types of study in these areas tend not to be critically
interested in the tools they use, but instead in what the tools can do in the furthering
of knowledge and existing scholarship. As I mentioned in my literature review, there are
many recent critical takes on the study of ‘the digital’ across the disciplines that position
the integrity and agency of the tool of study, for example the computational means of
(big) data analysis) at the foreground of analysis (see Thatcher & Dalton 2014), and that
is very much where I position my own work.
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As mentioned above, the methodology I ultimately adopted for this thesis revolved around
extracting data from the Google AdWords keyword planner, using the data both as em-
pirical analysis into the relationship between the value of words and the wider political
and cultural sphere, and also as the ingredients for my artistic intervention. As I detail
extensively throughout the thesis, artistic and academic critiques of Google have relied on
interaction with various Google interfaces such as GMail (Cabell and Huff 2013), person-
alised search (Feuz et al. 2011), Google maps (Zook & Graham 2007), and also specifically
AdWords (Bruno 2002, 2012; see also Berends et al. 2016; Ter Heerdt (in progress)), but
as far as I am aware, AdWords data has not been the subject of enquiry into politics and
society on a more empirical level (although touched upon by Kaplan 2014 and Jobin &
Glassey 2014), a gap I address at various points throughout the thesis, but particularly in
Chapter 6, The Political Economy of Google AdWords.
3.5.1 The reclamation of serendipity
Another key angle to my research has been the ongoing insights generated by the inter-
action with audiences and colleagues. Since I started the poem.py project in early 2016
I have used poems chosen by fellow panelists and chairs at workshops and conferences to
feed through the keyword planner and turn into receipts. This might perhaps be classed as
a practise-led method of research, as I very much followed the insights that were revealed
in this way, analysing the process of words as they presented themselves to me. According
to Scrivener and Chapman (2004):
Practice-led research is characterised by a focus on issues, concerns and in-
terests that are explored and manifested through the production of creative
artefacts. This implies that, as an object of experience, the creative product
is as important as any knowledge embodied in it (2004: 2-3).
I preferred this method over a systematic analysis of all the poems in an anthology (for
example), as it sparked a very intense relationship with participants, and also avoided the
risk of ‘bias by canonisation’ were I to rely on existing edited collections. I was asking
for people’s favourite poems, and the reasons for them giving them to me was sometimes
very personal, and very emotional. To be able to use words which actually mattered to
people on this level to demonstrate the violence of their algorithmic capture by the logics
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of linguistic capitalism was a powerful tool. As I will explain more in chapter 8, one par-
ticipant reacted so strongly to the monetisation of their favourite poem that they ripped
it up in front of me. An interactive workshop I led at Trinity College Dublin in 2017 also
proved a fruitful and fun method of learning from the AdWords data. I asked partici-
pants at the workshop to write their own poetry, trying to predict what the cheapest and
most expensive love poems might be. The results were beautiful poetic artefacts that also
gave fascinating insights into the value of language in literary and monetary ways (see
chapter 8). Another rationale behind my choice of an experimental, random approach to
the gathering of data in this way, was to subvert the restrictive logics of the anthology,
the poetry website, and the filter bubbles and echo chambers of the internet, by relying
purely on chance and serendipity. The poems I used came from the heart, from emotions,
and half remembered schooldays (although as a source, the poetry on school curriculae
also carries the risk of over-canonisation). They were, up until I scraped their facsimiles
from the web, seemingly untainted by algorithmic and market logics (although it is their
hidden para-textual functions this thesis strives to examine). This reclamation of ‘digital
serendipity’ (Maccatrozzo 2012) in the face of automation and computation is something
several scholars have called for. One of Fuller and Goffeys ‘Evil Media’ strategems is to
‘make the accidental the essential’, while Geert Lovink suggests that ‘if we can no longer
stumble into islands of reason through our enquiries, we may as well build them ourselves’
(2012), which reflects my argument about the ‘prisonhouse of digital language’ that I put
forward in Chapter 4.
Much criticism of personalised search results focuses on the negative effects of losing the
element of random luck which might send you in an unexpected but fortuitous direction.
This has been referred to as ‘the death of serendipity’ (Barnet 2009), and is reflected in
the hierarchical tracts of knowledge which undermine the randomness of the rhizomatic
structure of the Web (Hess 2008: 41), in echo chambers or filter bubbles (Pariser 2011),
or in the rise of personalised, aggregated content (Barnet 2009). Many techniques and
interventions have been developed to reclaim serendipity through ‘ludic subversion’, for
example (Mahnke & Uprichard 2014), but as I will explain in the final chapter it is
extremely difficult to avoid methods which aim to critique the iniquities and inequalities
of digital technology without being co-opted back into the logics of digital capitalism. My
project recognises this problem of almost unavoidable re-capitalisation, and instead makes
that issue centre stage, demonstrating how it is almost impossible to keep our words free
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from these influences by playing along with the system. John Cayley suggests that
[a] major challenge in the programming era will be to develop linguistic aes-
thetic practices that intervene significantly and affectively in socio-ideological
spaces thoroughly saturated with synthetic language that are largely controlled
by commercial interests (2017).
It is indeed today almost impossible to conduct critical research into, or with the help
of digital technology without somehow utilising, consciously or unconsciously, the very
structures we seek to critique. My thesis acknowledges these methodical hurdles, and as
Richard Rogers suggests in his book Digital Methods, seeks its insights by ‘thinking along’
rather than against digital technologies; in order to ‘strive to follow the evolving methods
of the medium’ (2013: 1). By this method, thinking along with the algorithms, and being
guided by a degree of serendipity, I have been able to assemble several ‘collections’ of
poem-receipts, which have been rich sites for analysis.
3.5.2 Reading and writing linguistic data
The advent of big data prompted some in the humanities (Moretti 2013), and in the
media (Anderson 2008) to believe that superior insights could be gained by computational
‘distance reading’ of large datasets, although this method of literary analysis is contested,
and even met with some degree of scorn in some circles, for example in Stephen Marche’s
provocation against the emerging uses of digital humanities:
Through these vast accumulations of ciphers the robots now endlessly scour for
significance much the way cockroaches scour for nutrition in the enormous bat
dung piles hiding in Bornean caves.... The algorithmic analysis of novels and
of newspaper articles is necessarily at the limit of reductivism. The process
of turning literature into data removes distinction itself. It removes taste.
It removes all the refinement from criticism. It removes the history of the
reception of works (Marche 2012: para.1).
Some scholars in the fields of New Media and E-Lit have also recognised the continued
importance of ‘close reading’ of texts. Whether the words are on printed paper (which is
of course not without its own politics of making), or are a mediated and dynamic amal-
gam of interfaces, software and commercial forces, close reading is still a critical means
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of understanding a text (see Pressman 2014; Rogers 2013; Golumbia 2014; Liu 2012).
Close reading of the poems re-rendered through {poem}.py has been an innovative, yet
incisive, way to prise apart the politics of linguistic capitalism, and the reciprocal way
language is shaped in a digital age, as well as the impact it has in shaping the wider
discourse. The importance some scholars of E-Literature give to techniques learned in
the study of pre-digital literature such as close reading and deconstruction (for example
Hayles 2008, 2012; Pressman 2014; Landow 2006), is also an important frame for my own
approach. Chapters 4 and 5 of my thesis use key figures of literary post-structuralism
such as Roland Barthes, Jacques Derrida, Jean-Francois Lyotard as lenses through which
to analyse digitised language. Digital Humanities scholars are also increasingly turning to
pre-digital critics of politics and culture such as Walter Benjamin in order to contextualise
modern media ecologies (Berry 2013, 2014; Halpern 2015; Parikka 2013), so my literary
and cultural approach to the study of language mediated and structured through emerging
technologies is not without a theoretical home.
As I mentioned earlier, as well as the artistic intervention, part of my method has also
been to collect Google’s suggested bid prices for several poems and texts collected daily
and in different markets over a 12 month period. The poems for this part of my project
were picked because I thought they created a kind of serendipitous ‘word cloud’ around
particular topical events (this was 2016) which might provide insights into popular culture
and politics as they fluctuated in the AdWords market. The data I gathered in this way
has been analysed and visualised in both a traditional quantitative way (via Tableau soft-
ware), as well as more creatively, but in any case, the way I have gathered and analysed
these large datasets does not negate or preclude a ‘closer’ reading of the data therein, in
fact, as Jessica Pressman suggests, in an age of ‘digital modernism’ the practice of close
reading must be ‘renovated’ if we are to make sense of the modern world and the texts it
produces (2014: 23).
My {poem}.py project falls very much into Richard Rogers’ idea of what digital methods
can and should achieve. For Rogers
digital methods repurpose or build on top of the dominant devices of the
medium, and in doing so make derivative works from the results, figuratively
and literally. That is, the initial outputs may be the same or similar to those
from online devices, but they are seen or rendered in new light, turning what
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was once familiar - a page of engine results, a list of tweets... a collection of
comments, or a set of interests form a social networking profile - into indicators
and findings (2017: 3).
Thus the poems given to me, so familiar to participants on a deep emotional level, are
re-rendered in the new light of digital linguistic capitalism. When I was at school I was
taught that the function of poetry was the ‘making strange’ of language so as to force ten-
sion, ambiguity, imagination, and interpretation. Once fed through the keyword planner,
poems are rendered unfamiliar by their forcible restructuring into the form of a receipt.
Reading downwards, like a list, words are aggregated so the poem struggles to maintain
its form; their exchange values are inescapably revealed, visibly questioning their stand-
ing and position within the poem. In this way, my poem-receipts become an innovative
means of data visualisation; not only challenging the decontextualising process of linguistic
capitalism, but also subverting the quantitative restrictions of more traditional methods
of visualisation such as graphs and charts. This can also perhaps be seen as a form of
translation, but much like the computational way Google Translate works (see chapter 4),
the rendering of the new poem bears the scars of its algorithmic reproduction. Knowing,
or guessing, what is inside the ‘black box’ is not what is ultimately important here. In-
stead it is making visible the effects of those opaque systems. If using poetry as a kind
of sacrificial offering to the algorithmic gods feels wrong (and it sometimes has to me),
then it only goes to show the power that language and literature can have. Harnessing
the innate power of language by using poetry in this manner is in fact a way of restor-
ing its critical potential in the face of digitisation and monetisation, as well as a means to
reclaim its narrative integrity from the the algorithmic logics of the linguistic marketplace.
3.5.3 Literature & fiction
As well as tool of epistemic, geographic and colonial power, all of which are of course mag-
nified in a digitally mediated and connected age, language also has considerable power as
culture in the form of fiction, poetry, and news media. My thesis harnesses this cultural
power of the written word, turning it against the political power of language by using
literature itself as a central tenet of my critique. As I mentioned in the introduction, lan-
guage has always been a tool of control over people and places in a myriad of ways. Today
more than ever, when analogies of Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four and Huxley’s Brave New
World fuel the discourse around authoritarian politics and fake news, literature proves it-
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self to be a similarly powerful force. Just as I have used the power of poetry to explicate
the effect of Google’s advertising systems on language, my thesis also uses literary fiction
as a critical lens.
Drawing on my own background in English Literature, which also explains the rationale
for my application of literary criticism and post-structuralist theory to my work, Chapter
7 begins by exploring the political consequences of language control through the idea of
‘Newspeak’ presented by Orwell in Nineteen Eighty-Four, which is a striking example of
the power of literature in critiquing and parodying power. Chapter 8 therefore also in-
cludes my own short piece of dystopic speculative fiction, which imagines a world in which
the monetary value of words through Google’s linguistic capitalism has made language
so unstable and worthless that it becomes ‘subprime’. While this short piece of creative
writing is not a practice-based component as such, it does form an important part of my
method, conveying speculative and conceptual ideas far more eloquently than a descrip-
tive chapter or section would. In terms of practice ‘led’ research, the story becomes an
artefact that ‘translate[s] messages between concrete objects and abstract requirements’
(Mkel 2007: 158). As Maarit Mkel writes, ‘the knowledge and the skills of a practising
artist or designer form a central part of the research process, and this has produced a new
way of doing research, and a new ‘way of knowing’ (2007: 157).
My project uses a mixture of poetry and literature that existed in a pre-digital age, but also
includes what might be called ‘born digital’ poetry written with Google’s AdWords prices
in mind, as well as a new piece of fiction through which I can explore and explain more
conceptual ideas. There are of course many examples of ‘born digital’ creative writing
that aim to explore the politics or philosophies of digital technology, however, by virtue of
their medium, they run the risk of being co-opted into the economic logics of the system.
By using pre-existing literature as a means of provocation and intervention, my thesis
shows that incisive critique into digital language, and human and machine cognition does
not need to be solely based on born-digital literature, and that experimenting with ana-
logue (as in the receipts I use to show how AdWords works), rather than purely electronic
representations is perhaps a more effective method. Approaches such as E-Literature and
New Media Poetics typically restrict their outputs to electronic only formats in order to
assume ‘a synergy between human beings and intelligent machines’ (Morris & Swiss 2006:
10). Indeed, as Johnston (2016) claims, digital poetry and other born digital texts can
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usefully be found in, and created from, technologies such as algorithmic mediation and
digital advertising, and the ‘living’ ecosystems, and dynamic representations of such media
can be innovative expressions of critique, as long, of course, that they remain self-reflexive
in their precarious digital ontology.
But I would argue that more informative and innovative synergies between man and ma-
chine can be created by questioning and bringing those assumptions into tension by mixing
methods and media. Critical analysis of man/machine and analogue/digital binaries might
be more insightfully executed by not dismissing pre-digital work in favour of born digital
texts. Using existing literature as a tool of analysis, as Alan Turing did in his original
1950 paper ‘Computing Machinery and Intelligence’ by using a Shakespeare sonnet in his
prototype Turing Test, is still an important intervention. Indeed, although I have col-
lected and analysed AdWords data in all its temporal and geographic fluctuations, the
culmination of my project, the framed poem as ‘work of art’, is deliberately no longer a
‘living’ artefact, in that my intervention is to violently freeze a particular version of the
poem in time; thus chaining it to a context and a price. My own method of research and
practice therefore troubles the assumption that ‘living’ interventions made possible by,
and dependant on, digital technology are the only, or the most effective way of progressing
the study of language in a digital age.
3.6 Towards a post-digital (auto)ethnography
The problematic materialities of so called ‘virtual’ technologies have been pointed out by
geographers (Kinsley 2013; Ash et al. 2016) as well as other scholars in the field of digital
technology. Christophe Bruno notes that
After shifting from materiality towards immateriality at the end of the twen-
tieth century, we have recently been experiencing opposite shifts. Whatever
we may call these trends, ‘re-materialization’, ‘vintage media’, ‘neo-analog’,
‘post internet’, ‘post-digital’, etc., they all deal with the inverse paths starting
from the immaterial or conceptual and heading towards material or physical
space...(2014: para.2).
Christophe Bruno has been an inspiration to my own work, even before it developed into
an artistic project, so his observations about the ‘material turn’ in digital methods are
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key to me here, and are also an excellent way to begin thinking about what this might
mean in terms of what has been called the ‘post digital’, which in itself is a disputed and
ambiguous term.
3.6.1 The post-digital
As Florian Kramer explains, the ‘post’ in ‘post-digital’ does not necessarily indicate a
period ‘after’ the digital, or indeed a return to analogue methods and approaches (2015;
see also Parikka et al. 2017; Berry & Dieter 2015), but rather refer to a period where
‘the digital’ is so embedded within society and culture that it loses its meaning as a stan-
dalone concept. As I mentioned in the literature review, the post-digital is often read
alongside James Bridle’s idea of the ‘New Aesthetic’, a term he coined to try to describe
new ways of seeing and representation in a digital age. Bridle’s work often aims to reveal
the tensions between analogue and digital worlds by virtue of aestheticising the anoma-
lies or glitches which present themselves in different types of technology, for example the
‘rainbow plane’ images captured by satellites which he says ‘provide a glimpse into the
ways machines see the world’ (2014). Nathan Jones and other glitch artists, poets and
scholars (see Menkman 2011 and many others) also suggest the exposure of the anomaly
as the ‘random’ (Goriunova 2008) or not so ‘random’ (Parikka & Sampson 2009) moment
which reveals the hidden machinations behind technology. ‘The glitch-incision’, writes
Jones, ‘does not claim to reveal a beyond-media here, but rather is a figure for a lapse in
a system that reveals another system, a gap that opens transversal perspectives through
one skin, into another’ (2017: 237).
Although some examples of ‘glitch’ poetry are based directly on Google search and au-
tocompletions (for example Riviere 2015; Nuotio 2012), and are not, as I will suggest in
the last chapter, entirely unproblematic in that method, I do not situate my own po-
etic intervention in the same vein as either the New Aesthetic or Glitch Art/Poetry. By
demonstrating the logics behind the monetisation of language by Google, it is not the
oddities, glitches or limitations I am exposing, but rather the grain of the digital econ-
omy; the new standards, norms and structures of digitised language, against which, in
an age when Google in some way mediates so much of the data that circulates online, it
is becoming increasingly hard (or unappealing) to go, as I will argue further in Chapter
6. Linguistic capitalism has become a normalised, virtually unnoticed part of everyday
life, and this is ultimately reflected in and represented by the output of a receipt in my
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intervention. A symbol of capitalism we carry round with us in our pockets, screwed up
in the bottom of our bags, and increasingly in our email trash folders, the receipt is so
familiar, yet so expendable, and as I mentioned above, it is the ‘making strange’ of the
familiar that can have such a profound and incisive effect as creative intervention. The
receipt is an analogue residue of the materiality of exchange and the mundanity of exis-
tence, and indeed is a medium that has been used to the same effect by artists before,
including Ceal Floyer’s exhibition of a supermarket till receipt at the Tate Gallery (1998;
see also Perry 2016). With all of this in mind, I find that my {poem}.py project falls best
into Christophe Bruno’s definition of the post-digital, which for Bruno is an intervention
by which ‘somebody creates an artwork that uses a digital tool; once the work is set up,
remove the digital tool and observe what remains afterwards; if the work still holds, one
may say it is post-digital’ (2014: para.3).
3.7 Conclusion
While the way I have self-reflexively interacted with and learned from audiences and collab-
orators has been a journey of discovery that might be best described as autoethnographic,
it does not seem to fit into some established examples of ‘digital’ or ‘computational’ au-
toethnographic approaches in which researchers harvest and analyse their own digitised
data (see Brown 2019). In fact I have gone to some lengths to avoid the personalisation of
my data and any kind of self-tracking or self-quantifying, as I describe in Chapters 7 and 8.
Despite this, I am still inclined to think that my approach is autoethnographic in a more
general way, at least as it is defined as ‘research, writing, story, and method that connect
the autobiographical and personal to the cultural, social, and political’ (Ellis 2004: xix).
As Ellis et al. conclude, ‘when researchers do autoethnography, they retrospectively and
selectively write about epiphanies that stem from, or are made possible by, being part of
a culture and/or by possessing a particular cultural identity’ (2011), and that is certainly
how I see my own engagement with my research. My cultural situatedness as a woman
with a background in the military was after all the catalyst for the whole project, and to
varying extents continues to inform my research.
Alternatively, Nick Seaver’s definition of an algorithmic ethnography also seems relevant
to my approach, particularly his ideas about the creative performativity of algorithms.
Seaver suggests that
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critical researchers might seek to enact algorithms ethnographically, seeing
them as heterogeneous and diffuse sociotechnical systems, rather than rigidly
constrained and procedural formulas. To do so, I suggest thinking of algorithms
not in culture but as culture: part of broad patterns of meaning and practice
that can be engaged with empirically (2017: 1).
Perhaps the difficulty in categorising my method might lie not only with my personal
interaction with, or situatedness (or not) within the digital structures I am researching,
but rather in its complicated relationship with whatever ‘the digital’ might be.
In his article ‘Questioning Digital Ethnography in an era of ubiquitous computing’ (2017),
Duggan unpacks the differing approaches which currently operate under the umbrella of
‘the digital’, arguing that digital ethnography (as defined by Pink et al. 2016), along
with other iterations he lists such as Robinson and Shultz’s ‘Cyberethnography’ (2009),
Dominguez et al.’s ‘virtual ethnographies’ (2007), and Kozinets ‘net-nographies’ (2017) are
in fact not ‘new’ methods as such, but are just technogenetic developments in ethnographic
study, and that the term digital (or its variations), is therefore not necessarily helpful. He
also suggests that these ‘digital’ ethnographies run the risk of ‘pull[ing] apart notions of
technogenesis by privileging the digital in ethnographic approaches’ (Duggan 2017: 4).
Similarly to Seaver, Duggan instead advocates a ‘nonmedia-centric’ approach to ‘digital’
ethnographies which ‘focuses on digital culture and practice rather than necessarily life
online’ (2017: 6), which is perhaps the closest description of my own method; the ubiquity
of digital technology making the nominative distinctions between digital and non-digital
negligible in much the same way as practitioners of the post-digital do. Bearing in mind
Duggan’s concerns about digital ethnographies, along with Christophe Bruno’s definition
of post-digital aesthetics, and the added intricacies of subjectivity and immersion in digital
technology, I have weighed up the merits and drawbacks of this mix of approaches in
relation to my own theory and practice, and have come to the conclusion that my own
method might therefore best be described as a ‘post-digital (auto)ethnography’.
66

Chapter 4
GEOGRAPHIES OF
(CON)TEXT: LANGUAGE AND
STRUCTURE IN A DIGITAL
AGE
Il n’y a pas de hors-texte (Jacques Derrida 1976)
4.1 Introduction
As I mentioned in the first chapter, there are three themes running through this thesis
(context, value, and circulation), which pull together my overall argument from several
different angles. This chapter concentrates on the idea of context, or rather (con)text, as I
want to emphasis that the way words are organised, structured and processed on the web
can have consequences on other scales (local and global) and in other contexts, be they
cultural, economic or geopolitical. As well as applying a post-structuralist critique to the
geo-linguistic makeup of digitised language through the works of Lyotard (1984), Jameson
(1974) and Derrida (1976, 1988), the chapter also uses Michel de Certeau’s concept of
tactics and strategies (1988) to imagine how and why different actors produce, mediate
and traverse digital spaces not, as the ‘landscapes of code’ imagined by Thrift and French
(2002), but as a ‘landscape of words’, or a geography of (con)text (Thornton 2017). This
conceptualisation of the structural constraints (or otherwise) of language is a key part of
the thesis as a whole, linking in with ideas of circulation (of data and capital), and the
creation/representation of value which culminate in the creative interventions explored in
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Chapters 7 and 8.
4.2 What happens when words become data?
Now that almost all language is in some way digitised, ‘data-ised’ and submitted to com-
putation, the ownership, control and organisation of linguistic and other data can have a
profound, yet not always intentional or indeed predictable, impact on social, cultural and
political discourse, and on personal freedoms and securities. As well as significant power
and profits for those who harvest and process it, the ‘data-isation’ of language brings the
risk of serious collateral damage. By virtue of their reproducibility and enhanced means of
movement and dissemination, words-as-data can have paratextual agencies and excesses
beyond their linguistic function; the granular configurations and distortions of data can
be instantly and exponentially magnified to a global geopolitical and discursively signif-
icant scale. But in contrast to this apparent post-modern untethering of language from
its locational and referential functions, language that appears non-normative, or somehow
unexpected, such as poetry or other creative variations of text, resists computation, and as
a result has its movements through digital space restricted. It becomes suspect; penalised
for its originality, or its unmarketability, as it fights its way through search engines, fire-
walls and new libraries of spam.
Once reduced to data, language loses the linear, or narrative order it might have had on
the printed page or in speech. It is deconstructed in the process of digitisation, becom-
ing part of the fluid pool of decontextualised data which flows through the spaces of the
web, commoditised by the companies that increasingly control and mediate those spaces
through advertising platforms and social networks. Indeed, language-as-data produces new
contexts, in both a linguistic and physical sense, and creates new narratives. Processed
on huge scales, digitised data has a wide geographical reach, so when it is reconstructed
back into what we might call ordinary language (for example via search results, online
translations or dictionaries), the manner in which that data has been stored, ordered and
moved becomes extremely important.
Imagining context in this way facilitates the study of language in digital spaces from both
material and theoretical angles. Firstly, it becomes necessary to think about how context
as a kind of space might be produced, and the structures, biases and lacunae of the data
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within it. Secondly, we can start to think about the movement of data though those
spaces. How is language-as-data made retrievable, searchable, (in)visible, and exploitable
by a range of different actors, from tech giants such as Google and Apple, to individual web
users, advertisers, activists and politicians, and how their competing motives and agencies
change the contextual makeup of that space. Not only is the ownership of language online
a lucrative business (as we see from Google advertising platforms AdWords and AdSense),
but as Lyotard (1984: 46-7) suggests, ‘context control’ in the production of knowledge
is a powerful means for the legitimisation and therefore dominance of information. The
physical and epistemic context of language reduced to data is perhaps at once liberating
and restrictive. When reduced to data, words carry an entirely new set of values, motives,
and meanings. They may become trapped within the logic of the digital economy, but
can also become magnified to new scales and agencies by virtue of algorithmic systems of
processing and interpreting. In conceptualising the de/re/constructions of linguistic data
in this way, this chapter therefore considers both the physical and theoretical implications
of the geographies of (con)text.
4.3 What do I mean by (con)text?
Much of the work in the nascent field of ‘digital geographies’ (Ash et al. 2016) has to
date been focused on how digital technologies affect and produce geographies (for exam-
ple Graham 2005; Zook & Graham 2007), or how space has become intrinsically linked
with code (Kitchin & Dodge 2011). Yet more work has been done on algorithms and their
work in the world (Kwan 2016; Dourish 2016; Neyland 2015; Gillespie 2014). The ideas in
this chapter, and the concept of ‘geographies of context’ offer something novel by focusing
on the data geographies and structures within and on which these algorithms work in the
hope of opening up thought to the material and theoretical ‘spaces of calculation’ (Amoore
2016: 11) within which the data and algorithms interact, and in particular when the data
is representing language. Even if such space is considered to be primarily topological,
as is the case with vector space, the spatial relations within it are still important. As
Till Straube contends ‘the various articulations of relational systems making up the layers
found within digital infrastructures should be taken seriously as spaces proper’ (Straube
2016: 6). Although the context of words on pages have always been linked to their eco-
nomic value (as a book, a telegraph, a newspaper article, for example), the manner in
which data-ised words sit in relation to other words on web pages has taken on epistemic,
economic, and even political possibilities unimaginable within the relative constraints of
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print capitalism. As I will discuss further in subsequent chapters, new kinds of capitalism
mediate the contextual spaces of data. Forms of digital, platform, semantic, or linguistic
capitalism (Srnicek 2016; Fuchs & Mosco 2015; Feuz, Fuller & Stalder 2011; Kaplan 2014)
have created new workers, owners, users, products and commodities, and their currencies
are based predominantly on data. But even if we think of (con)text as an abstract space,
the generation of value by and within that space lends it a ‘very real social existence’
(Merrifield 2015) wherein those who dominate have corresponding agency in ‘real’ space.
As Shaw and Graham (2017) have shown, there is great power (and great money) in the
control of informational flows by large technology companies such as Google. Of course,
the ‘text’ of (con)text does not refer only to words, in fact its Latin root comes from texere
(to weave). If we think how the weaving together of different threads determines different
patterns, meanings and values in textiles, then the use of (con)text as a metaphor for the
abstract space of linguistic data becomes even more relevant and politically significant.
Often regarded as a forerunner of digital computer programming, and also the catalyst
for new sets of labour relations, technologies such as the Jacquard loom not only revo-
lutionised the weaving of silk and other materials, but also had wide-scale societal and
political impacts similar to those of the digital revolution. Just as big data technologies
and the patterns and narratives they produce - have become contentious issues today, the
automation of the textile industry in nineteenth century Europe saw widespread resistance
from workers facing unemployment and exploitation. In an era of AI and machine learn-
ing, data, and its (con)text, has become a similarly controversial raw material.
This chapter thus sets out to develop a critique of ‘the digital’ that concentrates on the
physical constructs of language on the web. Rather than the ‘landscapes of code’ imag-
ined by Thrift & French (2002: 309), instead I want to imagine a ‘landscape of words’,
or a ‘geography of (con)text’. A geography of (con)text can thus be imagined as the
relational makeup of an ever-changing body of text, through and amongst which paths
and trails of significance are intentionally or unintentionally traced, woven, diverted or
created, producing dynamic contextual spaces, in and with which different actors, with
differing motives, continuously engage. This chapter will begin by thinking about bodies
of linguistic data as relational, yet often problematic and incomplete spaces. It will then
discuss how competing actors contribute to the (in)visibility and (im)mobility of this data
on the web; how it moves and is moved around, exchanged and manipulated. I find it
useful here to imagine these movements as maneuvers, played out like de Certeau’s every-
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day tactics in attempts to (re)gain power over or subvert certain narratives, controlling
conduits of meaning, or perhaps ‘poaching’ in lexical spaces (de Certeau 1988: 165-176).
As de Certeau writes, ‘on the blank page, an itinerant, progressive, and regulated practice
a “walk”- composes the artifact of another “world” that is not received but rather made’
(1988, 134-5), but ‘walking’ through digital space is not necessarily such a progressive or
liberating linguistic experience. The mathematical and often binary logics that make and
mediate the language within this space set paths from which it is hard or inadvisable to
deviate; systemic processes which are only complicated and exacerbated by the commod-
ification of linguistic data by technology/media companies such as Google, Facebook or
Apple. It is therefore to the dominant structures of (con)text we turn first, before consid-
ering the other actors within these spaces, their tactics, motives and intentions, and then
finally thinking about the unintentional or collateral consequences of maneuvers within
this space which are made perhaps inevitable by the technologically magnified scale and
reach of language-as-data.
4.4 Language spaces
It is estimated that only 5% of the data which exists on the web is indexed by commercial
search engines. The machinations of the deep web and the dark web are beyond the scope
of this chapter, but suffice it to say, there are still over 100,000,000 gigabytes of data
for search algorithms to work on (Google n.d). This is what I refer to as the searchable
database,1 although given its dynamism and inherent hierarchies, it might better be de-
scribed conceptually as a ‘data environment’ (Parisi 2017). The data that makes up the
searchable database is, however, not necessarily democratically spread or representative
of society, and neither is its visibility (or findability) upheld by any explicit or implicit
norms of ‘fairness’. Factors such as categorisation, language, tagging and indexing make
some data easy to find, and some not, and the algorithmic systems managing the data
are also always influenced by the motives, skills and potential prejudices of the flesh and
blood programmer. The linguistic data which makes up the searchable database is also not
an accurate reflection of all the analogue data produced in the world. As many scholars
have noted (Crawford 2013; O’Neill 2017, Noble 2018; Graham 2014), there are significant
weightings and gaps in the technological, linguistic, geographic or social agency of some
1Although not a database in the strict sense of the word, this phrase attempts to describe the quantity
of indexed data on which search algorithms are able to act.
72
4.4 Language spaces
groups or areas which means that the ‘searchable database’ is a distinctly hierarchical and
undemocratic dataset before commercial ranking algorithms have got anywhere near it.
Mark Graham has highlighted this content bias in the case of Wikipedia (2014), a plat-
form which by nature of its user interaction and editing, is often held up as a success of
the democratic Web. But an analysis of geotagging shows that the ‘facts’ presented by
Wikipedia are constructed by and of the world’s dominant languages and places. ‘Knowl-
edge created in the developed world appears to be growing at the expense of viewpoints
coming from developing countries’, writes Graham, with 84% of geotagged articles being
about Europe and North America, and more articles about the Middle East in English
than in Arabic languages. It is easy to see how this might also effect Google Search,
especially as Google now use Wikipedia as a source for its ‘intelligent’ Knowledge Graph
feature which pulls facts and images together into a handy box displayed at the to of your
search results. Added to this, by virtue of its link structure and reputation, Wikipedia has
been found to be on Page One of search results in 99% of searches (Search Engine Watch
2012). Therefore as Graham suggests, ‘Wikipedia might not just be reflecting the world,
but also reproducing new, uneven, geographies of information’ (2014). The tendency for
search results to favour collected information or analysis sites is, according to Reilly, also
at the expense of original (potentially controversial or partisan) source material, which
can lead to minority non-state groups or actors being made less visible, (Reilly 2008) and
results being dominated by bland links and under the influence of groups with more com-
mercial or political ‘organizational clout’ and ‘off-web prominence’ (Gerhart 2004). Thus,
because of the ranking algorithms, the actual objects of the search become invisible, re-
placed by representations of themselves, whether an opinion, a encyclopedia type entry
or an advert (Mager 2012), all the time the search engine is further abstracting the user
from the object of their search. The corpus of linguistic data that exists in this digital
space is therefore far from inclusive. What can be contributed to the searchable database
is highly contingent and can exclude groups of people on multiple social-economic levels.
Despite the oft-touted democratic and analytic qualities of big data, as Kate Crawford
writes, although ‘data are assumed to accurately reflect the social world there are sig-
nificant gaps, with little or no signal coming from particular communities’ (2013: para.
3). As I will detail more in relation to Walter Benjamin in the next chapter, those with
better technology, better skills, better social standing, better connectivity and with ac-
cess to better platforms, are the main authors of the searchable database, and it is this
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privileged data that is used by the wealthiest and most powerful technology companies to
search for answers to the world’s questions. As organic search results, auto-completions
and auto-suggestions are based on a mixture of previous queries and the data already
existing on the web, the volume and structure (including any bias) of this data becomes
crucially important in how these results are algorithmically extracted and reconstructed.
4.4.1 Searching
The surprising, confusing, and even distressing results sometimes produced by search
engines are well documented, and can have a significant impact on the wider cultural
and political discourse, reinforcing stereotypes (Noble 2018; UNWomen campaign 2013),
marginalising the less powerful or wealthy, or spreading ‘fake news’ and even potentially
influencing election results.2 As I mentioned in the introduction, a personal example of
this stemmed from a search for the phrase wives and girlfriends sexist, which I had typed
in Google after hearing ‘wives and girlfriends’ being used problematically at a military
security briefing. Rather than finding some cultural criticism about the portrayal of foot-
ballers’ wives in the press and media, the word ‘sexist’ was substituted/mistaken by the
algorithm for the word ‘sexiest’, and my search results consisted entirely of references to
the top ranking sexiest and hottest WAGs within its index.
Apparent anomalies and glitches such as these have tended to be held up popularly either
as proof of some kind of inherent sexism/racism within the system, or as sad but inevitable
reflections of society. However, the algorithmic decisions that generate them are not based
on any cultural or semantic knowledge as such, but on the mathematical logics of search
technologies, on vectors, on marked up, decontextualised language, and on the analysis of
big data by ‘keyness and co-location’, a method of corpus linguistics which in the field of
Critical Data Analysis has been criticized because it ‘omits essential qualities of actual lan-
guage use’ (Fairclough 2013: 20). In the pool of data in which the algorithm works, which
I have called the ‘searchable database’, the word sexiest is statistically more likely to be
linked to the phrase wives and girlfriends than the word sexist the associations perhaps
compounded by the disproportionate volume of sexualised content or sensationalised news
copy in the database, by algorithmic reproduction of erroneous typos or synonyms, and,
as I will expand upon at length later, by the machinations of the linguistic marketplace.
2In the aftermath of the 2016 US presidential election, both Google and Facebook have been forced to
acknowledge the potential impact of politically biased fake news stories or advertising click-bait hosted on
their platforms (The Financial Times 2016).
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Figure 4.1: Safiya Noble’s ‘Algorithms of Oppression’ (2018). Photo: Amazon.com
It is due to the lacunae and/or overloading of the searchable database with certain types
or strings of information that the autocomplete/autocorrect function of Google search
has so often been criticised for the controversial and stereotypical results it can produce.
Far from simply reflecting the questions people have typed into the search bar, Google’s
autocomplete function, just like search, reacts not only to the search query, but is an
amalgamated reflection of the entire corpus of data available to the algorithm. Words and
phrases that appear next to each other more often within this digital corpus, will therefore
be more likely to be linked in autocompletions, which is the reason why racist and sex-
ist autocompletions are still fairly common, despite the number of times they have been
called out in recent years (Baker & Potts 2013; Noble 2018) (see Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2).
As I mentioned in the previous chapter, due to the black-boxed nature of the proprietary
technology which operates commercial search engines such as Google, it is almost impossi-
ble to reverse engineer the search algorithm, as many scholars have pointed out (Pasquale
2015; Kitchin 2017). However, it is possible to understand why such apparent anomalies
occur by studying the development of the information retrieval systems on which search
technology is based, although some of the more scientific literature in this area can itself
be fairly uncritical. In order to combat natural language processing (NLP) problems such
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as synonymy and polysemy (Langville & Meyer 2011: 6), most search engines now use
semantic searching based on Vector Space Analysis, an algebraic method of measuring the
spaces between words in a large corpora data set. While Vector Space Models differ, their
use in language corpora is based on the assumption that ‘words that are closer together in
the vector space are semantically closer in some sense’ (Caliskan-islam et al. 2016). In this
way, one recent study claims to have revealed the ‘human’ biases in semantics found in
language corpora using a process of word embeddings. Caliskan-islam et al.’s 2016 report
used various already acknowledged stereotypical word associations and compared them to
the results of vector space analysis on data collected from the web, finding a correlation
between human bias and prejudice and that found in the machine learnt results. The
analysis revealed, for example, that ‘flowers are significantly more pleasant than insects,
and insects more unpleasant than flowers’, musical instruments are more pleasant than
weapons, and that European American names are more pleasant that African American
names (2016: 3). Similar results were found in another recent report that used a corpus
of text from Google News as its training set (Bolukbasi et al 2016). Bolukbasi et al.
found that ‘the closest word to the query BLACK MALE returns ASSAULTED while the
response to WHITE MALE is ENTITLED TO’ (2016: 41). Although these reports stress
the importance of the contextual ordering of words in the production of meaning - even
in non-absolute topological space - and show how a result like the ‘wives and girlfriends’
example can have occurred due to a reflection of loaded or incomplete linguistic corpora,
they are not without their problems. There is an important distinction to be made between
the way algorithmic models work and the data they work upon, although the distinction
is often ignored. Lev Manovich writes that algorithms and data are ‘two halves of the on-
tology of the world according to a computer’ (Manovich 2013, 67), and as I have explained
above, how the database is produced and constructed, and the relationships between the
data within it is crucially important to the outcome of search results. Caliskan-islam et
al.’s report notes that the statistical machine-learning model they used ‘knows’ the prop-
erties of flowers and insects ‘with no direct experience of the world, and no representation
of semantics other than the implicit metrics of words’ co-occurrence statistics that it is
trained on (Caliskan-islam et al. 2016: 3). As discussed above, given the incomplete,
loaded and skewed nature of the data search engines can work on, co-occurrence alone is
no basis for absolute knowledge. Their model does not ‘know’ the properties of flowers any
more than the Google algorithm ‘knows’ women are sexy and not sexist; what it ‘knows’
is how the properties of flowers are represented in particular body of data, which is not
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the same thing.
4.4.2 Translating
The systemic problems faced by search data and algorithmic processing can be seen also
in online translation, where similar vector space analysis is deployed to produce the most
accurate predictions of corresponding words in different languages. Although its accu-
racy has improved over time (and there are of course other online translation tools),
Google Translate has always been infamous for its amusing and intriguing inaccuracies
and anomalies, a good example of which is when in early 2016 the word ‘Russia’ began
to be synonymised with ‘Mordor’ when translated from Ukrainian to Russian. Reports
at the time suggested either that the translations had somehow been manipulated by
Ukrainian hackers to ridicule Russia (How Stuff Works 2016), or were caused by a ‘bug’ or
an ‘automated error’ in the algorithm (The Guardian 2016a). Google’s own response to
the incident simply reiterated what has long been known; that Google Translate does not
actually translate from language to language in a semantic way, but relies on the corpus of
data available on the web in a particular language to provide most likely predictive matches
based on the frequency and proximity of words and phrases in vector space. Google put
out statements explaining how its translation tool ‘looks for patterns in hundreds of mil-
lions of documents to help decide the best translation for you... automatic translation is
very difficult, as the meaning of words depends on the context in which they’re used’ (The
Guardian 2016a). As the context for the translate algorithms is the same indexed dataset
used by search algorithms, then there is always the possibility that ‘translations’ will pick
up on cultural or regional anomalies, or stories most recently disseminated. As several
sources pointed out, there are a significant number of references to Russia and Mordor
in Ukrainian language popular literature, news and satire (Molchanov 2015; BBC News
2015; Bershidsky 2014). Bershidsky also notes that a translator of Tolkien’s text suggested
that Sauron was based on Josef Stalin - although this is a suggestion refuted by Tolkien
himself - and mentions a rumour that in 2012 ‘a design company was planning to light up
an enormous Eye of Sauron over a Moscow skyscraper’. Such is the strength of association
between the two terms, that if the words ‘Russia’ and ‘Mordor’ become interchangeable
in the limited quantity of Ukrainian text which Google Translate has to work on, then
‘glitches’ like this will happen. It isn’t a ‘bug’ or an ‘error’, in fact the algorithms are
doing exactly what they are programmed to do. Of course there is the possibility that the
anomalies could have been deliberate, and similar ones could easily be replicated with the
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Figure 4.2: UN Women campaign (2013)
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appropriate amount of effort; it is after all relatively easy to ‘play around’ with Google, as
some Google Map hackers (The Guardian 2018) and Googlebombers (Search Engine Peo-
ple 2010) have shown, although presumably it is becoming harder to do so anonymously
as more and more Google services require logging in. Whether or not it was a concerted
tactical attempt to manipulate and subvert the system, or whether the data available to
the translate algorithms was already loaded with cultural references which might cause
mistranslations, the (de)contextual ordering of words on a digital level in this case was
quickly magnified to a geo-political and potentially dangerous diplomatic level.
A similar thing happened in 2013 when researchers contacted US intelligence officials
after noticing that Google Translate had begun ‘translating’ the cod-Latin placeholder
text Lorem Ipsum into ‘apparently geopolitical and startlingly modern’ English words
and phrases such as China, NATO and Internet (Krebs 2014). Rather than uncovering
some kind of spy communication network, however, this was simply an insight into how
translation technology projects vector representations and ‘word neighbors’ from a source
‘language space’ (in this case Lorem Ipsum), to target ‘language space’ (English), thereby
predicting the most likely translation (Mikolov et al. 2013). The incident therefore reveals
far more about the types of website which use Lorem Ipsum than it does about covert
operations. The web only holds a finite quantity of real Latin text and corresponding
translations, just as it only holds a finite amount of Ukrainian text and translations, so
when the Lorem Ipsum text is used as a placeholder which corresponds with the content
of a website which can be viewed in different languages, in effect diluting the word-stock
of that language, then the algorithm knows no better than to match the ‘Latin’ word to
the English one. As Lorem Ipsum tends to be used as placeholding text on the multi-
lingual websites of official organisations, governments, diplomatic pages or multinational
businesses, so the ‘translations’ will reflect the language used on those sites.
4.4.3 Defining
Online dictionaries also suffer from algorithmic predictions of meaning based on large cor-
pora data sets. Although Samuel Johnson was criticised for stamping his own personality
on some of the definitions in his 1755 ‘Dictionary of the English Language’3, the objectiv-
3A British Library webpage states how Johnson’s definition of the word oats is ‘very rude to the Scots.
He defines the word as “A Grain, which in England is generally given to horses, but in Scotland supports
the people”’ (The British Library n.d.).
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Figure 4.3: Oxford Dictionary example of rabid, October 17 2016. Screenshot: author’s
own.
ity of an equally popular but more modern, online dictionary was recently also called into
question when it started to use the phrase rabid feminist as a contextual usage example
for the word rabid (see Figure 4.3). Oxford Dictionaries Online, the digital version of
the Oxford Dictionary of English which (amongst other things) supplies Apple products
with their built-in British-English dictionary4, responded to criticism of this apparently
sexist word pairing by explaining that ‘our example sentences come from real-world use
and aren’t definitions’. Their website explained how the phrases are drawn from ‘a vast
bank of more than 1.9 million example sentences (around 38 million words) of real En-
glish, extracted from the world’s newspapers and magazines, academic journals, fiction,
and blogs’ (Oxford Living Dictionaries 2016).
Just like Google’s search and translation tools, the Oxford Dictionary’s examples are seem-
ingly just a reflection of the linguistic data that exists online, which as I explained above,
is not necessarily representative, democratic, or untainted by the technologies and com-
mercial interests which mediate it. Unlike in Johnson’s day, definitions based on digital
data are calculated mathematically, so their potential inaccuracies or controversies are
based on the accumulated mass of available data, rather than on the qualitative bias of
one person or small group. The phrases generated as likely usage examples will therefore
mirror the most likely pairings or orderings of already existing words based on the seman-
tically irrelevant factors of frequency and proximity. It would therefore seem (rightly or
wrongly) that the word ‘feminist’ is topologically closer to the word ‘rabid’ than any other
word in the corpus of available linguistic data, including, we must assume, the word ‘dog’,
which is an interesting linguistic development in itself.
4see BuzzFeed 2016 for a comprehensive ‘storyfied’ report of the controversy
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What can be drawn from the examples of online search, translation and definitions, is that
when language becomes data - due to the nature of data processing, language technologies
and digital networking - it becomes volatile and invasive; its effects spreading more widely
and more quickly, than the printed word. It can perpetuate stereotypes and inequalities,
confirm biases, create diplomatic incidents, and with the increasing ubiquity and indis-
pensability of the technologies that employ it has a perhaps unprecedented impact on
web users. The Oxford Dictionary has what is presumably a very lucrative contract with
Apple for the supply of words for its database of definitions and examples, all of which are
made visible at the touch of a screen though the millions of Apple devices worldwide. As
Attig (2016) responded to the incident on Twitter, with examples such as ‘rabid feminist’,
the Oxford Dictionary is in effect ‘beaming a sexist lexicography straight to students’
iPads’. While there may be no tactical agenda for Apple beyond a convenient and cost-
effective business agreement, the physical reach and volume of their products, coupled
with their reliance on algorithmically mediated samples effectively puts an extraordinary
and unintended epistemic power in the hands of another private company. As useful and
ubiquitous as the tools provided by companies such as Apple and Google are, what we
can see from this is that the way big tech companies use mathematical methods to extract
search results, translations and definitions from large corpora can have serious side effects.
But there are other actors in this space; activists, politicians, academics, advertisers, and
even the hand of the market are all part of these contextual maneuvers.
4.5 Language games
Recent debates around privacy and encryption have highlighted the specific nature of the
interests of the state, civil society and commercial companies in the visibility or invisibility
of linguistic (and other) online data. Text can be hidden or redacted for private or political
purposes - through the use of passwords, paywalls or even through site architecture such
as sitemaps and robot.txt. Such was the case, for example, in 2003 when it was reported
that the White House had hidden webpages which referenced Iraq from being indexed
by the webcrawlers (Elmer 2009). Privacy activists have suggested ways to deliberately
obscure personal data. Brunton and Nissenbaum’s users’ guide to ‘Obfuscation’ calls for
the ‘deliberate use of ambiguous, confusing, or misleading information to interfere with
surveillance and data collection’ (2015: 1). They see obfuscation as a tactic, or a ‘weapon
of the weak’ (2015: 55) to be deployed from within the surveillance society using ‘every-
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day’ language as a subversive tactic against the powerful (de Certeau 1988, 30). Criminal
activities such as phishing attacks often vary a web address or keyword by one letter in
order to exploit the inadvertent user who may have misspelled a search query, or clicked
on the wrong link, thus directing them to a fake site. ‘In the lexicon of the World Wide
Web’ write Matt Fuller and Andrew Goffey, ‘such typos are the homonyms and synonyms,
the words that allow a user to pass over into another dimension of reference’ (2009: 153).
Companies or individuals can guard the portals and spaces of sites by buying up domain
names or keywords. Spam emails often rely on algorithmically generated jumbles of words
that need to make just enough sense, not to fool humans (at least in the first instance),
but rather, to fool firewalls. Language in online spaces can also be disguised in order to
deceive commercial copyright or plagiarism software. Evidence of the resulting linguistic
mutations this embeds in the database is clearly visible. Tarleton Gillespie uses the ex-
ample of the misspelling of ‘Britny Speers’ so that people searching for illegal downloads
could find recordings, ‘but the record industry software could not’ (Gillespie 2014: 184).
On the flipside, however, it is sometimes impossible to search for a specific word without
being autocorrected, which may seem to give the platform doing the ‘correcting’ a more
‘strategic’ method of ‘producing, tabulating and imposing’(de Certeau 1988: 30) power
within the contextual space of the search, yet, as I will suggest, power balances within
geographies of (con)text are constantly being challenged by actors on all levels, and it is
hard to imagine an unconnected strategic vantage point within that context.
Data-ised language in this sense becomes either a tool, or means of access or restriction;
its linguistic function as a means of human communication becoming secondary to its
use and exchange value for other purposes. But as well as being used as a tactical tool,
language can in itself have its movements restricted as it passes through digital spaces.
Non-normative, creative language can be actively ‘criminalised’, not only by Google, but
also by firewalls or anti-virus software which blocks text that does not conform to whatever
‘natural language’ databases or templates it has been taught. The condensed, carefully
worded nature of poetry can sometimes be construed by algorithms as key-word stuffing; a
tactical manipulation of the search rankings which is frowned upon by Google, and which
can lead poetry websites to be ‘buried’ in the search rankings (Hoy 2006). Artist Sophie
Mayer (2013) noticed how the poetry magazine Poems in the Waiting Room had to issue
advice to potential contributors, asking them to send their submissions in the body of an
email rather than in an attachment, as the attached poetry might be mistaken for a virus
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by the spam filtering software. All this starts to beg the question just how communicable
is poetic or creative language in a digital age? Is it less communicable than a virus? How
restricted or restrictive - is language when it becomes data? And further to this, what
is the function (and fate) of language if it is written for, or increasingly by in (the case
of algorithmic content generating) machines or algorithms for the sole consumption of
other machines or algorithms? As the method for this type of exchange is all acted out
mathematically, then the onward effects on non-mathematic language becomes little more
than collateral damage; the leftovers of a linguistic power-grab perhaps, or a post-modern
language game.
4.6 Language markets
Poetry is of course also the lens through which I conduct my intervention into another
major player in the landscape and mobility of online language the advertising industry.
As I will explain in subsequent chapters, in a system Frederic Kaplan has called ‘linguistic
capitalism’ (2014), the language which flows through Google’s search and advertising
platforms becomes infused with the logics and values of what might be termed a linguistic
marketplace; its grammars, patterns and frequencies formed not through generations of
linguistic happenstance, but as advertisers compete for lucrative keywords, and (as we
have seen earlier) as machines learn and magnify algorithmic glitches. Words have gained
a currency detached from, for example, their narrative function. Not only do their prices
fluctuate according to apparently neoliberal free-market competition, but there are also
many distortions to this market due to centralised interference and control from Google in
the form of regulations, censorship and other linked applications, as I explore in chapter
6. The data-isation and monetisation of language in this process has a subsequent effect
on the density and frequency of certain words within the searchable database, privileging
both paid-for words and phrases, and also organically optimised language in the search
results. To paraphrase N. Katherine Hayles, language does not emerge unscathed from its
encounter with code (Hayles 2005: 39). Indeed, data-ised language tells other, paratextual
stories as it moves and is moved through digital space. It gains economic value as it draws
eyes to adverts and negotiates spaces controlled by ‘cognitive rent’ (Pasquinelli 2009: 157)
or ‘lexical squatting’ (Fuller & Goffey 2009: 153), and as we have seen, it becomes weighted
with the residue of the wider pool of decontextualised, yet hierarchised data, or ‘tracts
of knowledge’ (Hess 2008: 35). This residue turns tools such as translate and search
into ‘authoring device(s)’ (Rogers 2009: 176), and turns (machine) translations into new
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linguistic art forms (Nabugodi 2016). But the stories told and the paths forged in this
manner are always products of the structures from which they originate and through which
they flow. Even the vectors which quantify data-ised language do not just point to, or
connect things, but are carriers of meaning; they add to the story. We too have become
vectors in the digital assemblage, or as Mackenzie Wark puts it:
Both the flaˆneur and the facebooker are voluntary wanderers through the sig-
nage of commodified life, taking news of the latest marvels to their friends and
acquaintances (2015: para.40).
But Wark’s flaˆneur is very much the Benjaminian flaˆneur of the arcades, not the modern
day de´rive-drifter whose goal is to subvert, not admire, the spectacle. It is surely impossible
to drift through digital space today without picking up the ‘signage of commodified life’
in the form of ‘likes’, ‘shares’ and click-bait, whether voluntary or not. As de Certeau
identified, with the ubiquity of the mass media ‘instead of an increasing nomadism, we
thus find a “reduction” and a “confinement”: consumption, organised by this expansionist
grid takes on the appearance of something done by sheep progressively immobilized and
“handled” as a result of the growing mobility of the media as they conquer space’ (de
Certeau 1988: 165). There is of course much more to be said about the changing values
of data-ised language and the circulation of linguistic capital, which I will expand upon in
Chapters 5-7.
4.7 Conclusion: The prison house of digitised language
To conclude this chapter, it is apparent that language is an integral element of digital space,
and one way to conceptualise this is through thinking about the composition of data-ised
language as ‘(con)text’. Just as in other spaces, there are social and political factors at
play, and power is exerted and subverted by competing actors. Following de Certeau,
the manipulation and movement of language within this produced space can therefore
be read as kinds of tactical maneuvers which ‘make use of the cracks that particular
conjunctions open in the surveillance of the proprietary powers’ (1988: 37). We can see
in the decontextualised database, or, indeed, in such a simple action such as cutting and
pasting what Derrida called the ‘citational graft’ of a sign; the capacity to put quotation
marks around any word or phrase and move it elsewhere, thus ‘break(ing) with every given
context, engendering an infinity of new contexts in a manner which is absolutely illimitable’
(1988, 12). As Ming Lim suggests, in the mechanics of the search engine industry we can
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see that there really is nothing outside of the (con)text:
In this space, signs truly refer only to other signs and all pretense at ‘pres-
ence’ or ‘essence’ or ‘authenticity’ is no longer necessary. Marketers who use
SEM [Search Engine Management] are now subject to the peculiar laws of an
architecture which have barely begun to be theorised (2008: 10).
But Derrida’s illimitable contexts were imagined before the structures and restrictions of
modern digitised language were fully realised. In this context, words are not ‘free’ to be
eternally deferred, but become exponentially re-infused with the residue of the dominant
structures, market forces, biases and stereotypes that make up the corpus of the search-
able database. Inextricably linked with code (Hayles 2005, 16), their meaning has been
‘arrested’ (de Certeau 1988: 165)5; chained to the past by algorithmic association and
given a record it is impossible to expunge. Followed around by ‘semantic escorts’ (Meta-
haven 2009: 189) which have the power to decide who or what can and cannot be sexist,
(un)pleasant, rabid or racist, they have in effect been ‘reconstructed’; squeezed through
binary systems which force an either/or logic on words even as they squirm to get away.
And neither is digitised language free from an organising metanarrative. Words-as-data,
already (re)constructed by virtue of the way they are stored and transmitted are also
monetised within the system of ‘linguistic capitalism’ (Kaplan 2014). As Franco Berardi
states, ‘today the economy is the universal grammar traversing the different levels of hu-
man activity’ (Berardi 2012: 158).
But what of de Certeau’s tactics? Who benefits from the structural and economic re-
strictions of language-as-data? If, as Gunnar Olsson believes ‘it is in the interest of social
cohesion to impoverish language’ (1978: 110), then the power wielded by the big technol-
ogy companies such as Google, Apple and Facebook becomes even more terrifying, as I
will detail in the provocations of Chapters 7 and 8. In terms of ‘(con)text’ that is the
geo-linguistic space of the web - it might perhaps be easy to think of these big technology
companies as strategic actors in de Certeau’s sense of an institution which has estab-
lished itself in ‘a place that can be delimited as its own and serve as the base from which
relations with an exteriority composed of targets or threats (customers or competitors)
can be managed’ (de Certeau 1988: 36). But it is more complicated than that. As the
content and the currency of the web is made up of interactive, interconnected, data-ised
5‘To arrest the meaning of words once and for all, that is what the Terror wants’, quoted in de Certeau
1988: 165
85
4.7 Conclusion: The prison house of digitised language
language, none of the actors (including us as users) involved in the kinds of (con)textual
maneuvers I have described can ever act from a completely strategic (air gapped) van-
tage point. While there are different levels of access to other resources that shape digital
infrastructures, such as source code, what we might call ‘natural’ language - which has
been deconstructed and decontextualised into data - has a liquid quality that permeates
through the spaces of the web, in some way making users of us all. It may seem that with
their control over the mediation of language, the big technology companies have the upper
hand, but they have, to a certain extent, created something over which they no longer
have complete strategic control. What does seem to be the case, however, is that like the
spaces of consumerism described by De Certeau, language-as-data always seems to have
an ulterior, paratextual motive and, perhaps because of the mathematised logic of code,
can never just be language. So just as we are trapped within the structures of a digitalised
discourse, so are we too involved to be able to look in from the outside from a strategic
vantage point. ‘There is’ de Certeau says ‘no longer an elsewhere’ (1988: 40). We are
truly coopted; practicing out everyday lives within what Jameson might have called the
‘prison house of digital language’ (1974). Yet despite its structural constraints, the man-
ner in which linguistic data is disseminated online can, as I have shown, have far reaching
effects untethered to and unpredicted by its topological environment or physical location.
In this way, it could be concluded that digitised language falls somewhere in the middle
of a structuralist/post-structuralist critique; being at the same time both free from and
constrained by the geographies of (con)text.
This chapter has set out my ideas on how the granular digital and algorithmic structuring
of linguistic data can have significant consequences on a magnified global, societal, and
political scale. I conclude that the way language is stored, processed and manipulated
online reconstructs stereotypes and inequalities into the wiser discourse. I introduced
the concept of ‘geographies of (con)text’, as a way to explore the different actors who
operate within this geo-linguistic space, and to analyse their motives. The chapter has also
introduced some of the work I present in subsequent chapters about the power and politics
of language in the age of algorithmic reproduction (Chapters 5-6), the value, circulation
and liquidity of digitised language (Chapters 6-9), and my own tactical intervention which,
like Jameson in his structural analysis of Russian formalism (1974), uses poetry as means
to critique the structural ‘prison-house’ of language in an age of linguistic capitalism
(Chapter 7). Before that, however, the next chapter sets out the framework of the thesis
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as a whole, ‘The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction’, an essay written
by Walter Benjamin in the 1930s about the impact of technology on culture and politics,
but which I argue provides an insightful lens through which to study language in the age
of algorithmic reproduction today.
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Chapter 5
LANGUAGE IN THE AGE OF
ALGORITHMIC
REPRODUCTION
Using Walter Benjamin’s 1936 essay ‘The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Repro-
duction’ (1999) as a theoretical springboard, this chapter continues my investigation into
what happens to language when reproduced algorithmically through search engines such
as Google, and sets the scene for the unfolding of the Benjaminian frame in the follow-
ing chapters. Reflecting both the political and economic frame through which Benjamin
examined the work of art, I argue that the processing of language through the search
engine is similarly based on the distancing and decontextualisation of language from its
‘source’, or from the intent of the user; an exploitation of media which is politically no
less important today in an age of fake news (Graham 2017) and algorithmic bias (Noble
2018). Using the Benjamin text as a focus, the chapter also discusses techniques learned
from participation in a search engine optimisation (SEO) training course, which reveal
how much of the language we see online has been structured for the consumption of al-
gorithms. Setting up ideas for a wider critique about the power and political economy of
language (Chapter 6), and my own intervention (Chapter 7), I then suggest that the power
and politics lurking behind these algorithmic processes is facilitated by the aesthetics of
the Google empire, and that, following Benjamin, the most effective way to counter the
aestheticisation of politics is to make art political. But in re-politicising digital artistic
critique we must take care not to re-aestheticise the politics of technology, paying close
attention to the means of its production.
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5.1 Introduction
The title of this chapter, and indeed the whole thesis, is a fairly obvious and unapologetic
appropriation of Walter Benjamin’s 1936 essay ‘The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical
Reproduction’ (1999), however I have used it less of a template than a springboard from
which to explore ideas about reproduction of a distinctly more modern kind, that of words
and language by algorithms, and more specifically through search engines such as Google
and its associated applications.
When researching language in a digital age, there are questions frequently asked which I
think must be tackled straight away, one of which is: how is the reproduction of language
- or indeed art - different in an age of digital as opposed to mechanical, analogue technol-
ogy? And following on from that, is language as an evolving part of human ontology not
inseparable from the progress of technology (Stiegler 1998); ‘textural structures being...
always already technological’ (Barnet 2003), and is there not therefore some kind of con-
ceit in decrying the corruption of ‘natural’ language and meaning at the ‘hands’ of digital
technology? Surely post-structuralism tells us that language is never fixed anyway, and
indeed, why is language important to humans at all?
The proliferation of text and information afforded by the printing press and new methods
of dissemination was perhaps just as much of an information revolution as the start of mass
access to the Web. Indeed, Robert Darnton (2009: 33) argues that ‘every age was an age
of information, each in its own way, and that information has always been unstable’. And
if computerisation of language is seen as a threat to the integrity of the printed text, per-
haps through inadequate machine reading such as Optical Character Recognition (OCR),
or machine translation, then likewise copies of all kinds of text have always deteriorated,
varied, or been open to corruption through translation, plagiarism and bootleggers selling
pirate copies (Bridle 2015). To a certain extent these are valid points, but James Bridle’s
defence of digitised language highlights important differences between different forms of
reproduction. Yes, language generated by printing presses had a monetary value in that
there has always been a market for cheap copies, and likewise much of the text created
for new readerships of newspapers was controlled by monetary concerns (in terms of dis-
tribution and physical space on the printed page), as were new communications methods
such as the telegram. But the way language is valued online is not the same as that of the
column inch, or the ‘price-per-word’ method of the telegram, where words are valued more
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by the physical space or effort they take up, rather than any value inherent in the words as
narrative, in a literary or aesthetic sense, or purely as a function of human communication.
On the Web and in the telegram, language is indeed moulded by either the proliferation
or brevity needed to make or save money for both consumers and producers, but what I
argue throughout this thesis is that the algorithmic reproduction of language is infused
with a different kind of market value, whereby words themselves can be elevated beyond
or outside both their material manifestation and their semantic function in order to create
capital. This is language being ‘othered’ by what Katherine Hayles calls the ontology of
the database; its narrative order, and its creative and communicative functions (to hu-
mans) compromised by classification and enumeration (Hayles 2012: 179). Further to this,
I want to suggest that the algorithmic reproduction of language by reduction and recon-
struction through the enumerative and economic structures of search engine technology
has consequences for the integrity and evolution of language and discourse which reach far
beyond the relative stability of a printing press cliche´, which we might perhaps see as the
forerunner of the algorithmically reproduced ‘glitch’. Print capitalism may have given ‘a
new fixity to language’ (Anderson 2006: 46) but ‘linguistic capitalism’ (Kaplan 2014) and
‘semantic capitalism’ (Feuz et al. 2011) is far less stable, and it is in this flux of money
and words that new forms of power and influence flourish.
Apart from the appropriation of Benjamin, part of the methodology used in this chapter
has included researching the commercial Search Engine Optimisation (SEO) industry by
attending a training course, which has given me an important insight into how search
rankings (specifically Google in this case) work, but more importantly, made clear not
only the role of the market in those rankings, but of an industry aimed at adapting or
manipulating language in order to succeed in that market. In this chapter I will therefore
be using the basic structure of an SEO training guide to organise the chapter through
three main themes, the first of which deals with the ‘organic’ optimisation of web content
through links, keywords and tagging which leads to a discussion of language and linguis-
tics, raising questions of authorship, readership, content and context. The second section
will focus on how language is commodified as it circulates through digital spaces such as
commercial search engines and email, and the inherent linking of text to market forces,
while the third section explores issues of power, monopoly and influence which the control
of the means of processing, producing and reproducing language entails. These factors
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the linguistic, the economic, and the inevitable political debate in which they synthesise
were central to the atmosphere of cultural/ technological debate which informs Benjamin’s
1936 essay; their historical combination, according to Benedict Anderson, having enough
discursive power to affect (and effect) national consciousness. In exploring the ‘explosive
interaction between a system of production and productive relations (capitalism), a tech-
nology of communications (print), and the fatality of human linguistic diversity’, Anderson
was of course writing about the development of print-capitalism since the 14th Century,
but I argue that the collision of language, capital and technology are equally explosive
and discursively powerful today. Bringing Benjamin’s essay to its natural conclusion, the
chapter concludes by suggesting that the power and politics lurking behind these algorith-
mic processes (Introna & Nissenbaum 2000), is facilitated by the aesthetics of the Google
empire, and that, following Benjamin, the only way to counter the aestheticisation of pol-
itics is to turn this tool of power back on itself, to make art political; reclaiming language
(be it literary, artistic, political or prosaic) from the algorithmic marketplace in order to
re-politicise artistic critique, which is the focus of my intervention detailed in Chapter 7.
5.2 Why Benjamin?
That which withers in the age of mechanical reproduction is the aura of the
work of art (Benjamin 1999: 215).
I cannot claim to be the only person to use Benjamin’s theories on culture in a more con-
temporary context, and am by no means the first to see the potential in using Benjamin as
a means of exploring and critiquing modern digital technology, whether in terms of critical
theory (Berry 2014), geography (Gilge 2015, 2016a; Kingsbury & Jones, 2009), machine
translation (Nabugodi 2014; Littau 1997), big data (Halpern 2015), or in comparison with
other theorists of technology such as Donna Haraway (Franklin 2002). The argument I
put forward in this chapter is intended to add to this burgeoning debate with a hopefully
unique mixture of Benjamin’s critical theory and work I have been doing around Google
and the highly lucrative and competitive commercial Search Engine Optimisation indus-
try (SEO). I hope that this slightly experimental splicing of Walter Benjamin and Google
SEO tips facilitates an engaging discussion of the socio-technical, economic and political
nature of search technology, and the effect it is having on language (whether creative,
communicative, or a mixture of both) and the wider discourse, particularly in our current
age of fake news (Graham 2017) and algorithmic bias (Noble 2018).
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Benjamin’s essay recommends itself particularly to my examination of digital technologies
in that his critique of mechanically reproduced art necessarily, and implicitly, includes
mechanically produced language. It is perhaps the idea of creative, or literary language
- in a distinctly humanistic way - being somehow corrupted or exploited by algorithmic
reproduction, that drives my own critique. However, when reduced to data for transmis-
sion or storage, all digitised language (whether artistic or otherwise), is reduced to what
we might think of as a ‘binary soup’. The consequences for artistic language in a digi-
tal age are thus necessarily mediated by the processes that govern and mediate all other
types of digitised language, and indeed any other piece of data. In an age when data has
become such a lucrative and politicised commodity, the collateral effects on the language
it represents and reproduces can have serious repercussions, as I cover in Chapters 6 and 7.
In recent years there has been something of a revival in Benjamin studies, with 2015
marking the 75th anniversary of his death. Mackenzie Wark’s (2015) Benjamedia essay,
written as part of the anniversary events, identifies distinct parallels between the political
and historical situations of today and when Benjamin originally published, asking not only
if Benjamin still speaks to us today, but ‘what he can do for us’ in the future. Benjamin
was fascinated, and perhaps conflicted by the tensions between past, present and future
(Kingsbury & Jones 2009). The sadness displayed for the ‘withering’ of the aura in the
Work of Art essay, and a love of artefacts, history and high art which was perhaps at
odds with his supposed revolutionary credentials (Werckmeister 1996), might suggest a
less than progressive philosophy, but Benjamin’s apparent nostalgia does not exclude his
recognition of technology as a potential force for good. As Tim Beasley-Murray (2012:
781) observes, even in the face of the mechanical violence of the war machine, he ‘does
not resort to nostalgic technophobia’, instead seeing a perhaps unrealised emancipatory
potential in the reproducibility of media such as film and photography.
Following Benjamin’s lead, my critical stance on search engines, and Google in particular,
does not preclude any notion of the benefits and creative possibilities of digital technology.
Perhaps answering David Beer’s (2009) call for a critical counteraction to the ‘Web 2.0
bandwagon’, my work is instead a call for continued caution towards the tools we increas-
ingly rely on to communicate and express ourselves in everyday life, making the power
and effect they have visible through critiques and interventions such as I describe in this
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thesis. As Benjamin himself wrote, ‘technological revolution... are the fracture points in
artistic development where political positions, exposed bit by bit, come to the surface’
(2008: 329), and these fracture points are perhaps just as evident today. In the age of
digital technology, where advertising and information can be said to have taken over from
heavy industry as a major accumulator of wealth and influence, proprietary algorithms
have become the facilitators of the movement of raw materials and commodities (in this
case raw data or text instead of coal or steel) for capital (re)production. They are in
effect ‘do[ing] for information systems what canals did for mercantilism’ (Poon 2013), and
making their owners extremely rich and powerful in the process.
The ownership of these new means of production has therefore never been more important,
and nor has the ownership of the commodities themselves. Algorithmically reproduced
words have become the vital textual currency of the Web and the lifeblood of ‘linguistic
capitalism’ (Kaplan 2014). But as I showed in the previous chapter, as words are digitised,
they become little more than constellations of data, re-ordered in storage and transit as
they are moved further and further away from their original context. In Benjaminian
terms their ‘place in time and space’ (1999: 214) is compromised as they circulate through
the Web, and especially through text-based information and marketing platforms such as
Google’s search and advertising technologies. Here they perhaps risk losing their ‘aura’;
stripped of their contextual meaning, their value becomes subject to the fluctuating laws
of the market (Bruno 2002; 2012), rather than any residual narrative function, or indeed
even the intent of the human searcher (Jarrett 2014). As I explained in Chapter 4, and will
again in more detail in Chapter 8 (with the concept of Subprime Language), as words flow
through the portal of the search bar, the subjective context from which they originated
is negated in favour of their potential profit as optimised keywords, and each time they
make that journey, circulating around the web, their economic value increases.
5.3 What is language in the age of algorithmic reproduc-
tion?
Language isnt what it used to be (Hayles 2006).
According to Google itself, there are over 200 different ‘signals’ which can affect the rank-
ings of search results, including location data, personalisation the device you use, browsing
history, and the time of day, not to mention the intricacies of the sorting and ranking al-
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gorithms themselves (Search Engine Land 2010). These issues have been discussed at
length by other scholars, but what I want to do in this section is to take some of issues
I discussed in the previous chapter about data structures and the searchable database,
and relate them to the cultural and political context in which Benjamin wrote his ‘Work
of Art’ essay. To briefly recap, in Chapter 4 I put forward the concept of ‘Geographies
of (con)text’ in order to explore how the language on the web is constructed and dis-
tributed, and the wider effects of its algorithmic processing through platforms such as
Google search. In particular, I discussed what is perhaps the most fundamental factor in
determining what comes out of a search engine, and that is what goes into it, i.e. the
data available on which the algorithms can work. Without such data structures, algo-
rithms are, as Fuller and Goffey (2009) point out, ‘useless’. What I call the ‘searchable
database’, however, which produces the context for all web searches, auto-predictions and
auto-corrections is far from uncomplicated, and holds within it the same hierarchies of
links, language, categorisation and social and political agency as any socially produced
space (Massey 2013; Lefebvre 1991).
What is uploaded to this corpus of data is also contingent on who has the technology
and the skills to upload to it, which can be heavily socially and geographically skewed,
depending on different levels or types of internet access in different parts of the world. In
this respect, one of the things which first struck me about the ‘Work of Art’ essay was
Benjamin’s fairly damning description of how advances in the printing and distribution
industries had enabled those he considered unworthy and unqualified to contribute to the
production of written texts. Noting that ‘the greatly increased mass of participants has
produced a change in the mode of participation’, Benjamin complained about how an
increasing number of people became writers at first occasional ones. It began
with the daily press opening to its reader’s space for ‘letters to the editor’.
And today there is hardly a gainfully employed European who could not in
principle find an opportunity to publish somewhere or other comments on his
work, grievances, documentary reports, or that sort of thing (1999: 225).
What this shows, however, is that literary agency a century ago was also dependent on
economic, geographical, social, and class factors, i.e. those ‘gainfully employed’, those in
Europe, those with access to the necessary technologies, and, in this context, those who
happened to be male. The advent of Web 2.0, to which ‘anyone’ has access and the poten-
tial to contribute might indeed have brought about a ‘change in the mode of participation’,
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but far from being a democratising leveller of society, or a measure of equal participation,
what can be contributed to the ‘searchable database’ is highly contingent and can exclude
groups of people on multiple social-economic levels. As Kate Crawford (2013: para. 3)
writes, ‘data are assumed to accurately reflect the social world, but there are significant
gaps, with little or no signal coming from particular communities’. As I mentioned in the
previous chapter, there are also both technical and economic factors that also skew the
overall ‘level’ of the content available online.
But even amongst the privileged who had the means, skills and opportunity to ‘become
writers’, Benjamin noted the changing quality of what was being contributed to the liter-
ary archive. When those who have traditionally only been readers or consumers of text
suddenly gain access to authorship, Benjamin (1999: 225) worried that ‘literary licence
is now founded on polytechnic rather than specialised training’. This seems perhaps a
familiar argument with regards to the amount of unedited material that circulates on the
web today. There is, therefore, no guarantee of the reliability or quality of the dominant
content, or as Geert Lovink (2008: 45) puts it ‘with the rise of Internet search engines it is
no longer possible to distinguish between patrician insights and plebeian gossip’. This is of
course further complicated with the increasing popularity of computer generated language
in the creation of news stories or weather forecasts, for example.
5.3.1 Search Engine Optimisation
The concept of the reader-turned-author is perhaps most relevant when it comes to my
research into SEO. Search Engine Optimisation has become big business. Whether self-
taught, through one of thousands of dedicated SEO companies, or via Google itself (there
are many guides and instruction videos online), millions of individuals, businesses, journal-
ists, bloggers, academics and other authors are using what Benjamin might have considered
distinctly ‘polytechnic’ skills not only to upload content and add to the corpus of online
data, but crucially to adapt that content for the specific consumption of algorithms.
‘Google is’, as Lisa Gitelman notes, ‘certainly making us all into wordsmiths of a very
particular, very narrow sort’ (2013b). Perhaps the most basic of the methods of SEO
is the strategic manipulation of what are, somewhat ironically, called the organic search
results, which are the non-paid for results. This method necessitates close attention to the
textual content of a website, to keywords and synonyms and to the linguistic construction
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of links, tags, Universal Resource Locators (URLs) and Hyper Text Markup Language
(HTML), but although language here is key, it is a language so infused with the practi-
calities of algorithmic enumeration and discovery, that it has perhaps developed its own
agency, telling stories beyond its narrative function (Hayles 2012), or creating what Fer-
ragina and Venturini call ‘parallel language’, or a ‘folksonomy’ which runs along side and
through already existing language (2013). I will go into more detail about these alterna-
tive narratives constructed in the process of SEO and linguistic capitalism in later chapters.
According to Benjamin, when a work of art is mechanically reproduced, and that re-
production in itself has no artistic authenticity, it becomes subject to other social and
economic forces and so necessarily enters the sphere of the political. Using the example
of photography, he explains how the reproduction is no longer a work of art with an aura
but has instead been ‘designed for reproducibility’ (1999: 218)1. Much like the keywords
carefully implanted into a webpage, the reproduced work of art becomes an instrument of
production in itself. Language on the internet has, it seems, taken on a different purpose.
In order to optimise the efficiency of your website you must optimise it for reproducibility.
You must plan your language with logical, as well as semantic, precision, picking keywords
which will maximise your chance of exposure in much the same way (yet somewhat iron-
ically) as we all have to supply searchable keywords which help optimise the visibility of
our academic articles. What is interesting here in terms of SEO, however, is the language
which is used about language. The ‘Google verified’ SEO instructor who led my intensive
training course2 suggested we ‘make ourselves a list of synonyms’ with which to bolster
the keyword associated data on a website without having to repeat the keyword itself too
many times (‘keyword stuffing’ is frowned upon by Google as an unfair practice). ‘We dont
talk about dictionaries, we talk about lexicons’, my instructor continued, before showing
an example of a list of ‘synonyms’, which were in fact words associated with each other
in the loosest sense but certainly not synonymous. What SEO fails (or does not care)
to recognise, is that words in a lexicon, unlike those in a dictionary, do not necessarily
mean the same thing. The list which the instructor gave as an example was more like
an entry in a thesaurus; the words all had something to do with each other (even if by
virtue of meaning the opposite), however they were not synonyms. But by creating these
connections with keyword lists and sitemaps, and then re-affirming them with clicks and
1This emphasis on the ‘reproducibility’ as well as the ‘reproduction’ of art is central to Benjamin’s
essay. A recent translation of selected works reflects this in its title: ‘The work of art in the age of its
technological reproducibility, and other writings on media’ (2008).
2I attended a one-day intensive SEO course.
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site visits, we are all - as search users of varying degrees - in effect teaching the algorithms
that they are synonyms. It is this kind of erroneous word association that will return
results for vegetarian when you search for vegan, for example, or Muslim when you search
for Asian (Baker & Potts 2013).Benjamin2008
5.4 The death of the reader
Ah, humanity! (Bartleby the Scrivener, Melville 1998)
Perhaps an even greater destabiliser of meaning, however, is the process of decontextual-
isation through which language goes when processed online. When encoded for machine
processing, ‘all difference of media dissolves into a pulsing stream of bits and bytes’ (Lunen-
feld 2000: 7). In fact, in their digital form, there are no ‘edges’ between different media
at all. ‘Digital documents... are materially, bibliographically the same as the windows
that they appear in and the programs that manipulate them’ (Gitelman 2014: 17). So
not only is the potential difference between what is art and what is literature, or a novel
and a blog eroded, but the distinction between a body of text (as literature) and the type
of text which is retrieved by algorithms through search engines is too.
As detailed in Chapter 4, even so-called ‘semantic’ searches, which aim to gather meaning
from groups of data rather than spatial relationships between single words, are just match-
ing data patterns, and when you add the auto-correct and auto-predict functions into the
mix, the potential for the proximity and frequency of certain data to be compounded,
re-confirmed and therefore perpetuated ad infinitum leads to the kind of anomaly which I
encountered, where the word sexiest was presumably statistically more likely to be linked
to the term wives and girlfriends than the word sexist. Safiya Noble’s (2018) recent book
Algorithms of Oppression provides numerous examples of the racial implications of this
kind of process. As Mark Fuller and Andrew Goffey put it in their Evil Media manifesto,
harvesting data from websites is a matter of using and then stripping off the
mark-up language by which web pages are rendered in order to retrieve the
data of interest and returning this to a database, ready for mining. At this
point, semantics is largely irrelevant (2009: 149).
But to return to SEO, although Google’s PageRank algorithm started out as a hierarchy
of citations (Brin & Page 1998), as I explore further in Chapter 6, it was a system which
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was easily gamed by link-farming or other black-hat techniques (see also chapter 4). This
type of manipulation of the rankings is deemed unfair by Google, mostly because they
are less in control of the demand, supply and income generated by web traffic. However,
according to my SEO instructor (and confirmed by Matt Cutts at Google 2014), incoming
links to a website are becoming less important than the actual content and construction
of a site. As well as carefully selected keywords, ‘Google likes fresh content’, we were told,
but by ‘fresh content’, my instructor meant any recycled content which has been altered
slightly, commented on, or added to just enough to keep the web crawlers interested, and
recommended in-site blogging as an effective tactic. This recycling of words in this man-
ner, however, is curiously at odds with the recycling of other commodities in that the
explicit goal is the production of more, rather than less, waste, and that this excess of
waste, rather than its reduction, is the means of capital gain. But what Benjamin called
‘locust swarms of print’ have become part of what it means to exist online, and as long
as web presence and search rankings hold such an existential power over society and the
market, these swarms will ‘grow thicker with each succeeding year’ (2007: 78).
It is, however, not just commercial websites that have to adopt optimisation strategies. It
is newspaper articles, blogs, and headlines, which also have to tailor their text to court the
algorithms. And this text and those keywords will necessarily be reflective of the already
popular; they cannot be new, or creative, or challenging otherwise they just would not
serve their purpose. The result is the emergence of ‘a new conformity in the language... of
news online’ (Dick 2011: 475), and various other types of content. This kind of practice,
which is in effect mandatory if you want your site or your words or profile to ‘exist’ online,
can only result in the clogging up of the searchable database with repetitive, unimaginative
copy, or ‘empty phrases’; a term used by Benjamin to describe the flood of cheap journalism
which mechanical reproduction facilitated. ‘The empty phrase’, he wrote,
is an abortion of technology... the expression of the changed function of lan-
guage in the world of high capitalism... the label that makes a thought mar-
ketable, the way flowery language, as ornament, gives it value for the connois-
seur (2007: 242).
Flowery language, however, means nothing in Google search, where an army of algorithmic
‘Bartlebys’ (Melville 1998) are not reading, but merely copying, and therefore reproducing
empty words and empty phrases from a decontextualised pool of linguistic data. Simi-
larly, the Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software which digitises text ‘chronically
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“misreads”, not because of any hardware malfunction or programming error but precisely
because scanning is not reading’ (Gitelman 2006). This is not so much the Death of the
Author (in a Barthean sense) (Barthes 1977), but what we might call the Death of the
Reader, and evidence of a slow strangulation of creativity and authorial autonomy. A
democratisation of literary agency perhaps, but also the creation of a proliferation of au-
thors forced to write text for algorithms to read in order to remain visible. As Murray
Dick concludes in relation to Google’s effects on journalistic standards,
SEO is applying pressure to these standards not in the perceived interest of the
reader or because of publication constraints (as once may have been the case),
but in the interests of a third-party commercial arbiter in online distribution:
Google (2011: 475).
I explore George Orwell’s vision of politicised language in Chapter 7, but his views on the
‘decline’ of the English language in a pre-digital age are also of interest here. To Orwell,
the popular recycling of lazy metaphors, phrases and images rather than inventing new
ones turns speakers and writers into machines, a state of consciousness which he sees as
‘favourable to political conformity’. As we see from Nineteen Eighty-Four, this machinic
and constricted mode of writing is indeed inherently political in that it also governs and
constricts thought. Like Benjamin’s ‘empty phrases’, to Orwell, the authoritarian power of
language also comes from unimaginative repetition of already existing language, or what
he calls ‘gumming together long strips of words which have already been set in order by
someone else, and making the results presentable by sheer humbug’, which could perhaps
be used as a presciently sharp critique of the commercial SEO industry.
But despite his apparent disdain for ‘the empty phrase’, Benjamin did also see the eman-
cipatory or even revolutionary - potential in new, more democratic and technologically
enhanced forms of media and art, especially in the medium of film. In the ‘Work of Art’
essay, he describes the visceral, shocking effect that rebellious new forms of writing such
as Dadaism might have on the masses. Eschewing the traditional economic and linguistic
structures and values of the old bourgeois order of language and literature, Dadaist work
smashed together apparently disparate montages of words and phrases; what Benjamin
(1999: 231) refers to as ‘word salad’. In another essay on ‘Experience and Poverty’, Ben-
jamin (2006: 733) elaborates on the new kind of language made possible by the experience
of modernity, writing that ‘what is crucial about this language is its arbitrary constructed
nature, in contrast to organic language’. It would at this point be easy to suggest that
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the ‘arbitrary’ radicality of surrealist language, poetry and art in Benjamin’s era has par-
allels to some of the digital art made today from ‘arbitrary’ algorithmic language such as
search results and autocompletions, for example Google Poetics, or what Dan Hoy (2006)
(critically) calls ‘Google-sculpted’ flarf poetry, which are issues I go into in some detail in
chapter 7. But as the next sections will describe, algorithmic reproducibility is different to
mechanical reproducibility to two key ways. Firstly, due to the responsive, learning and
controlling potential of the proprietary algorithm, and secondly, because far from being ar-
bitrary (and also ironically far from being ‘organic’), algorithmically reproduced language
is in fact mediated by the rules and regulations of companies such as Google, and also by
the neoliberal laws of the digital market (see chapter 6). So ‘rather than stimulating a
participatory revolution, new technologies have doused us even deeper in new, ever-more
intrusive forms of capitalism’.3
5.5 The commodification of language
Google has created the first global, real-time, and multilingual linguistic market
(Kaplan 2014: 59).
Optimisation of the ‘organic’ results might appear to be a ‘natural’ way to manipulate
the search rankings, but as I have shown, are far from free of economic incentive. The
machinations of the market are, however, far more clearly visible in other ways, most
noticeably in issues around plagiarism, the online auctioning of keywords (AdWords), and
targeted advertising through web browsers and email (see Chapters 6-7)).
To one extent or the other, language has always been commodified ever since things were
written down, became reproducible, mobile, and therefore entered the market. What
Benjamin (1999: 212), calls the ritualistic, cult or ‘auratic value’ of pre-mechanical art or
language is lost when it is reproduced ‘by third parties in pursuit of gain’ therefore be-
coming a commodity. And ‘once a monetary value has been established’, writes Mira Seo
(2009: 582), ‘plagiarism can enter the literary discourse’; the original ‘aura’ of the work of
art becomes less important than its exchange value and the preservation and ownership of
its rights for commercial gain. Mechanical, and now algorithmic, reproduction can only
accelerate this process. If we think of this in terms of text, this immediately translates
into who has the ‘right to copy’ text, and how this copying is regulated.
3Feedback received on an early version of this chapter, submitted to a journal for publication in 2015.
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As Lucas Introna (2015) writes on plagiarism detection algorithms, now language is so
widely available online through search engines this adds to the problem of who can claim
‘ownership’ of it intellectually, physically, or financially. But importantly, plagiarism al-
gorithms do not actually identify someone else’s ‘work’ (as in the essence, or aura of their
work), or their ‘ownership’ of it. Instead, they merely match the character strings to which
language is reduced when processed through computers. But taking a step back, can lan-
guage really be ‘owned’? Obviously, a book can be owned, and there are laws around
the protection of intellectual property, but even the relative stability of the written word
is complicated by the paratextual phenomena which arise through new technologies of
reading such as Amazon’s Kindle. The commercial e-text is in effect ‘leased’ to a reader
and can be monitored or indeed revoked at any time. As Ted Striphas writes, ‘economic
imperatives and legal considerations have become more deeply implicated than ever in
routine cultural practices, such as book reading’ (2010: 310).
As I will explore in more detail in the following chapter, another way in which to see the
infusion of language with capital is analysing the way that AdWords works, which is by ap-
plying economic values to the words which flow through the Google search bar. Although
Google may have started off just as a search engine; an online version of a public library or
records office, ‘over time, it transferred itself into an advertising company, producing not
search results, but audiences as its primary commodity’ (Feuz et al. 2011). But in order
to gain these users or audiences and their lucrative data, Google first has to commod-
ify the words which attract that audience, a process which Kaplan has called ‘linguistic
capitalism’ (2014). In short, if you want to guarantee your website its place at the top
of the search engine rankings (without all the time-consuming bother of optimising your
site), you have to bid for the word(s) you feel will attract the most traffic. This creates
a strange world in which words have value in a way curiously abstracted and sometimes
seemingly disproportionate to their usual ‘ranking’ of importance or relevance in everyday
language and life. They have quite literally been auctioned off for their exchange value;
their integrity compromised by the distance between the ‘original’ and the reproduction
in much the same way as Benjamin describes. As in the case of the organic search rank-
ings, here too creative writing is superfluous to the needs of the market. Google actively
police the AdWords system to make sure it is functioning correctly as a generator of Ad
capital. AdWords which fail to generate enough click-through revenue are removed, as
the artist Christophe Bruno (2002) found out when he attempted to buy AdWords which
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Figure 5.1: Example page from Cabell & Huff’s American Psycho (2013.)
sought to provoke people’s imaginations rather than their wallets. Like the Dadaist poets
and artists described by Benjamin, he had ‘sacrificed market values in favour of higher
ambitions’ (1999: 231). As it turned out, however, the exchange value of Bruno’s poetic
keywords was not enough for Google, and his adverts were swiftly removed from the list-
ings.
Linguistic capitalism is also evident, although by its absence or erasure (Marczewska,
2015), in the way language moves through other digital spaces such as electronic mail.
In 2010, design graduates Cabell and Huff (2013) set up an artistic experiment by send-
ing each page of the novel ‘American Psycho’ (Ellis, 2010) between each other via GMail
accounts. Aware that GMail algorithms read email traffic for the purpose of targeted
advertising, they then recorded the adverts that were generated and, having removed the
original text, reconstructed the book by footnoting the adverts on the otherwise empty
pages. This was not only a brilliant nod to the kind of destructive consumerism Ellis was
critiquing, but it reveals the shortcomings of these types of semantically trained algorithms
when presented with creative or artistic language. Patrick Bateman’s skinning and muti-
lation of women generated adverts for skin tightening and teeth whitening procedures; his
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violation of their bodies with rats and chainsaws prompts adverts for rodent control and
topiary. In a particularly chilling example, an advert for healthy soup options is served
around the scene where Bateman is cooking the head of one of his victims in the microwave
(see Figure 5.1). I found this a fascinating way of showing what is happening to words
when they move through digital space in this case via electronic mail, which has invisibly
stripped the words of their linguistic or creative value in favour of their exchange value.
The words of the author, turned involuntarily into monetised data have been ‘stripped
of everything but that data’s end product [which] constitutes perhaps both the purest
document of digital capitalism and the sharpest critique of that capitalism’ (Benzon and
Sweeney, 2015), giving a glimpse into the meaning and value that Google’s algorithms
extract from narrative fiction when they ‘read’ the text.
The mediation and manipulation of language in an age of algorithmic reproduction is also
visible through the advertising platform AdSense, where Google pays websites to host ad-
verts. Harvesting payments for each ad exposure, a website becomes more profitable the
more times it is looked at. AdSense is closely linked to the AdWords platform, and some of
its adverts are targeted to keywords in the websites they populate, but perhaps the more
problematic linguistic side effect of AdSense is that it has become a vehicle for the spread
of fake news, which I will discuss in greater detail in Chapter 8. In the run up to the US
Presidential election in 2016, it was reported that ‘fake news factories’, some based in small
towns in Eastern Europe, earned thousands of dollars from AdSense by making up and
circulating politically controversial and viral stories. The more controversial the story, the
more lucrative its advertising revenue potential. As with AdWords, although in a different
way, the language constructed to earn advertising dollars via fake news stories, is there-
fore similarly compromised by its entanglement with market logics and the political sphere.
Once again, it is worth remembering that texts were being adapted and manipulated to
accommodate advertising from the emergence of print-capitalism and the proliferation of
the printing presses. As Benjamin (2007: 77) eloquently notes in his ‘One-Way Street’
essay, ‘script - having found, in the book, a refuge in which it can lead an autonomous
existence - is pitilessly dragged out into the street by advertisements and subjected to the
brutal heteronomies of economic chaos’. But in the digital, or algorithmic production and
reproduction of language, advertising and propriety operate under the surface rather than
in the street, relying on what Dan McQuillan (2015: 565) calls an ‘implicit social contract’
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(see also Beer 2009: 67) which uses ‘free’ services to conduct data-gathering projects just
as expansive as those of the intelligence agencies, but they are largely based only on trust,
not - ostensibly at least - enshrined in law. Of course, the interrogation of Mark Zucker-
berg by US Congress over the data gathering and sharing practices of Facebook in 2018
has dragged the role and implications of digital advertising and politics right to the fore
of public knowledge, and it may not be long before Google is forced to face similar public
scrutiny.
5.6 The aestheticisation of politics
Dont be evil (Google motto)
Google dropped their famous ‘Dont be evil’ motto in October 2015, when new parent
company Alphabet took over, but the phrase has always been a tacit clue as to how aware
its founders were of the potential power of their invention. Following on from the previous
two sections which looked at the linguistic and economic aspects of reproducing language
through Google’s organic and paid search and advertising platforms, the third method
suggested by my SEO training instructor to get your content visible and readable at the
top of the search rankings is, in contrast, incredibly simple; you can promote your site
through a Google+ account. While I am not suggesting that encouraging users to sign up
to Google services is necessarily ‘evil’, it is hard not to contemplate the inherent power
that one company now has over the ability of people to ‘exist’, and to make their voices
heard on the web. In fact, each of three SEO methods suggested in my research requires
a certain degree of interaction with Google; whether it is transacting with money or with
data, by contributing to what can be searched for and what can be found, or by helping to
develop and hone the algorithms with click confirmations or ‘implicit feedback’ (Granka
2010: 367). We have all, to one extent or another, become part of the system; assisting
the algorithmic reproduction of language away from its source and, like Benjamin’s Work
of Art, making it a political process, not just a linguistic one.
Central to Benjamin’s essay is the observation that the extreme and fascistic politics of
that era had been ‘aestheticised’ by its co-option of popular culture. Facilitated by the
technologically enhanced reach and influence of mass media such as photography, news,
advertising and art, Benjamin believed that the violence of an authoritarian regime had
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been disguised as an awe-inspiring show of cultural and militaristic strength, and that
the population had been appeased by their apparently voluntary immersion into new, and
beguiling levels of cultural awareness and participation, or as David Berry puts it, ‘fascism
introduces aesthetics into political life as a way of giving the masses a chance to express
themselves’ (2014: 33). As I said earlier, Benjamin did not see mechanical reproduction
as necessarily a bad thing, but what the essay does tell us is that he recognised that
potentially bad mechanical advances like those made in warfare, which used technology
as a force of destruction rather than construction, could be neutralised by the co-option
of the masses into the aesthetically subjective cultural power of the political and martial
spectacle. In 1930s Germany, according to Koepnick, ‘[transforming] the political itself
into an item of mass consumption, a commodity concealing its status as a commodity (and
allegory), a symbolic spectacle meant to produce lonely crowds and unite the masses as
separate’ (1999: 198). It is not hard to extend this to modern day social media and tech
companies such as Google and Facebook, whose business models are based on the finan-
cial exploitation and commodification of user data masked behind the quasi-philanthropic
rhetoric of wanting to connect people, or to get them access to the world’s information.
Although we now live in a very different political era, it is also not difficult to see the more
explicit political and military parallels between Benjamin’s era and today. Not only does
Google (Alphabet) executive and former chairman Eric Schmidt advise the Pentagon as
part of the Defense Innovation Board, but there has been considerable recent controversy
over Google’s involvement in a Pentagon program which ‘uses artificial intelligence to in-
terpret video imagery and could be used to improve the targeting of drone strikes’ (The
New York Times 2018), and indeed Google are currently bidding to provide cloud services
to the Pentagon. ‘We believe that Google should not be in the business of war’, is the
opening line of a letter from Google employees protesting at this involvement, but when the
identification of military hardware becomes part of the everyday free labour Google users
unknowingly undertake by completing RECAPTCHA puzzles depicting military trucks
and helicopters, their (and our) total (and voluntary) co-option into the system (and into
the spectacle) is surely almost complete. In recent years we have also witnessed how the
exploitation of user data and digital advertising have facilitated the spread of fake news
and misinformation on a scale that may have had an effect on Donald Trump’s election as
US President and continues to cause dangerously heightened diplomatic tensions between
Russia and the west.
107
5.6 The aestheticisation of politics
As well as the potentially dangerous power unleashed by the spread of language in the
form of fake news, the power of algorithmic systems has also been the subject of much
recent scrutiny. Scott Lash (2007) sees a ‘sinister’ and ‘military’ control in what he calls
the post-hegemonic power of cybernetic systems, and Taylor Owen (2015) and others have
expressed concern about the potential or inherent ‘violence’ of mathematically mediated
decision-making processes (see also Weizman 2012), while Cabell & Huff’s American Psy-
cho project shows what Benzon and Sweeney (2015) call the ‘invisible violence and excess
of big data’. David Beer (2009) extends Lash’s argument specifically to the perhaps ‘un-
conscious’ power of algorithms in this process, and I think it is possible to see in a company
like Google not only a frighteningly wide-reaching power over people in terms of the data
it holds, which, at any time can perhaps be subpoenaed, hacked, leaked, or corrupted,
but in Google it is so easy to be lulled into a false sense of security by the bright colours,
the silly name, the almost childish format and interface and the ‘free’ and easy applica-
tions. This ‘front-end Googlization’ (Rogers 2009: 173); the interactive Google Doodles
and puzzles which co-opt and ‘rebrand the past’ (Hoad 2015), the charming simplicity of
the search box and the apparent ease with which anyone can interact with and contribute
to public discourse, in effect disguises the politics of search with a layer of aesthetically
pleasing innocence. However, as Benjamin reminds us, this aesthetic is no accident. After-
all, ‘fascism sees its salvation in giving these masses not their right, but instead a chance
to express themselves’ (1999: 234).
And it is precisely this sense of agency and expression, afforded by the ability to com-
ment on news stories, connect with friends and create content online, that is so attractive,
and perhaps addictive, today, despite the growing number of users who are completely
aware of their own exploitation, the power and value of their data, as well as the potential
safety and privacy risks of total immersion into the world of digital commerce and capital-
ism. Following Deleuze and Guattari, Cheryl Gilge (2015, 2016b) refers to this seemingly
counter-intuitive voluntary co-option of the masses into Web 2.0 as ‘microfascism’, with
Google leading the way with an addictive aesthetics of utility and inclusion which contin-
ues to enable its powers of monopoly and manipulation.
There has been a substantial amount of both popular and academic critical attention given
to discussing, or challenging, Google as a monopoly, as a form of ‘algorithmic governance’
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(Rouvroy 2013; Danaher 2016; Just & Latzer 2017, see also next chapter), as perpetuating
class divide, as the (un)authorised holder of knowledge (as in the ‘right to be forgotten’),
as a government source, as a stealer of data, censor of the world, exploiter of users or as
a peddler of racist, sexist or politically incorrect narrative (see Noble 2018). But despite
these concerns, Google’s disarmingly user-friendly interface remains our most popular por-
tal into the Web, despite the existence of other search engines and the increasingly obvious
post-Snowden data security implications.
The obvious defence to any such claims is, of course, to fall back on what Tarleton Gillespie
(2014) calls the ‘illusion of algorithmic objectivity’. Algorithms, data, or any other concept
with a scientific basis cannot be ‘evil’, just as much as they cannot be ‘good’, ‘happy’, or
‘jealous’, for the very obvious reason that they are non-sentient mathematical formulae or
constructs, although as Lovink argues, it is possible that they can be out of control (Lovink
2009; see also Kitchin 2017). Dan McQuillan (2018) has, however, recently suggested that
algorithms can be ‘thoughtless’, in the sense that their very ‘banality’ (he uses Hannah
Arendt explicitly) can escape regulation, ethical concerns and accountability, and can
therefore be considered so reliable and objective that they can be used in pre-emptive
actions of law enforcement, governance and oppression. Gillespie suggests that simply by
calling search rankings ‘results’, they are automatically given a sense of unquestionable
mathematical legitimacy, which is, as I have shown, not always the case. Specifically
in terms of language, Matthew Fuller and Goffey (2012) have explored the (deliberately
anachronistic) potential of ‘Evil Media’. But naturalising, or anthropomorphising digitised
data is misleading, and perhaps disguises more important issues and performances. As
Orit Halpern suggests in her book ‘Beautiful Data’,
despite the seeming naturalness of data and its virtues, therefore, there is
nothing automatic, obvious, or predetermined about our embrace of data as
wealth. There is, in fact, an aesthetic crafting to this knowledge, a performance
necessary to produce value (2014: 5).
Going back to the introduction to this chapter and the thesis, I think this is a distinctly
industrial performance, with all the embedded social and economic structures which that
method of production entails, but these inequalities are hidden either in the sheer banality
of process, or by the ‘aesthetic crafting’ of the owner of both the raw material (in this
case Halpern’s ‘Beautiful Data’) and of the means of production, and in both cases that
owner is increasingly likely to be Google.
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5.7 Conclusions
This chapter has considered the linguistic, economic and political factors which influence,
and are influenced by, the algorithmic reproduction of language through commercial plat-
forms such as Google Search, and to do this has taken Walter Benjamin’s thoughts on me-
chanically reproduced art and language and contrasted them with experiences of how SEO
and linguistic capitalism work today. I have suggested that algorithmic (re)production is
the new mechanical, i.e. a logistical facilitator, moving and circulating information and
data around to produce capital, and that the critical scrutiny of the ownership of this
means of production and the potential power that brings is therefore a priority, after all,
language is power, and at the moment Google has hold of a significant proportion of the
narrative. But in addition to that we also have to take into account how algorithmic re-
production differs from mechanical. Not only does it replicate (or perpetuate) the process
of industrial production, but it also adds to that process in a way in which mechanical
replication did not (Carpo 2011); each click or query ‘changes the tool incrementally’
(Gillespie 2014).
As Martha Poon (2013) states, ‘algorithms execute action with a degree of responsive-
ness... [their] internal mathematical structure allows [them] to adjust depending on the
changing input conditions’. So when algorithms work on language, and when text is en-
coded and then decoded through computational processes like online search, the tensions
between numbers and words, or logic and creativity (Fuller & Goffey 2009), machine and
ideology (Galloway 2012), or database and narrative (Manovich 2001: 225), have a per-
formative and practical effect (Totaro & Ninno 2014), and can therefore result in a kind
of anomalous and ontogenetic excess of language. As Hayles suggests, the ‘processes of
signification change when speech and writing are coded into binary digits... [and] they do
not emerge unchanged by the encounter with code’ (Hayles 2005: 39). These generative
powers become potentially problematic, however, because they ‘are also pathways through
which capitalist power works’ (Lash 2007: 71). Language has always to some extent been
linked to capital ever since the first instance of material reproduction, but when digital
technology is underpinned not only by different forms of capital, but also different, per-
haps linguistically incompatible mathematical processes, the discursive power it has is not
only greater in terms of reach, but also as a result of the unpredictable, evasive and easily
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manipulated nature of algorithmically reproduced language. Although Google claims its
search engine indexes and sorts the world’s information in some kind of definitive, reliable
and perhaps passive way, in reality, changing and contingent human input, new kinds of
market forces, and the responsiveness and potential performative capacities of the algo-
rithm sometimes make it seem more like the Dow Jones than a library index.
But although the ‘hand of the market’ might be said to have potential epistemic power
in this context, there are other actors in this assemblage too. As Lucas Introna writes,
there are risks in ‘locating, or placing too much agency “in” the algorithmic actor, rather
than in the temporal flow of action in the assemblage as a whole’ (2016: 22), which is
why I have also emphasized the part that we as human actors play not only in writing
the code and programming the algorithms, but in producing the content and context in
which they can work. Although Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Natural Language Pro-
cessing (NLP) technology has perhaps begun to destabilise and blur boundaries between
human and machine in terms of authorship and readership, there are still considerable
geographical and cultural gaps in the data environment which also necessarily affect the
outcome of language reproduced through search. Even when not directly affected by overt
advertising strategies, the words which pass through the search engine are re-infused with
the residue of the dominant structures, market forces, biases and stereotypes which make
up the corpus of available searchable data. Their meaning as such may not be fixed, but
their use - and therefore their agency - will always be linked to their economic value, which
I show in detail in my intervention in the final chapter.
If we think how important language can be as a tool of power over people, places and
opinions in a logocentric, epistemological or physical way, then just as the mechanical
reproduction of art was for Benjamin, the algorithmic reproduction of language is an in-
herently political process and a fundamental means of the distribution of power. And
just like Benjamin was frustrated by the lack of revolutionary potential in a population
appeased by the mass accessibility of art and the aestheticisation of politics, and therefore
co-opted into the system, so it is now nearly impossible to avoid being a part of the Google
language machine, whether we intend to be or not.
Indeed, this is critical point when it comes to cultural, academic, and artistic critiques
of digital technologies, and in particular Google. If they are unaware of, or ignore their
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place in this language machine, then their standing as critique is necessarily compromised.
As we see at the end of the ‘Work of Art’ essay, Benjamin’s solution to ‘the situation of
politics which Fascism is rendering aesthetic’, is that ‘Communism [should] respond[s] by
politicising art’ (2009: 235); a call, perhaps, to recuperate art from the clutches of the
political and economic systems which use it as a means of power and control. But if this
interpretation of Benjamin is to be of any use, it is imperative that the precarious cultural
and political situation in which we find ourselves today by virtue of the ‘microfascisms’
of algorithmic technology is taken seriously (Gilge 2016b), and that the potentially re-
demptive and emancipatory artistic interventions spawned by these technologies do not in
themselves become part of the spectacle. Political art as Benjamin saw it must, as David
Berry writes, play a central role in ‘demystifying the production, the distribution, the form
and the content of art, in an attempt to make art serve the cause of the masses and not
vice versa’ (2014: 33). If we are to further Benjamin’s vision, we must, therefore, guard
against ‘the uncritical use of corporate algorithms as a generator of poetic chance’ (Hoy
2006), and be wary of the dangers of ‘aestheticising Google critique’ itself (Rogers 2018)
by omitting to foreground the politics of production that mediate all representations of
proprietary digital technologies. We must therefore make sure that language in the age of
algorithmic reproduction, threatened and at the same time made threatening, by digital
commercialisation, can still be mobilised against the aestheticised politics of technology,
be it mechanical, algorithmic, or whatever comes next. My own attempt to reverse the
aetheticisation of the politics behind Google’s search and advertising technologies (by way
of a political artistic intervention) is explained in detail in Chapter 7. But before that,
the next chapter aims to shine a light on the sometimes opaque relationship between the
marketplace of words which Google has created through its AdWords platform, and the
wider political sphere, exploring the tensions between market governance, and the systems
of algorithmic governance that have emerged as a result of these new digital economies.
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Chapter 6
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF ADWORDS: LINGUISTIC
MARKETS AND
ALGORITHMIC GOVERNANCE
6.1 Introduction
This chapter stems from two events; unconnected in time and space, but which in dif-
ferent ways prompted me to start thinking more about the political economy of Google’s
search and advertising platforms, in both theoretical and practical terms. My research
is based firmly around Frederic Kaplan’s concept of ‘linguistic capitalism’, using the idea
of a linguistic marketplace to critique and make visible the power of monetised language
in today’s digital economy and society. However, I feel my thesis would not be complete
without an interrogation of what exactly linguistic capitalism means in a wider political
economy setting; questioning the capitalist credentials of the term, and the algorithmic
and market-based logics that purport to drive it. In this sense, although throughout the
thesis I have been critiquing Google’s monetisation of linguistic data as a type of linguistic
capitalism, in this chapter I turn my critique to the term itself, asking questions such as
what kind of market am I talking about and what type of ‘capital’ does it circulate and
produce; on a political scale, just how ‘capitalist’ is this linguistic market, and to what
extent it is a ‘free’ market; what the role of Google and algorithmic systems are in this
market, and subsequently, what kind of governing and/or knowledge producing properties
it may or may not have.
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The first of the two events that guided this chapter occurred at a workshop I presented at
during my time as research assistant at NUI Galway in 2016. Organised by John Danaher,
the workshop, ‘From Algorithmic States to Algorithmic Brains’, was one of the first times
I had presented my {poem}.py project as a full paper, and I remember being very nervous
about the other participants who were internationally known experts in fields such as AI
and robot ethics, transhumanism, and the morals of neuro and bio enhancement. It was,
however, from a completely different field that the most challenging response to my paper
came. One of the delegates turned to me and suggested that far from being a potentially
problematic mediator of language - Google AdWords was in fact a triumph of Hayekian
free market economics; a linguistic market that effectively, and brilliantly, regulates the
distribution of goods around the globe. There were a number of responses to this challenge
that I wish I had had the wherewithal to articulate effectively on the day, but despite be-
ing an unexpected comment, I was in hindsight very grateful for the provocation, because
it presented me with the language, and with the theoretical framework, with which to
delve deeper into the sometimes ambiguous and opaque political economy of Google and
its AdWords platform.
The second event that inspired this chapter is more empirical in nature. It occurred in
the run up to the 2017 UK Parliamentary General Election, when several different actors
entered an AdWords bidding war over the keyword ‘dementia tax’. Over the course of
one 24-hour period, the three main political parties, charities, and also independent actors
began to compete against each other to secure the most prominent positions for their
own particular narratives on the search results page. Analysis of this incident provides a
fascinating snapshot into how the system works, and is worked, by actors with different
motives (and budgets), and also into the wider effect that the AdWords platform has
in the political sphere. So in this chapter I will first give an overview of the origins of
AdWords, before considering how Google’s search engine came to be perceived as what
Kaplan has called a ‘linguistic marketplace’, which as I will show is a sometimes am-
biguous conceptualisation of a system which is perhaps based less on the market than on
what we might call a centrally planned, opaque and algorithmically mediated system of
governance, which in effect hides behind free market rhetoric for justification and defence
against criticism. The chapter goes on to examine the political economy of Google Ad-
Words through a Hayekian lens, using his ideas about the knowledge producing capacities
115
6.2 The anatomy of a large-scale hypertextual Web search engine
of free markets to test whether Google’s platform really is capitalist in nature, and, helped
by some original empirical work of my own, to gain insight into what knowledge and social
capital might be produced by such a system, and to what effect. But first, back to where
it all began
6.2 The anatomy of a large-scale hypertextual Web search
engine
When Sergey Brin and Larry Page invented Google as students at Stanford in 1998, they
knew from the beginning how advertising could interfere with the efficiency and integrity
of their proposed search engine. In an appendix to their original paper, on ‘The anatomy
of a large-scale hypertextual Web search engine’, they noted that ‘the goals of the adver-
tising business model do not always correspond to providing quality search to users’, and
that ‘advertising funded search engines will be inherently biased towards the advertisers
and away from the needs of the consumers’ (2012: 3832). They were right to be concerned
that their goal to ‘organise the world’s information’ might be compromised by advertising,
but they had to fund their project somehow, and so adopted paid advertising by devel-
oping the AdWords platform. Although its advertising empire has expanded significantly
with platforms such as AdSense and Gmail, AdWords remains Google’s main stream of
revenue, and is certainly the reason the company exists in its current successful and dom-
inant form today. But despite their initial caution, Brin and Page could surely not have
anticipated just how much the search engine would be compromised by advertising and
the Search Engine Optimisation (SEO) industry. Indeed, a typical Search Engine Results
Page (SERP) today is probably unrecognisable from what they first imagined. Neither
would they have imagined that not only have search results become biased towards the
needs of the advertiser, but, as I will argue, they have taken on a political economy of
their own.
As explored in Chapter 4 (Geographies of (con)text), digital technologies such as Google
search are used by many different actors, with many different motives. While the search
engine ‘users/consumers’ as imagined by Brin and Page in 1998 were the people using
Google to look for the ‘world’s information’, the ‘users’ of the engine today include ad-
vertisers of commercial products, the SEO professionals and amateurs who are constantly
attempting to manipulate the information displayed on results pages in order to gain eco-
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nomic capital, but also a whole new set of ‘users’ intent on the creation and retention not
only of economic, but also cultural, social, and even political capital.
These new users of the search engine range from celebrities who use SEO techniques and
specialist companies to manufacture and maintain their reputations, to those wanting to
spread fake news stories (either for financial or political gain - or both), those wanting
to spread extremist material for the purposes of recruitment (and those trying to counter
these narratives), or indeed mainstream political party broadcasts trying to win office.
Of course, the user typing in search queries and looking for answers is still ostensibly the
main user of Google, and indeed without the searcher-as-user, the rest of Google’s digital
ecology would cease to function. The search bar, and all that flows through it, is after all
the liminal pivot on which Google rests. However, because of the complex geographies of
(con)text I described in Chapter 4, the core ‘use’ function of Google search is now not only
hampered by systematic structural bias, but is also irrevocably linked to the often invisible
political and economic undercurrents which lurk behind the search bar and its associated
assemblages (see Chapter 5 on the aestheticisation of politics). This means that although
the way Google works is sometimes still seen, and, as I will explain, indeed promoted,
as a simple mechanism for the organising and extraction of the ‘world’s information’, it
is in practice a long way from a free-flowing marketplace of either ideas, language, or
commodities. This chapter will therefore suggest that, while Google AdWords presents
as free marketplace in which ‘linguistic capitalism’ operates for the optimal production of
knowledge and distribution of goods, in effect the idea of a knowledge producing and self-
regulating marketplace is a construct perpetuated by Google (and supported by the SEO
industry) in order to mask an inherently ‘centrally planned’ and judgement laden system
which hides its responsibilities and accountability behind the facade of the algorithm and
the market (Pasquale 2016).
Rising to the challenge presented to me in Galway, this chapter therefore goes back to
Hayek’s original arguments about the ‘use of knowledge in society’ and argues that the
AdWords market is far from ‘free’ in Hayekian terms, but is highly regulated and corrupted
by various political, ethical and financial distortions, which makes it virtually impossible
for any tacit knowledge to be produced from it (Thornton & Danaher forthcoming).1
Algorithmically-mediated price mechanisms do not, and probably cannot, accumulate and
1Or at least calls into question any apparent ‘wisdom’ that is produced by this market, as I will go on
to show.
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signal that same kinds of knowledge that Hayek felt were essential to effective market
governance. Instead, the linguistic market can be seen not as a form of Hayekian market
governance, but as an opaque, yet powerful, system of algorithmic governance (see Chap-
ter 5).
6.2.1 Algorithmic markets
In September 1945, Friedrich Hayek published ‘The Use of Knowledge in Society’, in which
he made a bold claim about the information processing powers of the free market. Hayek
argued that the price mechanism contained within the market functions to automatically
collate and communicate information from diverse and partial sources, thereby enabling
people to better coordinate their actions to mutually beneficial ends. By this logic, the
price mechanism was a governance tool par excellence, preferable to centrally controlled
governance tools in almost every way (Hayek 1945).
We live today in an era characterised by the use of another information processing tool
in governance: the computer-coded algorithm (Danaher 2016; Pasquale 2015; Rouvroy
2013). In a networked and digitised age, an age in which nearly every move we make is
recorded, logged and ‘quantified’ (Moore 2017), we have come to expect, and possibly even
demand, the perceived support and assistance made possible by such algorithmic systems.
We look to the information processing powers of big data algorithms to help us make sense
of the complexity we have created. These algorithms feed us information, often packaged
into simple metrics like scores and ratings, that we use to coordinate and cooperate with
one another, and to facilitate the smooth running of our everyday needs and consumption.
As Karen Yeung notes, these algorithmic decision-systems:
manage risk or alter behaviour through continual computational generation of
knowledge from data emitted and directly collected (typically in real time on a
continuous basis) from numerous dynamic components pertaining to the reg-
ulated environment in order to identify and, if necessary, automatically refine
(or prompt refinement of) the system’s operations to attain a pre-specified goal
(2018).
There are of course many examples of algorithmically mediated markets, from shopping
sites to high frequency trading, but the type which lend themselves to a Hayekian analysis
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are what we might call ‘algorithmically constructed market places’. These arise when dig-
ital platform providers (such as Google, Uber, Facebook and Amazon) match consumers
to suppliers (where the suppliers are sometimes the platform providers themselves) via a
shared platform and use automated algorithms to set the prices that suppliers can charge
and consumers can pay on that shared platform. These constructed marketplaces often
include other non-price based scoring systems (e.g. rating or ranking systems) that match
consumers to suppliers. As such, the entire experience of being a consumer or supplier
on this marketplace (and it is important here to think back to the ‘users’ imagined by
Brin and Page), is mediated through an automated algorithmic governance structure.
This structure tries to automate the knowledge accumulation and signaling needed for
the marketplace, rather than relying on traditional feedback loops. What is particularly
interesting about some of these new forms of algorithmic market governance is that they
attempt to recreate, in automated form, the price mechanism beloved by Hayek, or more
importantly, they attempt to recreate a semblance of the Hayekian model. While markets
are not, and never have been, perfectly ‘free’ in a Hayekian sense, algorithmically me-
diated auctions and bidding processes, as well as algorithmically-controlled price-setting
tools, are being used by some of the leading digital service providers, and their benefits are
often touted and defended in Hayekian terms, suggesting that there is no tension between
this automated algorithmic governance and free market governance.
One of the main questions I try to examine in this chapter, is therefore a direct response
to the challenge presented to me in Galway. Does Google AdWords, as an automated, al-
gorithmically constructed marketplace, perform the same kind of knowledge accumulation
and communication functions as the Hayekian price mechanism? And further to that, and
to delve into the political economy of Google and its advertising platforms, is there any
tension between algorithmically-mediated market governance and the classical, Hayekian
form of market governance?
This chapter argues that there is considerable tension between these modes of governance.
Algorithmic price-setting mechanisms do not (and probably cannot) share the benefits that
Hayek claimed for the price mechanism. On the contrary, algorithmically constructed price
mechanisms suffer from many of the same limitations and distortions that Hayek lamented
in centrally planned forms of governance. Importantly, this argument therefore critiques a
particular rhetorical defence of algorithmically constructed markets and not the reality. I
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am not presuming that markets are or can be perfectly Hayekian, or that the algorithmic
model is akin to the Hayekian model. Instead I am questioning the quasi-Hayekian rhetoric
that has grown up around these systems as justification or as a method of abdication of
responsibility or accountability, and am doing so in order to critique the power that such
perceptions might engender when touted, encouraged or facilitated by companies such as
Google. This is what I mean by algorithmic governance in this context; it is the power
created by the artificial construction (or even co-option) of the idea of free market gov-
ernance as a justification for the apparent ‘wisdom’ of algorithmic price mechanisms. In
this way, flipping the rhetorical strategy on its head and critiquing these mechanisms in
Hayekian terms, I argue that Hayek’s knowledge argument (as presented to me as a chal-
lenge in Galway) can be turned against those who defend these systems in a Hayekian way.
6.2.2 Hayek’s argument
Hayek’s knowledge argument starts with the observation that ‘planning’ is essential to any
economy. Decisions (plans) have to be made about what goods and services to produce,
how to produce them and who to produce them for. The question is who should do the
planning (Hayek 1945: 520). When Hayek was writing, the answers to this question di-
vided into two camps. There were those who thought governments should do the planning
(Lange 1936; 1937) and those who thought that individual actors, free from government
interference, should do the planning (Von Mises 1920). Hayek sided with the latter, feeling
that the planning problem could be distilled down into a knowledge problem (Hayek 1945:
519-520). There was lots of data (information) available to putative economic planners,
but not all of that data was interpretable or meaningful (i.e. counted as ‘knowledge’). The
critical question, therefore, was not who was best placed to make use of existing data on
resources, productive processes and consumer preferences, but rather who was best placed
to discover and translate data into knowledge, and communicate this to others.
The problem, according to Hayek, was that the knowledge required to plan effectively
was dispersed throughout a network of actors and could only be discovered and rendered
meaningful through market-based transactions:
The economic problem of society is a problem of how to secure the best use
of resources known to any of the members of society, for ends whose relative
importance only these individuals know. Or, to put it briefly, it is a problem of
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the utilisation of knowledge which is not given to anyone in its totality (Hayek
1945: 519-521).
To be more precise, Hayek argued that the knowledge required to solve the planning
problem had three distinct properties (see Bronk 2013; Hayek 1945):
Discreteness: It did not come in a single package; it was dispersed among many
different actors, who had partial access to the totality.
Tacitness: It could not always be easily articulated or codified; it rested on
practical know-how and subconscious, tacit understandings of how productive
processes worked and how consumers behaved (see also Polanyi 1961).
Subjectivity: The values and preferences of consumers and producers were
subjective - known ultimately only to themselves.
Once these properties are appreciated, Hayek’s knowledge argument in favour of free mar-
kets is easy to make. Hayek claimed that central planners were ill-placed to acquire and
communicate the forms of knowledge needed to solve the planning problem. They could
not hope to amass the discrete perspectives of many individuals into a single coherent
plan for the market; they could not codify and articulate the tacit knowledge that under-
lay many market processes; and they could not hope to know the minds of the market
actors. He thought that free markets could do a better job. Free markets had a wonderful
knowledge accumulation and communication device at their heart: the price mechanism.
The discrete, tacit and subjective knowledge of market actors could be translated into
prices. These prices would tell people which goods and services were worth producing and
supplying, and which were worth buying. This would enable market actors to coordinate
towards mutually beneficial ends. Any interference from a central planner with the price
mechanism would necessarily disrupt and distort the knowledge accumulation and com-
munication functions that the price mechanism performs, sending people off in the wrong
direction, leading to the over - or under-production of vital goods and services.
The question I explore in this chapter is therefore whether an automated algorithmically-
constructed price mechanisms used by digital platform providers (such as Google’s Ad-
Words) can perform the same coordinating and accumulating functions as imagined by
Hayek. Although Hayek’s argument was focused on the economy as a whole, not on partic-
ular markets within the economy, it is still a useful model for understanding and critiquing
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the claims made on behalf of these specific algorithmically-constructed marketplaces. As
I will go on to argue, despite being only a section of the economy, Google commands a
near monopoly of the web search market, and is increasingly recognised by users and reg-
ulators as being the only search engine of significance. This perception of Google as the
only relevant search engine (and therefore the only market) has been perpetuated by the
SEO industry and by Google itself from the start, and indeed from the beginning Google
has defended itself and its algorithmically constructed markets in quasi-Hayekian terms,
making a Hayekian analysis an incisive and informative method of critique with which to
pick apart the wider political economy of Google’s search and advertising platforms.
6.2.3 Algorithmic governance
I have mentioned algorithmic governance in the previous chapter in relation to the political
power wielded by Google by its dominance of the internet, but here I want think a bit more
about how that power is contextualised within a wider history of political economy which
is now necessarily complicated by the advent of algorithmically constructed markets. Of
course, technically, all governance related decision-making is algorithmic; i.e. decisions are
made on the basis of the input and output of information, but what I am talking about
here are forms of algorithmic governance that are made possible by modern information
communications technology, specifically Big Data systems which work via a combination of
mass surveillance and collation of data from networked technologies (computers, phones,
smart devices etc.) and data-mining (descriptive and predictive analytics). The algo-
rithms that power such systems rely on statistical analysis and statistical learning rules,
as I explored in terms of online search and translation tools in Chapter 4. These systems
are increasingly familiar, with virtually every internet company or service provider taking
advantage of them in marketing and selling to consumers. Governments are also taking
advantage of them in making risk-related decisions, such as who to audit for tax purposes,
who poses a terrorist threat, or who should be released from jail (O’Neil 2017).
In his study of the rise of these contemporary algorithmic governance systems, which
he terms ‘algocratic’ systems, A. Aneesh (2006; 2009) contrasts them with pre-existing
governance structures. In particular, he contrasts them with market-based governance
structures and legal-bureaucratic governance structures. The former are characterised by
their use of the price mechanism to ‘govern’ human behaviour (i.e. to nudge it in par-
ticular directions, to structure and constrain its scope); the latter by their use of rules
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and laws. He argues that algocratic governance constitutes something new: the use of
computer-coded architectures to govern human behaviour. These new systems then work
alongside the old governance structures, sometimes being grafted on top of them, and
sometimes complementing them (Danaher 2016), creating multiple interlocking and over-
lapping layers of governance in human life.
The critical question is: are these newer modes of algorithmic governance compatible with
market-based governance? Can you simply recreate the virtues of the market through
an automated, algorithmically constructed price mechanism? Or is this simply impossi-
ble? The answer might seem obvious if we consult the historical record. The early use
of automated systems of algorithmic governance seemed to be very closely-aligned with
centrally-planned, bureaucratic modes of governance. In many ways, the quantitative,
statistical models used in algorithmic governance structures are the bread and butter of
the central planner, as Hayek himself pointed out (1945).
Furthermore, if we look into the history of socialist governance we see some obvious at-
tempts to use information communications technology to solve the knowledge problem
that Hayek identified and to enable socialism to flourish. The clearest example of this
is in the Cybersyn project run by the Allende government in Chile in the early 1970s
(Medina 2011; Morozov 2014), which was designed to be ‘a real-time control system capa-
ble of collecting economic data throughout the nation, transmitting it to the government,
and combining it in ways that could assist government decision making’ (Medina 2011: 3).
All of this suggests that the history of algorithmic governance is positively un-Hayekian,
missing the benefits of the free market’s price mechanism that he endorsed. But the his-
torical tide has now started to shift. In recent years, several algorithmically constructed
price mechanisms have come into operation, and while market actors have been using al-
gorithmic systems of calculation for years, what is important is that these newer systems
are trying to replicate the benefits of the free market within new structures of algorith-
mic governance. This practice is defended on the grounds that it finds the most efficient
‘market-clearing’ price for a good or service. Thus, for example, Uber mediates the price
of ride-sharing between the driver and passenger, or Google sets up algorithmically medi-
ated auctions to sell words to potential advertisers. These auctions include a price-setting
mechanism that tries to replicate what happens on a free market. Indeed, and despite
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Brin and Page’s original intentions to keep their search engine untainted by market forces
(Brin & Page 2012: 3832), Google has defended its use in explicitly free market terms,
claiming that a competitive auction leads to efficient pricing (Kordestani 2008).
The rise of such algorithmically-constructed pricing mechanisms suggests that Hayek’s
original suspicions about quantitative, statistical models, and the historical association
between cybernetic control systems and socialist forms of governance, are misplaced. If
we are to follow the logic of these more recent efforts at algorithmic market governance,
it would seem that the use of automated price-setting mechanisms, powered by big data
algorithms, can actually help to perfect the knowledge accumulation and communication
functions identified by Hayek, at least within discrete markets. In which case, the chal-
lenge given to me in Galway may have been valid. Algorithmically constructed markets
such as Google AdWords, stitched together through a Big Data infrastructure, might well
be an ideal form of the Hayekian market.
But is this really the case? Can we really perfect the information processing powers of
the market through our modern technological infrastructure? I argue that this is unlikely
(see Thornton & Danaher forthcoming). Algorithmic price mechanisms cannot accumu-
late and signal the kinds of knowledge that Hayek felt were essential to the success of
free markets. Indeed, a proper understanding of Hayek’s argument provides the tools for
dismantling the claims made on behalf of such systems. The next section explores the
genesis of AdWords and the market-based rhetoric which still surrounds it today, before
digging a bit deeper into the often opaque algorithmic systems and policies which involve
distortions to the price mechanism that are much closer to what we would expect from
centrally planned economies than decentralised free markets, and which necessarily involve
compromises that block the knowledge-generating virtues touted by Hayek. The final sec-
tion will examine what knowledge is produced by the AdWords market, and what insights
that gives us into the political economy of Google and its role within contemporary society.
6.3 Google’s AdWords market
In his 2014 paper ‘Linguistic Capitalism and Algorithmic Mediation’, Frederic Kaplan
suggested that with their search-based advertising platform AdWords, ‘Google has cre-
ated the first global, real-time, and multilingual linguistic market’ (Kaplan 2004). First
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launched in 2000, Google AdWords adopted its current price-per-click auction format in
2002, controversially borrowing its business model from early rival search company Over-
ture (formerly GoTo.com), whose founder Bill Gross was a firm believer that the market
provided all the information needed to set the price of advertising keywords. Interviewed
in 2005, Gross explained he had always been confident that ‘bid prices would increase
to their true value over time... as they have for mesothelioma, a rare cancer that- in a
gruesome twist of capitalist fate- affords a high chance of recovering damages in a lawsuit’
(Battelle 2011: 113).
As explained in previous chapters, AdWords operates on an auction model, whereby ad-
vertisers bid on the keywords most likely to attract customers to their adverts. Each time
someone searches for a keyword on Google, a mini-auction takes place, and the advertiser
who wins the auction has their advert displayed in one of a number of ranked spots at
the top or bottom of the search page, made visibly separate from the non-paid organic
results by a small Ad box next to the paid result. The winning advertiser pays Google
one cent more than the second highest bidder every time someone clicks on the advert. In
this way, the AdWords system supposes that ‘every word of every language has a price,
that fluctuates according to market laws’ (Bruno 2012: 144).
Despite Brin and Page’s initial reservations about advertising corrupting the purity of
their search engine, Google soon adopted a quasi-Hayekian rhetoric to defend this model,
claiming that the AdWords auction provides a platform for free market competition which
is ‘by far the most efficient way to price search advertising’ (Kordestani 2008). Distanc-
ing themselves from potential accusations of anti-trust and price-fixing over a potential
ad-sharing deal with Yahoo in 2008, senior business officer Omid Kordestani confirmed
that ‘Google does not set the prices manually for ads; rather, advertisers themselves de-
termine prices through an ongoing competitive auction’ (Kordestani 2008). AdWords can
therefore appear to be set up as the most efficient producer of ‘commercial information’
(Kordestani quoted in Battelle 2005), gathering signals from a distributed marketplace in
order, as Google’s then CEO Eric Schmidt put it ‘to provide a platform that mediates sup-
ply and demand for pretty much the entire world economy’ (in Battelle 2005: 248). The
AdWords auction can therefore be seen as a clear attempt to instantiate Hayek’s vision
of the marketplace in an automated, algorithmically-constructed form (Mirowski 2009, 11).
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The Hayekian narrative also persists in some areas of academic literature. In the US in
particular, where several court cases have arisen over potential trademark infringements
when rival companies purchase keywords relating to their competitors - or even com-
pany/brand names - in order to divert custom towards their own sites, some of the more
libertarian-tinged literature in law and legal studies 2 advocates the benefits of AdWords
as an unregulated leveller of the advertising playing field (2012: 157). In a paper enti-
tled ‘It’s Google’s world and we’re just clicking in it’, Aferiat argues against ‘excessive
intervention’ in the AdWords market (157), arguing that courts deciding trademark laws
should ‘refrain from stifling the sponsored links and allow these innovative, comparative
advertisements to expand consumer choice’ (187). Some go even further in their defence
of the ‘free’ advertising market. Ashley Tan’s 2010 article on AdWords and trademark
infringement contends that ‘AdWords transcends territorial boundaries in a manner that
makes it an extremely effective vehicle for liberalizing international trade’ (500). The
Hayekian rhetoric in article is remarkable. Indeed, it is literature in this area that seems
to mirror most closely the challenge I received in Galway. Tan continues:
AdWords has become a private sector experiment in applying free trade policies
to a truly global marketplace... it gives consumers access to the widest available
range of providers of services and goods while drastically reducing the barriers
to new market entry for foreign firms (2010: 504).
Even in what might be viewed as more critical literature, the organic feedback and knowl-
edge producing capacities of Google and its platforms are sometimes assumed without
much critical depth. Although his analysis is not quite that simple, and he does acknowl-
edge the effect of ad-ranking on the linguistic market, Kaplan’s original description of
AdWords is of a system that ‘relies heavily on the blind mechanisms of so-called collective
intelligence’ (2014: 58). In his book ‘The Stack’, Benjamin Bratton refers to ‘geoloca-
tive advertising schemes’ such as AdWords as ‘real-time Cloud-based user-response driven
systems’ (2016: 255) without really thinking about the different ‘users’ involved in this
2The Chicago School philosophy still has a firm foothold in the field of internet economics and regulation,
for example Bork and Sidak’s 2012 article ‘What does the Chicago School Teach about Internet Search
and the Antitrust Treatment of Google?’, which defends Google against anti-trust accusations, complaints
about monopoly and unfair practices on the grounds that its competitors simply arent trying hard enough.
The article, which was commissioned by Google, claims to ‘demonstrate competitors’ efforts to compete
not by investing in efficiency, quality, or innovation, but by using antitrust law to punish the successful
competitor (663). Bork and Sidak claim that the Chicago School (backed up by the Supreme Court) teaches
that antitrust laws are to protect consumers, not competitors, therefore they are not relevant (as they claim
the critics are all competitors, not consumers). ‘Penalizing Google’s practices as anticompetitive would
violate that principle, reduce dynamic competition in search, and harm the consumers that the antitrust
laws are intended to protect’(663).
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apparatus, or their differing motives and levels of agency.
Although he does go on to suggest a tension between the free market and centrally planned
economic models of digital platforms (2016: 330), Bratton also seems to accept a little
too readily that any knowledge (and therefore value) produced by these systems cannot
in itself be part of a system of control:
Google’s cloud economics draws on capitalised cognition, networked value pro-
duction, and incremental value accumulation and reappropriation. In this
sense, it not foremost an apparatus of surveillance and control per se but a
medium for the capture and transformation of living, thinking, and knowing
into platform value (2016: 138).
As this chapter will go on to show, the distinction Bratton draws between the knowledge
produced by these new marketplaces (and AdWords in particular), and their capacity to
control and surveil are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, the way the market is manipulated
actually manifests as a new kind of algorithmic governance, mediating and manipulating
flows of communication and information in opaque, yet significant ways.
Of course, for Google AdWords to be seen as having any kind of ‘governing’ capacity, its
authority and dominance would in effect have to be total, and to truly satisfy the Hayekian
model - and indeed to validate the critique - the AdWords market would have to be the
only market. As previously discussed, there are alternative search engines for advertisers
and consumers to use, and other means of advertising. But despite these other options,
and indeed - as discussed in Chapter 5 (Language in the Age of Algorithmic Reproduction)
- despite knowledge of the compromises and drawbacks, Google is often - and increasingly
- treated as ‘the internet’, the gatekeeper of information, and in one way or another, an
indispensable part of most people’s daily lives. More specifically, Google AdWords is in-
creasingly seen as the only player in the field, and indeed in the wider global economy.
Tan’s article on trademark infringement takes the governing capacities of Google AdWords
even further, hailing the platform as a ‘truly global marketplace with the potential to ad-
vance trade liberalization far beyond any governmental or even intergovernmental action
could achieve’ (2010: 508).
A recent US court case illustrates how this vision of Google AdWords as global regulator
has also become consolidated in policy circles too. In this respect, Google’s algorithmic
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price-setting systems have become ubiquitous and normalised, and their complete control
over the market is increasingly held by legislators and governments as providing conditions
positive for fair competition. In the case between Google and optician company ‘1-800-
Contacts’, official documents show how a perceived ‘army’ of Federal Trade Commission
lawyers argued that Google was being unfairly harmed by the contact lens company 1-800-
Contacts ‘fixing’ AdWords keyword search results by collaborating with other companies.
As the FTC’s pre-trial brief states:
in addition to not being able to serve up a large volume of potentially relevant
advertising, these artificially-imposed restraints hamper the search engines’
ability to learn by analyzing what users are choosing to click on (or not to
click on) (FTC 2017, 22).
So not only did the FTC conclude that this was financially damaging to Google, but cru-
cially, that by 1-800-Contacts meddling in the market, Google was being denied access to
the information needed to provide consumers and advertisers with the necessary decision-
making information. The impression given here is that Google has some kind of assumed
right, or an existential authority over an un-hampered market, at the expense of any other
actor. Google AdWords thus becomes the manifestation of Hayek’s theory, but in a digital
age.
6.3.1 The (un)wisdom of algorithmic markets
But despite the examples above, the reality is that AdWords is not a decentralised pro-
ducer of unhindered knowledge facilitating a level and fair market, and is in fact full of
the ‘artificially-imposed restraints’ deemed so undesirable by the US trade authorities . It
is in fact a distorted marketplace where Google’s software engineers interpose their own
knowledge and ideology between the advertisers and the consumers. The bid prices and
auction-winning prices are not reflections of discrete, tacit or subjective knowledge about
the value of certain words. AdWords advertising dominates the ad-market today, and is
Google’s main source of revenue. The success of the platform lies not purely in a ‘highest
bidder wins’ formula. The potential for adverts to win auctions (and therefore the top ad
slots), or indeed to appear on the results page at all, will depend on their perceived qual-
ity and effectiveness. As well as the bid price, adverts are given algorithmically-generated
quality scores to determine what is known as their Ad Rank. A poorly performing advert
will not necessarily be shown, even if its keyword bid won the auction. If it fails to attract
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enough clicks, it is not cost effective to host the advert, and more importantly, in free
market rhetoric, it has not provided a good enough service; it has failed to read the sig-
nals from consumers. This sensitivity to distributed consumer feedback might seem like a
self-regulating mechanism reacting to the knowledge produced by the market, but before
the decision on whether to click on an advert or not reaches the consumer, the process has
already been heavily mediated by the quality ranking algorithms, and by Google’s own
internal policies. The price is not a pure reflection of distributed knowledge.
Far from being a self-regulating decentralised system, Google is constantly changing the
goalposts in its constructed marketplace. Trying to keep on top of Google’s evolving ad-
vertising systems has become an industry in itself. Search Engine Optimisation (SEO)
experts are in a constant struggle between penalisation for attempting to ‘game’ the sys-
tem, and remaining visible amongst the search results. The rules of the SEO game are
often modified or tweaked with no warning, and at great expense to advertisers, whose rev-
enue streams can be drastically reduced when their adverts effectively disappear overnight.
SEO experts recount how in the earlier days of AdWords, if there was no competition for
the word you wanted to bid for, then you could win your advertising place for pennies.
But this policy changed, and as well as negotiating the often opaque algorithmic Ad Rank
score, which can be seen as a way to artificially inflate prices while hiding behind a hidden
formula and the rhetoric of the market, there are artificial base rates applied to certain
top spots on the results page which means that some low bid ads ‘simply do not show up
- even if you are bidding against nobody’ (Wall 2008).
Due to the opacity of the AdWords algorithms, it is of course almost impossible to empir-
ically prove anecdotes such as these, but they serve to provide an important insight into
how the narrative of free market competition pervades the SEO industry. It is also clearly
a narrative that Google itself is happy to cultivate. Many SEO forums contain discussions
expressing outrage at any suspected artificial distortions of this perceived market, includ-
ing accusations of cost per click (CPC) inflation caused by Google raising lowest bid prices
in the face of increasing competition for finite linguistic resources.
Apart from potential internal manipulation of bid prices, certain keywords are removed
from the marketplace entirely through Google’s ethical policies on censorship. As Google
co-founder Sergey Brin was quoted as saying, ‘[w]e dont try to put our sense of ethics into
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the search results, but we do when it comes to advertising’ (Sheff 2004, quoted in Diaz
2008, 23). Google’s current AdWords guidelines state that:
we value diversity and respect for others, and we strive to avoid offending users
with ads, websites or apps that are inappropriate for our ad network. For this
reason, we don’t allow the promotion of any of the following:
- hatred; violence; harassment; racism; sexual, religious, or political intolerance
or organisations with such views
- content that’s likely to shock or disgust
- content that’s exploitative or appears to unfairly capitalise at the expense of
others [my emphasis] (Google 2016).
Of all the above opaquely and artificially-imposed restraints, perhaps the most pertinent is
the banning of content which ‘appears to unfairly capitalise at the expense of others’ - the
precise meaning of which is unclear, but certainly does not indicate that this algorithmic
price mechanism would be able to collate the information necessary for the creation of
true distributed knowledge.
So, far from a ‘free for all’ marketplace, the mechanisms of Google’s advertising are closely
controlled and monitored. Google’s 2015 year-end US Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion report details how the company has been ‘removing hundreds of millions of bad ads
from our systems every year [and] closely monitoring the sites and apps that show our ads
and blacklisting them when necessary to ensure that our ads do not fund bad content’
(US Securities and Exchange Commission 2015). The list of prohibited keywords is confi-
dential. Far from levelling the market playing field with such knowledge, according to an
AdWords engineer, ‘having it public would make it too easy for people to work around
our policies’ (Google 2012).
6.3.2 Google AdGrants
Another apparent distortion of the linguistic market can be seen in Google Ad Grants,
a scheme that allows non-profit and charitable organisations to use up to 10k dollars a
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Figure 6.1: Adverts returned for a Google Search for ‘join isis’, 15 December 2016. Screen-
shot: author’s own.
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month worth of AdWords. In effect, the scheme enables small groups and charities to
enter into the paid ads market by ‘fixing’ the prices. The words they can buy are capped
at 2 dollars per word, meaning that they often lose out to big businesses competing for the
same word. If the AdWords used against the grant are successful, the click through rate is
capped at 2 dollars, but if a commercial ad enters the market and bids over the 2 dollars
then they will win the auction and pay Google the click through fee as normal. Although
Google frames its Ad Grants project as a philanthropic enterprise, its distortion of the
AdWords market is potentially huge. In 2013 Google’s UK Head of Public Policy Sarah
Hunter (HAC 2013) told UK parliament that ‘[b]y the end of 2012 we had donated over
33 million dollars to over 11,000 UK charities through giving them this free advertising’.
The wording is misleading here. There is no actual upfront donation of cash from Google.
The ‘donations’ are in kind, and as such are artificially constructed market influences.
Despite Google’s restrictions on political ad content, Google Ad Grants are also actively
encouraged for use by non-profits to fund an anti-extremism agenda. As Google’s head in
Europe, Dr. Anthony House (HAC 2016) told the UK Commons Home Affairs Select Com-
mittee in February 2016, ‘[w]e offer Google AdWords Grants to NGOs so that meaningful
counter-speech ads can be surfaced in response to search queries like join Isis’. Figure
6.1 shows some of the questionable AdGrants funded advertisements that were returned
when I searched for the phrase ‘join isis’ on 15th December 2016.
The scheme, which works the same way as commercial AdWords, with the 2 dollar cap,
has been criticised as ‘a precedent-setting maneuver that permits the company to tailor
its results based on perceptions of users’ ideologies’ (Knibbs 2016). As well as adverts
served in search results through AdWords, Google’s innovation centre Jigsaw has also
recently been behind a scheme it calls ‘The Redirect Method’ (Jigsaw 2015), for which
they selected 3 1700 keywords which might indicate intent to radicalise when searched for
(see Figure 6.2). During the eight-week trial in 2015, amongst the returned results were
adverts which redirected users to (Google owned) YouTube videos, carefully selected from
existing YouTube content to provide a ‘counter-narrative’ to the perceived intent of the
searcher. As well as the distinct tinge of Orwellian thought control (or even a Clockwork
Orange, see final chapter for an Orwellian provocation), the Redirect Method also defends
criticism of their manipulation of the market and potential discrimination against certain
3And presumably bid for- although it is not clear if Jigsaw’s involvement in this scheme allows the
Redirect Method to bypass the auction process, or receive ‘free’ words.
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Figure 6.2: Front Page of the Redirect Method handbook (Jigsaw 2015).
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opinions with a curious neoliberal logic. Their method, they say on their FAQ page:
is the same tactic that businesses use to advertise to consumers. [W]hile this
method fuels a trillion-dollar ecommerce business, it’s hardly been used as a
tool to provide alternative messages to people who are looking for extremist
content online (Jigsaw 2015).
In Google’s algorithmically constructed marketplace, therefore, it seems it is acceptable
to harness the power of the market to influence ideologies as well as consumer choice.
These are, in effect ‘centrally planned’ schemes that actively bypass market mechanisms
and prices. Some of Google’s interventions might be laudable from a policy perspective,
but by presuming they know better than the market, we end up with a mode of gover-
nance that is actually far from the Hayekian model. What we have now is quite literally a
‘marketplace of ideas’, which, far from the liberatory roots of the phrase, becomes quickly
oppressive, fascistic (see Chapter 5), and even dystopian (something I will explore in more
depth with an analysis of Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four in Chapter 7).
6.4 Political advertising: AdWords and the dementia tax
I want now to turn to the second of the incidents that guide this chapter, which I think
provides a fascinating insight into the political economy of Google AdWords, and how the
system works, and is worked, by a host of actors.
On the morning of Monday 22nd May 2017, just over three weeks before the UK Par-
liamentary General Election, Google search users began to notice and report that Con-
servative Party adverts were appearing at the top of the search results pages (see Figure
6.3). The adverts were being served against the keyword ‘dementia tax’, and appeared to
be straightforward AdWords purchases. Dementia tax was the (derogatory) label used by
the Labour Party and other critics to describe controversial social care reforms proposed
by Theresa May’s Conservative party in their 2017 election manifesto. The proposed pol-
icy had been to apply similar care charge rules to people in residential care as well as
those being cared for at home. The existing policy means that people in residential care
have to pay for their care if they have assets of over £23,250. The application of this
rule to people being cared for at home, often for long periods of time with ailments such
as dementia, meant that the value in their homes could be used to pay for their care,
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Figure 6.3: Google search for ‘dementia tax’, 22 May 2017. Screenshot: author’s own.
meaning the amount of money left to pass on to further generations would potentially
be reduced (although the Conservatives did raise the protected asset bar to £100,000.
The perceived targeting of long-term conditions such as dementia, sufferers of which are
often cared for in their own homes, is what led to the term ‘dementia tax’. It was such a
contentious and divisive issue in the run up to the election that it was eventually scrapped.
In the backlash that followed the announcement of the proposed policy, the term dementia
tax became a huge PR problem for the Conservatives, and was utilised by the opposition
and in the left-wing press to evoke the apparent cruelty of the proposed reforms. What
is interesting to point out here is that the term ‘dementia tax’ was not phrase that the
Conservatives used about their own policy, so it was somewhat ironic that it was that
precise phrase they decided to bid for via the Google AdWords auction in order to secure
the dominant position on the search engine results page. Although the phrase is qualified
in the advert and presented as the ‘so-called’ dementia tax, it was a keyword the Conser-
vative Party apparently had no problem embracing, harnessing and indeed purchasing in
order to exploit its commercial capabilities on Google. A Tory party spokesman defended
the tactic, releasing a statement declaring that ‘It is quite right we take steps to tackle
the misinformation and fear being spread by Jeremy Corbyn and the Labour Party’ (Huff-
ington Post 2017). Google AdWords in this instance became an overt means of taking
control of the political narrative, and what was an ostensibly commercial marketplace
became the vehicle of a direct attempt to influence voters. Political advertising in spaces
that normally carry commercial adverts is of course not a new thing. Perhaps the most
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famous example in UK politics was the Conservatives ‘Labour Isnt Working’ campaign
by Saatchi and Saatchi which adorned normally commercial advertising billboards, and
was credited with bringing Margaret Thatcher to power in 1979. Likewise today, political
parties pay to take out adverts in newspapers and TV slots, either as adverts, or as party
political broadcasts. But political advertising in a digital context has proved a different
matter. As well as the unprecedented scale and reach of digital advertising, social media
platforms such as Facebook have facilitated the micro-targeting of voters based on online
profiling and the collection of personal data. These are processes so opaque, covert, and
potentially illegal, that since the current scandal around political advertising in the Trump
and Brexit campaigns was revealed, they have prompted international investigations into
voter fraud, unprecedented fines for those involved, and the demise of companies such as
Cambridge Analytica. Like Facebook’s unique eco-system of clicks, likes, comments and
shares, all of which generate billions of advertising revenue, Google AdWords, linked as
it is intrinsically with the Search Engine, has also become a complicated and opaque part
of not only the digital economy, but also a ubiquitous part of the day to day existence of
digitally connected society.
Because these platforms rely on their ‘users’ to generate revenue through interaction via
Facebook or the Google search engine, these everyday social interactions, facilitated by
the revenue chasing tech companies by means of their platforms and apps, necessarily
become infused with the residue of the vehicle on which this capital circulates, be that
an advert, a fake news article, or a political campaign. Digital social relations therefore
cannot exist in isolation from the political economy of the platforms that created them.
This is part of what Jonathan Beller has called computational capitalism. As he puts
it, the ‘dominant economy’, in whatever form of digital capitalism, ‘is now parasitical on
its own metabolism. The social revolution in planetary communicativity is being farmed
and harvested by computational capitalism’ (Beller 2018). Indeed, in an age of digital
capitalism, the facilitation of communication and information exchange (via social media,
search, email etc) is inherently and symbiotically (co)dependent on its own compromise by
virtue of capital extraction. Google AdWords, its economy dependent on the dissemination
of the very commodities it needs to function (i.e. words), is therefore an important example
of this perhaps paradoxical (or at least precarious) form of computational capitalism,
something I expand upon in Chapter 8 when I put forward the concept of ‘subprime
language’.
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6.4.1 Winners and losers in linguistic capitalism
It might at first seem quite surprising that the keyword ‘dementia tax’ would be such
a valuable commodity, but the Conservatives were neither the first not the last actor
to bid for the phrase in the AdWords auction. Indeed, for a couple of weeks ‘demen-
tia tax’ became a fascinating example of the co-dependent relationship between Google’s
(re)production of language via the search engine, the ‘parasitical’ (Beller 2018) harvesting
of the economic capital produced by that language, and the ensuing competition for the
political capital made possible by the AdWords market.
It was not just the Conservatives who entered the market for ‘dementia tax’ that day.
There was a substantial media reaction to their original adverts, and it was not long
before the Labour Party and the Liberal Democrats also started bidding for Google ad-
vertising space. In fact the screenshot at Figure 6.3 provides a fascinating snapshot into
the politics, economics, and strategies at play in the run up to the election. Taken on 23rd
May 2017, the screenshot shows a set of results for the keyword ‘dementia tax’4, showing
the Conservative advert on top (and therefore probably the highest bidder), the Labour
party in the second of the paid advertising spots, and the Liberal Democrats in third place,
as an organic result. But although this screenshot potentially reflects the budgets of the
three main parties at that particular political moment, what is perhaps more interesting,
is that in order to capture the three parties like this, I had to venture to the second page
of the search results. There is only a certain amount of space on the result page available
for purchase via Google AdWords, as otherwise the search results would be exclusively
adverts (as long as enough distinct actors were in the market for the same keyword, of
course). Therefore when companies (or political parties) enter the market with new bids
and fresh budgets, anyone who had previously been at the top of the search results will in
effect be priced not only out of the market, but also out of the most prestigious digital real
estate. The ‘organic’ voice of the Liberal Democrats was at that time effectively buried
as it was pushed out of the front page by the mounting level of paid adverts.
Such was the media coverage of the Conservative’s use of AdWords, that as well as the
main political parties entering the market for ‘dementia tax’, privately funded adverts
began to appear against a search for ‘dementia tax’ too. One such ‘independent’ advert
did not reveal the identity of the person or group doing the bidding, but linked to a site
4As searched by me, not logged in to Google, from the UK, but using the RHUL VPN.
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created that day (22nd May 2017). The politics behind the advert became even clearer
on the site (www.dementia.tax), which stated it had been created ‘by a voter that really
doesnt want mayhem in power’, along with an unflattering photograph of Theresa May. I
was not able to find out any details of the owner of www.dementia.tax, or who was paying
for the AdWords, but I did have more luck with another privately funded intervention. As
reported in the Huffington Post (2017), Jason Scales, a 22 year old ‘internet entrepreneur’
from the Isle of Man also seized the moment to push back against the Conservatives
attempt to control the narrative. When he saw what the Conservative Party were doing
with AdWords, Scales quickly created a website with a landing page which claimed to
reveal ‘the truth about the Conservatives’ plan to screw you’, and what he called Theresa
Mays ‘Strong and unstable deception’ in terms of her social care policy. His website then
linked to the Labour Party website, thus balancing out what Scales believed to be an
unfair distortion of the available information. ‘If you dont have a counter to the ads to
state the facts as they are, then its sending a wrong message’, he told the Huffington
Post. Scales’ intervention was entirely politically motivated, his website describing him as
‘a concerned individual on behalf of the British Electorate’. He responded to my request
to speak to him via email, explaining that although he did already have a knowledge of
AdWords, he had ‘ never used it to this affect before.’
Bidding was difficult, initially I set an unusually high maximum bid and then I
set for Google’s own algo to dictate the appropriate max bid prices. One thing
that is has shown to me is that the parties are spending a lot of money on it.
My small funding of the campaign lasted but hours and received thousands of
clicks, the main parties are still pushing it (email correspondence, May 2017).
Scales had set an upper limit of £750 to spend on his counter-information campaign, which
he said ran out very quickly due to the high number of clicks on his advert. He also stated
that his average cost per click (CPC) was £0.26, which would equate to 2884 successful
diversions of eyeballs away from the Conservative’s advert, a figure he seemed pleased
with. His intervention was also widely circulated via other channels such as Twitter, as
indeed was the Conservative’s original campaign, with several people calling for as many
clicks on their advert as possible, in a bid to break the Tory Party budget.
One immediate reaction from some opponents of the Conservatives and their proposed
social care policy was to call for people to click multiple times on the advert. The Ad-
Words platform is the original and fundamental source of the wealth and power Google
138
6.4 Political advertising: AdWords and the dementia tax
enjoys today, but advertising this way can be expensive - and ultimately unsustainable - if
your advert attracts clicks that you are unable to convert into sales. As described earlier,
an advertiser only pays Google the price per click PPC each time the advert is actually
clicked on5, so multiple clicking on the adverts would potentially mean a greater strain on
the Conservatives budget, and a subsequent shortening of the campaign. But as explained
earlier in the chapter, the AdWords system is not quite as simple as that.6
Although AdWords is based on an auction model, quality scoring and other algorithmic
ranking factors also help to determine which bids ‘win’ the top spots on the search page,
and it is not necessarily the highest bid that comes out top (as already explained). Ad-
vertisers can also buy bundles of ad placements for a fixed price (called PPM - Pay per
Impression). This would normally be used for customers who just want their brand or
message to have more exposure, and do not necessarily need people to click-through. In
addition to this, Google has systems in place to detect and counter apparent click fraud,
whether automated or part of a physical campaign, and there are numerous independent
anti-click fraud companies too. Google AdWords is a very complicated and confusing econ-
omy, which is why an enormous multi-million dollar Search Engine Optimisation (SEO)
industry has grown up to sustain and perpetuate it.
Google AdWords is a strange and opaque marketplace, but whatever its distortions, and
the seemingly low cost of a click (£0.26 for Jason Scales), the bidding wars that went
on for ‘dementia tax’ that week significantly drove up the price of the phrase. This is
potentially great news for Google, who get paid the winning bid price on the pay-per-click
system (which is in effect 1 penny more than the second highest bid), but, less good for the
budgets of actors such as Jason Scales and the Conservatives and other parties. Published
figures for the 2017 election expenditure on Google AdWords show that between 18th May
- 30th June 2017, Google earned £562,152.59 from the Conservatives and £254,659.72 for
a similar period (9th May - 30th June 2017) from the Labour Party’s AdWords budget.
Even with these incomplete figures, what is illustrated here is that the two main political
parties paid Google over £800,000 for AdWords in a 6 week period in the run up to the
General Election (The Electoral Commission 2016). There is no breakdown available to
5There are other packages that involve payment for each exposure and also payment per interaction
such as a purchase.
6The process is in fact much more complicated than that, however. For example, the more successful
click-throughs an advert generates, the higher its ‘quality score’ becomes, thus driving down the cost of
each click.
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indicate how much of this was on keywords relating to dementia tax, but it is still a huge
exchange of economic capital for political capital.
There are also other actors in this market for whom the political interventions that day
caused significant effects. As mentioned earlier in the chapter, Google runs an AdGrants
system which gives free AdWords to charities and not-for-profit organisations. As it hap-
pened, up until the political parties and actors began bidding on ‘dementia tax’, the
Alzheimer’s Society had occupied the top spot on a Google search for the phrase, and had
done so free of charge under the AdGrants scheme.
When I began to research what was happening on Google search and AdWords on 22nd
May 2017, however, the first Alzheimer’s Society advert with keyword ‘dementia tax’
appears alongside other dementia charities at the bottom of the second page of the search
results, which in eyeball terms is pretty much oblivion. While a Huffington Post article
speculated that ‘the best place to hide a dead body is page two of Google’ (2014), there
have also been other more rigorous studies into browsing habits that show that people
rarely scroll beyond the first page (Agarwal et al. 2011). The adverts for the 3 main
political parties, however (and the Lib Dems had taken out a paid ad out at the time
of this screenshot) have pride of place at the top of the first page. This economic and
political hierarchy of results not only takes up valuable real estate space from the organic
results, but reveals the real-time effects this politicisation of AdWords is having. The
Alzheimer’s Society has in effect been priced out of the market; its own narrative on the
‘dementia tax’ silenced by those with bigger budgets, which is somewhat ironic given that,
as a representative from the charity told me, it was the Alzheimer’s Society that first
coined the phrase in a 2011 report, although ‘we only started using it as a PPC keyword
once the public debate around the term started and we decided to use PPC as a way to
present searchers with informed, unbiased information about social care costs alongside the
political messaging’. Just as with the other actors, the Alzheimer’s Society used AdWords
as a way to make their voice heard:
As far as I know we have not bid against political parties on a keyword term
like this before - I think it would be quite unlikely to happen regularly, but as
it was such a key election issue we wanted to make sure we were included in the
discussion and that people were getting accurate information on the ‘dementia
tax’ (email correspondence, June 2017).
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But in order to continue making their voice heard after the political parties began bid-
ding for the phrase, the Alzheimer’s Society was forced to switch from free AdGrants
advertising, to using their paid account.
We knew we’d have to use paid ads to compete against the ads from the
political parties. We use our paid account for popular keywords generally for
things like charity events (i.e. London Marathon places) or other fundraising
search terms (email correspondence, June 2017).
A saving grace for the Alzheimer’s charity budget was that although the click prices rose
significantly when the political parties entered the market, their domain is ranked very
highly on Google’s AdRank system (as explained above) due to the longevity and quality
of content of their website, which gives their site a ‘high landing page score’, all of which
are factors in bringing down the PPC. Sites not ranked as long-standing authorities on
dementia tax (such as Scales’ brand new site, or the political party sites) would have had
a lower AdRank score and a higher PPC.
Just as official political advertising and also revenue generating fake news articles turned
Facebook into a political weapon in the run up to the 2016 US Presidential election,
so the AdWords keyword system has knock on effects that did not exist in a pre-digital
era. Commodifying keywords via a competitive auction pushes other advertisers out of the
marketplace, and therefore out of the public discourse, in the case of Alzheimer’s charities,
quite literally out of sight on the third page of the search results. As mentioned before,
political parties have of course always paid for advertising, but this new way of harnessing
linguistic capitalism through Google AdWords speaks volumes not only about the state
of digital democracy; a new fusion of politics and proprietary technology with strong and
far-reaching collateral effects, but also about the nuances of individual campaigns and the
political economy (and indeed the anatomy) of the search engine itself.
6.5 Can the Google AdWords market be Hayekian?
In this chapter I have shown how, despite the rhetoric of justification that surrounds
Google’s AdWords system, the practicalities of specific algorithmically constructed price
mechanisms such as AdWords are far from Hayekian. Indeed, they will never have the
same knowledge accumulation and signalling powers that the Hayekian price mechanism
for three main reasons.
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The first reason for this is that algorithmic price mechanisms always intermediate between
suppliers and consumers, and thus have distorting effects on prices. Hayek imagined that
prices were emergent functions of discrete actors working in response to local variations
in discrete, tacit and subjective knowledge. Algorithmic price mechanisms might rely on
mass surveillance technologies that aggregate from such discrete sources of information,
but the algorithm’s engineers (or the algorithm itself in the case of a machine-learning
system) will necessarily suppose themselves to have some greater insight or knowledge
than these local actors. As mentioned in Chapter 3 (and developed in the final chapter),
Google’s algorithms are tweaked and changed hundreds of times a year, often without
warning or explanation, and the effect this has on the AdWords market is, as this chapter
has shown, significant.
Contrary to the spirit and purity of the Hayekian model of the price mechanism, the algo-
rithms that govern AdWords also embed assumptions about the preferences of the market
actors and make predictions about their future behaviour in an effort to better tailor the
prices to the market.
The second reason why the AdWords price mechanism is not Hayekian has to do with the
distinction between information and knowledge, and the specific types of knowledge that
Hayek’s argument focused on: the tacit and subjective forms of knowledge. Big data al-
gorithms such as Google’s collect and organise objective quantifiable data. Consequently,
they miss important sources of knowledge that Hayek held to be crucial to the price mech-
anism. They only collect and act upon information whose relevance was foreseen by the
system’s designers, and that can be seen and read by digital technologies. This has led
to systems that omit important information and display systematic biases against certain
populations (Crawford 2014; ONeil 2016; Noble 2018). Indeed, even with the power of
technology, it is surely impossible to collect all sources of information needed to truly
reflected the distributed knowledge of the masses. Although his ideas are distinctly un-
fashionable today (for many reasons), Hayek’s argument had a surprisingly humanistic
and anti-objective ethos to it. As mentioned earlier, Hayek saw a distinction between
information and knowledge. Knowledge was a qualitative interpretation or organisation of
information, and he claimed that there were specific types of knowledge that were available
only to humans in certain ‘circumstances of time and place’ (Hayek 1945, 524). These are
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forms of knowledge not easily articulated or codified and that are ultimately subjective
in quality. Given that algorithmic structures feed upon objective and codifiable forms of
information, it is difficult to see how an algorithmic price mechanism such as AdWords
could ever accumulate and signal the types of knowledge that Hayek felt were essential to
price-oriented governance.
The third reason why AdWords is not an example of a Hayekian market relates to the
what kind of goods or commodities can be traded within that market. While what I have
described above about the AdWords keyword ‘dementia tax’ in the run up to the 2017
General Election could perhaps be seen as a perfect instantiation of a competitive market
in a Hayekian sense, in reality the opacity of Google’s search and AdWords systems render
invisible - or enclose - the information needed for the full functioning of a knowledge pro-
ducing market. The other important thing to remember here is of what exactly does the
‘capital’ in what Kaplan calls ‘linguistic capitalism’ consist, or what does is represent? As
we have seen above, the AdWords market is made up of a far broader range of ‘products’
than a Hayekian marketplace.
The commodities traded on AdWords are not necessarily goods or services, or even the
keywords that led to those goods and services. What can be traded, and what therefore
becomes subject to economic competition, are not products, but ideas. These are not com-
modities/resources etc which might (arguably) be effectively distributed via Hayekian-style
market (algorithmic or otherwise). These are ideologies. With the allowance of political
advertising through its AdWords auction platform, Google had created a marketplace of
ideas, but a marketplace of ideas so far removed from the inclusive democratic vision of
the web as imagined by the early web designers such as Tim Berners Lee, that it borders
on the dystopic, a thought that will be developed in more detail in the next chapter.
6.6 Conclusion : What knowledge is being produced?
This chapter has argued that an algorithmically constructed marketplace such as AdWords
can never be an instantiation of a Hayekian market-based system of governance, but
rather is more of system of algorithmic governance. Indeed, we should be wary and
suspicious of any claims made by proponents of algorithmic price mechanisms that tout
their objective, knowledge accumulation and communication credentials. Google AdWords
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represents the pricing algorithms they employ as objective, motiveless agents. They claim
that the algorithm reflects the wisdom of the masses not the policy preferences of the
company. But this is clearly not true: in effect the algorithms are used to implement policy
preferences and ideologies. As Frank Pasquale (2016) notes, it is easy, and increasingly
common, for corporations such as Google, to use both the market and the algorithm
as ‘excuses’ for their behaviour, allowing the algorithm to masquerade as an objective
regulator of individual behaviour. This creates a dangerous and oppressive precedent. As
Ezrachi and Stucke remind us in their recent book Virtual Competition, the power behind
algorithmic regulation is not the invisible hand of the market, but something perhaps far
more insidious:
what might at first glance be seen as competition is, in fact, the creation
of a new force - the ‘digitalised hand’. That hand, controlled by algorithms,
determines the market price in any given market through complex calculations.
It is controlled by those who seek to maximise their profits (Ezrachi and Stucke
2016, 209).
The question might then be not only whether algorithmic governance structures can ever
be compatible with a Hayekian version of market-based governance, but that if we are to
accept a new hybrid ‘digitalised hand’, what knowledge does this type of market produce?
And further to this, what epistemological power is vested in whoever controls the systems
producing such ‘knowledge’? As Mirowski and Nik-Shah warn us, the ‘cadre that gets to
construct the markets gets the final say on the nature of truth’. If we are to see Google
as the constructor of the linguistic marketplace, then this has serious effects on the narra-
tives being produced by that market. Afterall, ‘the visible hand that fashions the auction
believes it can govern the world’ (2017, 8).
In answering these questions, we should also be wary of attempts made by digital platform
providers to ‘perfect’ or ‘complete’ the databases of knowledge upon which they construct
their algorithmic markets. It is unlikely that such attempts will fill the knowledge gaps
needed for Hayekian efficiency. Indeed, there is also an argument to say that more data,
particularly data of the wrong type, produces poorer knowledge. The idea that more
data is always better, despite its quality, would perhaps even have been an anathema to
Hayek, who rejected the idea that ‘scientific’ aggregate statistics could equal ‘the sum
of all knowledge’ (1945, 521), instead believing in the importance of localised, subjective
tacit knowledge. Indeed, if we look to Hayek’s suspicions of statistics and scientific ways
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of trying to ‘know’ and ‘see’ everything of the central planning model, we can see not
only Googles ‘World Brain’, or Uber’s ‘God View’, but also echoes of Donna Haraway’s
feminist critique of the God Trick, or the problematic claim to objectivity. To Haraway
objectivity turns out to be about particular and specific embodiment and def-
initely not about the false vision promising transcendence of all limits and re-
sponsibility. The moral is simple: only partial perspective promises objective
vision... Feminist objectivity is about limited location and situated knowledge
(Haraway 1988, 582-3).
Thus in both Hayek and Haraway we can see a distrust of the obsession to see everything,
or know everything, which we might extend to critique the algorithmic ‘god-views’ of com-
panies such as Google, Facebook or Uber, and the increasing modern obsession with big
data. To Haraway, what she calls ‘unlocatable’ knowledge equals ‘irresponsible’ knowl-
edge, and ‘[i]rresponsible means unable to be called into account’. But this is perhaps the
main problem with algorithmic governance and its reliance on quantitative big data (and
as much of it as it can get) how can it be called into account especially when it operates
under the guise of market impunity?
This chapter has been a response to a challenge I received that suggested that Google
AdWords should be seen as an instantiation of Hayekian free market economics, with all
the wisdom and knowledge producing capabilities such a system might entail. In respond-
ing to the challenge in this way, I have used Hayek’s arguments to show that far from a
model of efficient market governance, Google AdWords is in fact a system of algorithmic
governance (see Thornton & Danaher forthcoming).
While I have suggested that AdWords is definitely not a free market economy, ideologi-
cally speaking, it might be too simple to conclude that it is therefore centrally-planned.
In this respect it is probably more helpful to move beyond such binary views and to see
algorithmic governance as something genuinely new and different. As Lucas Introna and
Helen Nissenbaum identified, in the early days of the internet, information was pulled
in two very different ideological directions. On the one hand, a post-modern narrative
saw the opportunity for the dissemination rather than centralisation of knowledge, but
on the other hand, the private ownership of technology had a limiting effect (2000: 170).
Even before that, there was a confused ideology underlying the development of networked
technology, as demonstrated with the early cybernetic projects such as Cybersyn, and
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perhaps the somewhat surprising apparent harmony between Hayek and Haraway’s views
on situated knowledge that I detailed above. Likewise, the advent of Web 2.0 brought
possibilities of participation and inclusion, yet the privatisation of information by com-
panies such as Google led to a ‘dispossession’ of the means of communication (Jakobsson
and Stiernstedt 2010).
According to Philip Mirowski, the reason for ideological confusion is that computational
systems and neoclassical views of markets are fundamentally incompatible. This is one of
the reasons why ‘there is not as yet a credible economics of knowledge’ in the computational
age (2009: 99).
If the marketplace of ideas is thought to operate like a computer, and then
one insists upon neoclassical economic theory as the correct and appropriate
model of the market, then economists are dealing in delusion, since they regu-
larly endow the market with capacities that no existing computer can or ever
has possessed. Although it is not a popular opinion in the contemporary pro-
fession, it seems hard to escape the implication that neoclassical economics
and computers just are incompatible. One may wish (as Hayek did) to por-
tray the entire market institution as resembling a computer, but to do so,
one must relinquish any commitment to the neoclassical orthodoxy (Mirowski
2009: 143-4).
So what is there to be said of a political economy of algorithmic knowledge, and specifi-
cally of Google AdWords? Is there new wisdom in algorithmic markets? Perhaps the same
problems exist today as they did when Hayek originally formulated the knowledge prob-
lem, for Cybersyn style central planners and for algorithmically governed markets. Not all
information can (and perhaps needs to be) codified. Just because we have the means of
codifying things in digital, algorithmic systems still doesn’t mean that we can get at the
discrete, tacit and subjective knowledge needed to create the perfect market (even if that
was our objective). More (or bigger) data does not necessarily solve this problem, and
such data will in any case always be affected by the biases and motives of the companies
and individuals who create and automate the processing algorithms. What Google has
created with tools such as AdWords is not a system of algorithmic governance that levels
the epistemological playing field and provides efficient distribution of services through the
price mechanism, despite the quasi-Hayekian rhetoric on which they rely. Instead, what I
have argued is that any knowledge produced through such systems will necessarily carry
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the bias not only of its algorithmic structuring, but is also unreliable knowledge based on
centrally planned constructed marketplaces and price setting interventions.
Despite my conclusion that Google AdWords does not produce the necessary knowledge
for the efficient governance of the market, this does not mean that AdWords does not
produce any knowledge, or that the knowledge it does produce might not have significant
effects in the world. Indeed, the final two chapters, which detail my intervention into
Google’s linguistic capitalism, are based around gaining insights from the aggregated ‘wis-
dom’ of the AdWords market. The linguistic market does indeed produce knowledge based
on the aggregation and algorithmic processing of information. It just remains crucially
important to remember that algorithmically produced ‘knowledge’ will always be tainted.
Indeed, far from a Hayekian ideal of the wisdom of the market, the purported ‘knowledge’
produced through the market mediated search engines7, can have dangerous political and
social effects, as I described in Chapter 5, and will expand upon in the following chapter.
7Google specifically calls search results ‘knowledge’, as in the ‘knowledge box’ that appears at the top
of the results
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Chapter 7
CRITIQUING LINGUISTIC
CAPITALISM: PROVOCATION
& INTERVENTION
Stop searching, start questioning (Geert Lovink 2008).
7.1 Introduction
In the preceding chapters I have used Walter Benjamin’s ‘The Work of Art in the Age of
Mechanical Reproduction’ essay (1936) as a frame on which to hang my arguments and
observations about Language in the Age of Algorithmic Reproduction. Using Benjamin
has allowed me to think about how the values of words change as they circulate through
digital spaces, their ever-changing positions and agency within what I have called a ge-
ography of (con)text, and the political, economic and cultural effects that modernising
technologies such as Google AdWords and digital advertising might be having today on
language and the wider discourse.
As discussed in Chapter 5, central to Benjamin’s essay is the observation that the ex-
treme and fascistic politics of that era had been ‘aestheticised’ by its co-option of popular
culture. Facilitated by the technologically enhanced reach and influence of mass media
such as photography, news, advertising and art, Benjamin believed that the violence of an
authoritarian regime had been disguised as an awe-inspiring show of cultural and militaris-
tic strength, and that the population had been appeased by their apparently voluntary
immersion into new, and beguiling levels of cultural awareness and participation. This
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phenomena of control through technologically advancing culture is what, in an age of dig-
ital capitalism, I have also argued is a kind of new algorithmic governance.
But how - in this digital age- are these political effects of technology to be countered?
Benjamin’s solution to ‘the situation of politics which Fascism is rendering aesthetic’, was
that ‘Communism [should] respond[s] by politicising art’ (1999: 235); a call, perhaps, to
recuperate art from the clutches of the political and economic systems which use it as a
means of power and control. As mentioned before, the ‘violence’ and authoritarian nature
of the technologies that mediate, confuse and influence popular culture and the political
landscape today have become more and more obvious in the time I have been researching
this thesis (e.g. fake news spreading via advertising, Russian bots on Twitter etc.). As a
result, and in response to Benjamin’s call, this final section of my thesis is dedicated to
exposing, making visible, and resisting the power and politics behind language in the age
of algorithmic reproduction, by means of artistic intervention.
As discussed in Chapter 3 [methods] earlier, it is almost impossible to untangle the work-
ings of black-boxed algorithmic systems such as Google’s search and advertising platforms,
but it is still possible to show their effects both quantitatively and qualitatively. I have
already demonstrated how analysis of Google data can help to expose the politics behind
our everyday flows of information (Chapter 6), but in this chapter, I will explain and
demonstrate my critical intervention called {poem}.py; a project that exposes the work-
ings of linguistic capitalism by creating -and ultimately framing and exhibiting - paper
receipts for poetry fed through Google’s AdWords platform.
The chapter will therefore explain the genesis of the {poem}.py project as a critique of
linguistic capitalism, and also more broadly as a new method for the research of opaque
technologies. It will follow its development from poster to commissioned exhibition; docu-
menting some of the methodological hurdles, work-arounds and inspirations I came across
along the way. It is in this respect, my answer to calls for artists ‘to invent new ways
to interact with information, new ways to represent it, and new ways to make sense of
it’ (Lovink 2008, 9). Or as Martin Feuz et al. state, ‘new methods are urgently needed,
otherwise the knowledge and power differentials between those on the inside of search en-
gines and those who are mere users of a powerful but opaque machine are bound to grow.’
(Feuz et al. 2011). While exposing the power and politics behind Google’s search and
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advertising technology, and providing a focus for some of the wider problems of research-
ing proprietary and opaque technology detailed in Chapter 3, the project also acts as a
standalone piece of politicised/political art and as an act of resistance. Poetry, forced to
circulate through systems that strip it of its aesthetic value and context, is thus reclaimed
from the algorithmic marketplace, repoliticised, and returned to art.
But before I turn to the intervention, I want to present a provocation. As well as tool of
epistemic, geographic and colonial power, all of which are of course magnified in a digitally
mediated and connected age, language also has considerable power as culture in the form
of fiction, poetry, and news media. My thesis thus harnesses this cultural power of the
written word, turning it against the political power of language by using literature itself
as a central tenet of my critique. As I mentioned in the introduction, language has always
been a tool of control over people and places in a myriad of ways. Today more than ever,
when analogies of Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four and Huxley’s Brave New World fuel
the discourse around authoritarian politics and fake news, literature proves itself to be a
similarly powerful force. Just as my intervention uses the power of poetry to explicate
the effect of Google’s advertising systems on language, in this next section I use Orwell’s
literary fiction as a critical lens.
7.2 Provocation
[I]t is clear that the decline of a language must ultimately have political and
economic causes (Orwell 1968).
Weaponised by centuries of successive invasions and colonisations, and manipulated by
repressive regimes or systems of governance, language has always been a tool of power.
Language in this way is always capable of potentially devastating political and societal
physical and discursive effects, which gives an extraordinary amount of power to those
who have control over it. This section explores the political power embedded in Google’s
commodification of language using George Orwell’s concept of Newspeak as a provocative
method of critique.
George Orwell’s ‘Nineteen Eighty-Four’, first published in 1949, has been an increasingly
popular metaphor for debates around the privacy and surveillance issues of technologies
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such as Google and Facebook, as well as for the post-truth era of fake news, and alternative
facts. Orwell’s idea of Newspeak, the language of thought control and state propaganda
employed to further the ideology and control of English Socialism (Ingsoc), is a compelling
analogy for some contemporary issues, but I think rather than a straight forward com-
parison to the misinformation and accusations seemingly employed during (and after) the
2016 US Presidential campaign, there are deeper problems within today’s informational
infrastructure that a more thorough reading of Orwell’s text draws out.
In an appendix to the main text entitled ‘The Principles of Newspeak’, Orwell imagines
that:
The purpose of Newspeak was not only to provide a medium of expression for
the world-view and mental habits proper to the devotees of Ingsoc, but to make
all other modes of thought impossible. It was intended that when Newspeak
had been adopted once and for all and Oldspeak forgotten, a heretical thought
- that is, a thought diverging from the principles of Ingsoc - should be literally
unthinkable, at least so far as thought is dependent on words (2000: 343).
The idea that ‘thought is dependent on words’, and indeed that a government can control
the thoughts of the population by controlling language and discourse is central to Orwell’s
critique of the totalitarian regimes of both Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia, but has also
been used in relation to the ‘linguistic engineering’ that took place in Maoist China (Ji
2004). It is, however, not an entirely unproblematic relationship. There are philosoph-
ical objections and indeed multi-lingual practicalities that question the causal effects of
words on thought. As Fengyuan Ji points out, ‘banning people from using heretical lan-
guage will not automatically lead to the slow extinction of heretical ideas’ (2004:12). This
may indeed be so, but as more and more headlines appear about the ‘nudging’ effects of
Facebook newsfeeds on voting behaviours (Tufekci 2015); as stereotypes and prejudices
are compounded by confirmation bias in auto-completions and auto-predictions, and as
the minds of criminals are moulded by what they see on a Google search results page,1
there does indeed seem to be a somewhat problematic yet entirely relevant causal linkage
between the words people see online, what they think, and what they ultimately do. As
Safiya Umoja Noble has shown, search engines have the power to ‘reinforce racism’ and
1I am thinking here of Dylann Roof, who murdered nine people in Charleston, South Carolina in 2015.
In Roof’s own words, his sympathy with the murderer of black teenager Trayvon Martin in 2012 ‘prompted
me to type in the words“black on white crime” into Google, and I have never been the same since that
day’ (The Washington Post 2015; Noble 2018).
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other oppressive behaviours (2013; 2018). The actionable effects of the words disseminated
online through platforms such as Google and Facebook are now taken so seriously that
both companies have been under considerable governmental pressure to combat fake news
and hate speech. As previously explored, there are now even Google facilitated schemes
to ‘redirect’ searches for Jihadist and extremist material online.
The other important point about the analysis of linguistic engineering through the lens of
totalitarian states, is the assumption that only governmental regimes have the power to
bring about unquestioned, unchallenged and mandatory changes to language. Ji writes:
Linguistic engineering in nontotalitarian societies is not effectively controlled
by the state, and even when it has political backing, people are free to criticise
it and usually to ignore it. Linguistic change is brought about almost entirely
by persuasion and social pressure, not by coercion, and it is often accompanied
by heated debate and the persistence of rival usages (2004: 4).
While this may perhaps have been true in a pre-digital age, the near monopoly market
dominance that Google enjoys today, together with the opaque, proprietary nature of its
operations, and the irredressible and almost unchallengeable power that it holds, does
indeed bear many of the hallmarks of a state totalitarian regime. Any potential linguistic
changes that result from its advertising strategies are not open to competition or debate,
nor are they even clearly visible, but are the result of a far more insidious instrument of
power. As Golumbia writes, ‘we should never expect schemes to regularize, normalize,
segment, or even culturally control language to be wholly effective without implementing
similarly effective controls on all other social behavior’ (2009: 110).
The second point I want to make about the Orwell text concerns the limitations and re-
strictions of language that is so important to the idea of Newspeak, which was purposefully
designed with
very few words to choose from. Relative to our own, the Newspeak vocabulary
was tiny, and new ways of reducing it were constantly being devised. Newspeak,
indeed, differed from almost all other languages in that its vocabulary grew
smaller instead of larger every year (2000: 352).
We can see echoes of Newspeak in the shrinking of the creative vocabulary of digital lan-
guage in favour of the most popular keywords, which might be cheaper, easier to find, or
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more easily understood to both algorithms or human readers. As discussed in Chapter
5, Search Engine Optimisation techniques encourage the re-hashing of existing content,
rather than anything new, and although it could be said that SEO is in itself a creative
industry, unless it is also economically lucrative, there is little value to Google in original,
or creative language, as my {poem}.py intervention will articulate in the next section.
The exception to this rule could be niche words such as mesothelioma, the type of can-
cer caused by asbestos poisoning, which is searched for relatively infrequently, yet has an
extremely high suggested bid price which corresponds with the lucrative litigation indus-
try surrounding it and the increased likelihood of a return on investment (Battelle 2011).
People searching for mesothelioma are presumably not Googling for fun.
But for the millions of other words which circulate the web more frequently, and might be
used in Newspeak as part of ‘the business of everyday life such things as eating, drinking,
working, putting on one’s clothes, going up and down stairs, riding in vehicles, gardening,
cooking, and the like’ (2000: 344), it is their proliferation and multiplication that makes
them valuable. Although it is one of the factors that might downgrade a site, SEO tactics
still advocate moderate amounts of ‘keyword stuffing’ - the practice of filling web copy
with varieties of popular keywords that might relate to the product or site being promoted.
These keywords might be duplicates, synonyms, or even antonyms, as one SEO instructor
once advised me. As long as the words are popular enough to direct a search to a site, it
really doesn’t matter.
Important here too is the control over what words can mean. Newspeak words could only
be used for one purpose:
their meanings were far more rigidly defined. All ambiguities and shades of
meaning had been purged out of them. It would have been quite impossible
to use the vocabulary for literary purposes or for political or philosophical
discussion (2000: 345).
Likewise, when you search for a word in Google, it is likely you are being returned the most
commercially viable version of that word, which is not necessarily the one you intended.
For example, if you enter the word cloud into Google, the paid and organic results will
relate to cloud computing rather than to less monetisable versions of the word, such as the
meteorological cloud, or indeed the lonely cloud that Wordsworth was imagining in his
Daffodils poem. As I go on to show, the meaning and value of the words passing through
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Google are therefore ‘rigidly defined’ by their economic purposes. The poetic - or aesthetic
- value of the words you may have imagined is stripped away as it passes through the por-
tal of the search bar, only to be replaced by its exchange value in the linguistic marketplace.
Now if you take those two ideas; i.e. that words have a real effect on how we think (and
potentially on what we do), yet the way Google commodifies language encourages the
shrinking and restriction of our online vocabulary, then it becomes even more clear how
much power there is in being in control of the language that circulates online. Perhaps
most disturbing about this situation is the emergence and dominance of a new linguistic
economy in which the overriding motive for the regulation of language is not state politi-
cal control (as in Maoist China or Orwell’s dystopia), but private capital gain. Not only
do we now have a system which controls language (and therefore the wider discourse) by
restricting its possibilities, and its creative potential, therefore presumably doing the same
to how we think, but the system rests on a kind of neoliberal logic which is perhaps just
as frightening in its scope, power and reach, than an overtly political one.
As Franco ‘Bifo’ Berardi writes in response to Kaplan’s early work on linguistic capital-
ism (2011), the monetisation of language through Google’s AdWords platform means that
‘the economy is the universal grammar’ (2012). The argument I make in this chapter
is that in a digital age, it is this monetised grammar that increasingly both constructs
and deciphers - or interprets - language. The way the web works at the moment, with
Google mediating and exploiting the circulation of monetised words, the potential for po-
litical influence comes often as a side effect of the economic incentive; through Macedonian
teenagers exploiting AdSense with lucrative ‘fake news farms’, or through manipulation
of the SEO industry. We might say that, while concentrating on exploiting language for
money, Google have in effect let money control the narrative.
As mentioned earlier, the Orwell critique of the state of digital capitalism today is not
unique, but is perhaps often used a little too loosely. By paying close attention to the
text, and specifically to the idea of Newspeak, I have attempted to highlight the very real
dystopian potentialities of the data-isation and monetisation of language in the system
of linguistic capitalism. Although the Orwell text was written in a pre-digital age, it
is an incisive critique of the power of language when deployed for political or economic
purposes. In the next section I continue to use literature as a method of critique, using
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poetry as lens through which to make visible the dystopian potential within Google’s
control of monetised linguistic data. As discussed in Chapter 3, it is almost impossible to
untangle the workings of black-boxed algorithmic systems such as Google AdWords, but it
is still possible to show their effects both quantitatively and qualitatively. The next section
will explain and demonstrate a project called {poem}.py, an artistic intervention which
fuses poetry, code and data in order to make visible the political power that Google and
linguistic capitalism have over people and places today, as well as exposing the potential
linguistic effects of the datafication and monetisation of language.
7.3 Interventions
Imagine the day when a search engine will rule the whole textual content of the
web, in which the memory of mankind will be stored. Think of the power in
their hands (Bruno 2002).
Whilst I first began to think about using the frame of Benjamin’s ‘Work of Art’ essay as a
result of Martha Poon’s observations about the movement and replication of information
by algorithms as modern day industrial transport systems such as canals (see Chapter 4 -
Geographies of (con)text), from the beginning of my project I was also very aware of and
interested in, the use of creative intervention to critique the workings of Google’s algorith-
mic systems. Combining what you might call an ‘economic’ theoretical approach with a
‘creative’ approach has enabled me to investigate, and to some degree expose, the value
generating movement of words (or more accurately, linguistic data) around the digital
landscape. Previous chapters have covered the more logistical and economic elements of
the algorithmic processing of linguistic data, but this chapter will begin by contextualising
my project amongst the growing number of artistic statements and critical interventions
into search technology, language, and Google’s role in the informational landscape.
As mentioned in Chapter 3, part of my method in this thesis has been to harness the
power of language through literature in order to analyse and critique digital technolo-
gies and tools. This is perhaps contrary to traditional digital humanities or data science
methods which tend to use literature and digitised literary datasets as passive objects on
which to be experimented with digital methods and tools. In this respect, this chapter
harnesses the creative imagination of George Orwell (amongst others), in order to power
my critique of the exploitation of language by Google, as well as using a range of writers
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from Shakespeare, Wordsworth and Wilfred Owen, to Margaret Atwood, Billy Bragg and
William Gibson in order to progress that critique. I want therefore to begin with exam-
ples of some of the similarly literary and creative interventions that use the lens of Google
and its associated platforms and portals to shine a light on wider issues of (big) data,
algorithmic systems, and processes of digital technologies and economies, and which have
inspired my own work. It is worth mentioning that while all of these examples have been
instrumental in formulating my own method, some of them have done so through their
incisive, intelligent and creative critique (which I have sought to emulate), while others
have helped to make clear some of the challenges (and also gaps) in using creative methods
to critique digital technologies (which I have sought to overcome and build on).
As Google’s dominance over the informational landscape has grown, there have been a
number of academic and artistic interventions into the potential problems and implica-
tions of search technology that have helped to shape my research and to inspire my own
creative project. All of them have used playful - even humourous - methods to deliver
incisive critiques of the technologies that mediate our everyday lives. Feuz, Fuller and
Stalder’s innovative experiment into search personalisation and what they call ‘seman-
tic capitalism’ (2011), consisted of feeding the indexes of the greatest works of Michel
Foucault, Emmanuel Kant and Friedrich Nietzsche through the search function of sep-
arate logged in Google accounts. By creating search histories for the philosophers, the
authors’ idea was to see how these imagined ‘personalised’ profiles affected subsequent
search results. The results were quite surprising, suggesting that, far from increased per-
sonalisation, search results seemed to do the inverse; reflecting the statistical group profile
into which Google’s algorithms have sorted the user. As the paper concludes,
A strong interest in philosophical terms - which can be gleaned from the se-
mantic history - could, for example, be associated with certain age and income
groups, which, in turn, become associated with certain preferences in, say,
holiday destinations. In such a way, Google infers Immanuel Kant’s taste in
hotels, or Friedrich Nietzsche’s bias for or against open source software (2011).
The experiment thus very cleverly revealed that personalised search results tend to serve
the needs of advertisers rather than benefitting the individual user.
I was also fascinated by a ‘happening’ curated by the artist Christophe Bruno into the
then fairly new Google AdWords platform in 2002 (see also 2012). Bruno opened an Ad-
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Figure 7.1: Christophe Bruno’s ‘AdWords Happening’ (2002)
Words campaign and bid for a selection of cheap keywords. He then composed a series
of adverts which, rather than contextualising the keywords and clearly trying to promote
a product or service, were small snippets of poetic nonsense in which the keyword was
entirely irrelevant (see Figure 7.1). What Bruno was trying to test was whether or not
the people who were served his adverts after searching for one of his keywords would be
curious enough to click through to his website on a whim, even though the advert clearly
was not what they had been looking for; thus subverting the logic of the market in favour
of poetic intrigue. Bruno has conducted similarly interventions which have aimed at ‘di-
verting global symbolic structures like Google search engine’ (Bruno Interview 2006). The
‘Human Browser’ is a kind of mobile installation during which an actor is fed and artic-
ulates a text-to-voice stream of search results which are generated by the environment,
situation or space through which the actor moves. Bruno’s point is to show how speech
and sensical language has become subsumed by the ubiquity and invasiveness of the Web,
and as lost its individual power and agency. In fact only now in the hijacking and sub-
version of the global structures of power which make up the Web, is language effectively
‘effective’ (Bruno interview 2006).
Cabell and Huff’s intervention into Google, in which they fed the text of Brett Easton
Ellis’s ‘American Psycho’ through GMail and recorded the adverts it generated (which I
discussed in Chapter 4) was also a huge influence on the development of my own critique
and methods. However, while Bruno’s and Cabell & Huff’s interventions are perhaps
what inspired my own, there are also many other creative interventions that I find inter-
esting, but also potentially problematic. In 2015, poet Sam Riviere published a series of
poems based on the online persona of Kim Kardashian, critiquing the blurring lines of
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public and private in an age of blogging, social media, and online celebrity. Kim Kar-
dashian’s Marriage (2015) consists of 72 ‘found’ poems (one for each day of the titular
marriage), which he constructed using existing publicly available material (including Kar-
dashian’s own make-up tips), and then exposed to the vagaries of Google’s search and
auto-complete functions. The result is a series of poems ‘that have been produced by har-
vesting and manipulating the results of search engines to create a poetry of part-collage,
part-improvisation’, and which proved commercially very successful for a book of poetry.
Riviere’s method is reminiscent of other forms of ‘found’ poetry, such as Sampsa Nuotio’s
Google Poetics project (2012). With its tag line ‘Google writes poetry on subjects that
people are truly interested in’, Nuotios website (www.googlepoetics.com) collects drop-
down lists of auto-completed Google searches that ‘make sense’ as surreal snippets of
verse (see Figure 7.2 for my own example of this method). But while we might say they
are amusing, and sometimes poignant, distorted reflections of humanity in a digital age, I
think the question needs asking: what are these things doing, further than being a bit of
a novelty and adding to the ever growing genre of electronic literature or creative digital
humanities projects? Is this just Art for Art’s sake? or - as discussed in chapter 5 -
is it unwittingly contributing to the aestheticising power of Google’s particular form of
governance?
Yet there is so much more potential in a project like Google Poetics. For example, the
site does not credit the contributors of these Google Poems, stating that they get so many
similar ones that people may feel aggrieved if someone else got the credit, and because ‘we
don’t wish to differentiate which poems are made by the curators and which by the read-
ers’. These questions of authorship throw up such interesting questions about algorithmic
agency (see also Chapter 5, where I discuss the ‘Death of the Reader’ and Benjamin’s
views on print capitalism), in terms of questions of new forms and claims of authorship
in a digital age. In this way, Google Poetry belongs to everybody who has ever used Google.
As I have explained in an earlier chapter (Chapter 4 - Geographies of (con)text), although
auto-completions are based on previous searches AND on the content of the web, there
are many other hidden manipulations behind what comes out of the search engine, that
are far more important to pursue than capturing the funniest ‘poem’. By this I mean the
lacunae of data on which autocomplete works, the bias in the data, Google’s policing of
controversial words and phrases, and of course the complication of paid advertising, all
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Figure 7.2: Example of Google Poetics method (Nuotio 2012), June 2014. Screenshot:
author’s own.
of which combine to reveal some of politics behind the search engine which I have been
trying to expose in this thesis. Therefore, while ‘algorithms can instigate and facilitate
imagination, creativity, and frivolity, while saying something that is simultaneously old
and new, always almost repeating what was before but never quite returning’ (Mahnke
and Uprichard 2014), and while there is undeniably something of the absurd and the
poignant about the poems, there are much deeper and I believe far more urgent critiques
and interventions to be made here. The type of insight Christophe Bruno exposed with his
AdWords Happening poems, for example, or Cabell and Huff did with American Psycho,
is - for me - a far more penetrating critique of the clash of humanity and digital technology
than making poetry from search results, or trying to separate machine written poetry from
that of a human.
It is, however, these types of study that seem to gain most attention in the media. In
a recent study, data scientists from IBM and the University of Melbourne describe their
latest attempts to generate poetry by machine (Lau et al. 2018), which they ‘tested’ via
paid crowd-sourcing and a literature professor. Perhaps unsurprisingly to anyone with any
knowledge or appreciation of poetry, the study revealed that form and structure are not
the only, or the most important ingredients, in fact, the study concedes that ‘our focus on
form actually hurts the readability of the resulting poems.’ Recognising the importance
of its content, rather than the strictness of its meter and rhyme, the machine-generated
poetry was then rated on a scale of 1-5 as to ‘how much emotion a poem evokes’, conclud-
ing that ‘machine-generated poems... underperform in terms of readability and emotion’,
and suggesting further work in that area. To me, trying to quantify such a subjective
quality as emotion, not only seems futile and distinctly unscientific, but calls firmly into
question the value in applying data science techniques to humanities studies; something I
have already called into question in terms of some applications of digital humanities schol-
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arship2. Likewise, projects such as ‘Bot or Not’ (Botpoet.com n.d.), where website users
‘have to guess whether the poem you’re reading is written by a human or by a computer’
and keeps a running leaderboard of ‘most human/computer-like human poems’ and ‘most
computer/human-like computer poems’, a system that seems to bestow undeclared - and
underexplored - binary value on language. Or ‘Botnik’ (2018), a platform which ‘scours
various types of human-created, word-crowded content - from season-three Seinfeld scripts
to Yelp reviews - in order to build predictive, idiom-specific keyboards’. Users can then
use these corpus specific keyboards to create ‘new, inevitably askew versions of well-known
works’, as this ‘alternative’ Harry Potter cover shows (see Figure 7.3).
Apart from the fact that it is ‘part of the Techstars Alexa Accelerator’, and therefore
funded by Amazon, projects such as these seem doubly uncritical as they seem to create
algorithmically generated content just because they can. They say they are ‘a community
of writers, artists and developers building and using machine tools to remix and transform
language’, yet they give no reason why, apart from wanting to ‘create strange things’. In
effect, they are just mimicking predictive text based on pre-uploaded corpora of data such
as ‘romantic poetry’ or ‘harry potter’. The results are funny, but they have no bite. They
are just copying commercial predictive text algorithms, and in that way are just reproduc-
ing the existing mode of production, rather than saying - or creating - anything new. ‘We
would like, selfishly, not to replace humanity with algorithms’, their site declares, ‘instead,
we want to find natural ways for people and machines to interact to create what neither
would have created alone’ (Botnik 2018).
The more I have read about ‘digital art’, interventions and playful critiques which use new
technologies, language and algorithmic platforms, the more I have become aware of the
difference between some creative projects in terms of those that used technology to create
new forms of (perhaps human-machine hybrid) art, and those that questioned what these
technologies were doing to both art and humanity. The latter category (to which I hope
my own project contributes) fascinates me because it raises so many questions about digi-
tal aesthetics, human agency, machine art, but also because it makes the whole subject so
overtly political. It allows technologies to be pulled apart for their motives and methods,
and for artists and academics to ask wider questions about what technology is doing not
2Another example of this disciplinary and methodological mismatch is a study which claims to be able
to ‘quantify the beauty of outdoor spaces’ using ‘online data combined with neural networks [to] provide
a deeper understanding of what environments we might find beautiful’ (Seresinhe et al. 2017)
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Figure 7.3: Example of AI generated Harry Potter text (Botnik.org 2018).
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only to art, but to wider society and culture.
But like many current critiques of AI technologies and data science, exercises, or experi-
ments like these run the risk of being done just because the technology is there to do it,
and don’t add, or challenge anything, or indeed acknowledge or engage with the politics of
the technologies they use. These are at best missed opportunities, but at worst, they serve
to consolidate, normalise, and even aestheticise (see Chapter 5) the problematic systems
on which they are constructed. They become conveyors of advertising capital themselves
as they are shared and spread on social media - giving an air of agency and control to
the people who interact with and ‘generate’ them (again, thinking back to Benjamin). In
this respect, the creative, or radical, potential of some of this work is tempered by its
passive enrollment in the systems of the digital economy. As Oli Mould suggests in his
book Against Creativity,
Capitalism of the twenty-first century, turbocharged by neoliberalism, has re-
defined creativity to feed its own growth. Being creative in today’s society has
only one meaning: to carry on producing the status quo (Mould 2018: 3).
Yes, there is some kind of ‘value’ in what these things are doing. ‘Bot or Not’ is, of course,
a simplified Turing test, and ‘Botnik’ could perhaps be read as an (unintentional) critique
of the type of big data analytics that makes such a mess of digital search and translation
systems (see Chapter 4). Both could usefully be used as foci for more critical and in-depth
analysis. Likewise, they are both fun and educational tools, but, like digital ‘found’ poetry
(as discussed above), to my mind they are missing the point of their self-situatedness in
(and therefore their reproduction of) the AI / algorithm discourse. Instead of creating
reams and digital reams of algorithmically generated texts just because technology now
facilitates that type of project, I think that a return to the analysis of already existing
literature (despite the technology on hand), might be a better way of grappling with the
questions of human/machine interaction that pervade across the disciplines today. For
example, I find it fascinating that in his seminal paper on ‘Computing Machinery and
Intelligence’ (1950), Alan Turing turns to poetry in his attempt to explore the question
of whether machines can think. In a variation of the imitation game, the intelligence of
a witness is tested viva voce style, using questions about Shakespeare’s Sonnet 18, which
ironically is the same poem quoted in the problematic ‘Deep-speare’ machine-generated
poetry study discussed above (Lau et al. 2018). From Turing’s paper:
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Interrogator: In the first line of your sonnet which reads ‘Shall I compare thee
to a summer’s day’, would not a ‘spring day’ do as well or better?
Witness: It wouldn’t scan.
Interrogator: How about ‘a winter’s day’. That would scan all right.
Witness: Yes, but nobody wants to be compared to a winter’s day.
Interrogator: Would you say Mr. Pickwick reminded you of Christmas?
Witness: In a way.
Interrogator: Yet Christmas is a winter’s day, and I do not think Mr. Pickwick
would mind the comparison.
Witness: I don’t think you’re serious. By a winter’s day one means a typical
winter’s day, rather than a special one like Christmas.
Turing here has used existing human poetry in order to test a non-human system, which
is precisely the opposite of what the studies I discuss above do, although they purport to
belong to the same tradition of data science. What is critical to Turing’s experiment is a
deep knowledge and understanding of poetry and other cultural and emotional knowledge,
not of digital techniques and methods. Indeed to my mind this makes the 2018 Lau et
al. paper redundant.3 Lau et al.’s 2018 conclusion that concentrating on form alone is
not enough to create ‘human’ poetry, was effectively reached by Turing in 1950. As the
example shows, the first objection to the changing of ‘summer’s day’ to ‘spring day’ is one
of form. ‘Spring’, being only one syllable long, does not fit into the iambic pentameter of
the rest of the sonnet, in which each line is made up of five metrical ‘feet’, each of one
stressed and one unstressed syllable. Of course, as Lau et al. point out, deviation from
strict scansion is also a method of poetic expression, but it is the next part of Turing’s
3Which in itself bring up further questions about the proliferation of data science funding in the rapidly
growing number of research institutes that support this kind of work, but these are questions for another
day/forum.
163
7.3 Interventions
test that shows the importance of subjective emotion over (soley) form in human poetry.
In an example of the poetic method of pathetic fallacy, in which human emotions or re-
sponses are reflected or personified in nature or inanimate objects, the substitution of a
‘summer’s’ to a ‘winter’s’ day (which satisfies the form in terms of scansion), is objected to
because ‘nobody wants to be compared to a winter’s day’. The ‘winter’s day’ alternative
is then further complicated (and therefore humanised)4, by an emotional response to a
Charles Dickens story (Mr Pickwick’s Christmas), and the suggestion that some people
might like to be compared to certain winter’s days, especially Christmas Day. I think the
importance that Turing gave to a deep understanding of cultural and artistic nuance is
critically important, yet has to some extent been lost in the commercialised and perhaps
politicised agendas, methods and databases available to modern machinic computation,
analysis and critique.
As I have mentioned above, work in this area tends to try to answer the question of
whether a machine can write poetry, i.e. computer generated poetry which is ‘tested’ by
seeing if a human can tell it has been written by an algorithm (e.g. Bot or Not). However,
such arguments tend to fall into humanistic debates about the nature of poetry and art
rather than asking what I think is the more pertinent question of ‘can a machine read
poetry’, which is what Turing was getting at, and what are the consequences if it cannot,
or if other forces embedded in digitised systems prevent it from doing so or corrupt its in-
terpretation of language? Digital big data technology enables us to ‘read from a distance’,
a technique taken up widely in Digital Humanities (see Moretti 2013 and discussion in
Chapter 3), and indeed in large corpora analysis in data science too. However, I think
that to abandon ‘close reading’, as in the traditional ‘close reading’ method of deep and
multi-layered and subjective textual analysis employed in literary criticism, is to miss an
incisive way of examining language in the age of algorithmic reproduction. The economic
- and subsequent political and cultural - capital generated by words monetised in Google’s
system of linguistic capitalism need to be incorporated into readings of digitised language.
Going back to Benjamin’s ‘Work of Art’ essay, and the new opportunities and insights
gained by new artistic technologies such as photography, these paratextual values can be
seen as the ‘multiple fragments which are assembled under a new law’; in this case, the
complicated, yet critically important laws of an algorithmically mediated marketplace (see
4According to N. Katherine Hayles, the important intervention Turing makes is to embody the condition
of the posthuman; his test revealing a ‘cybernetic circuit that splices your will, desire, and perception into
a distributed cognitive system’ (2008: xiv).
164
7.4 {poem.py} : a critique of linguistic capitalism
Chapter 6). As mentioned earlier, Benjamin saw this new technological textual layering
as ‘the mutual penetration of art and science’, likening the process to Freud’s relatively
recent method of psychoanalysis which he says ‘isolated and made analyzable things which
had heretofore floated along unnoticed in the broad stream of perception’ (1999: 229). It
is exactly the ‘unnoticed’ flows of capital that mediate language and affect our ‘streams of
perception’ today that I attempt to ‘make analyzable’ and visible with my own interven-
tion. In the next section I present and document my intervention into linguistic capitalism,
called poem.py, which develops a radical new approach to the ‘close reading’ of poetry,
exposing the competing values and contexts that construct and decipher language in the
age of algorithmic reproduction.5
7.4 {poem.py} : a critique of linguistic capitalism
My intervention into linguistic capitalism also began with poetry, when I decided to ex-
periment with working out how much poetry is ‘worth’ to Google (in monetary terms)
by feeding poems through the AdWords Keyword planner and printing the results out as
receipts. I document the project’s development in detail here, because the process, with all
its set-backs and successes is critically important to my overall argument and is therefore
worthy of further scrutiny, as it draws out many methodological and disciplinary problems
of research in this area (see Chapter 3), as well as developing and crystallising arguments
and discussions around the themes of value, context, and circulation that draw this thesis
together.
The project started off when I was required to provide a poster for the Information Se-
curity Group (ISG) Open Day at Royal Holloway in May 2016. Unlike most of my PhD
contemporaries in the Cyber Security Centre for Doctoral Training (CDT), I was unable
to create a poster filled with the mathematical formulas, graphs and data that made up
the required template, yet I had to think of a way to represent and explain the validity and
importance of my project to an audience of cryptographers, mathematicians, computer
scientists, and industry leaders, and perhaps more inportantly, to satisfy my main funders,
the EPSRC (Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council). It was under the pres-
sure of having to produce a poster capable of translating my work to this audience that
I started to experiment with ‘valuing’ language as it passed through Google’s algorithmic
5I also see my intervention as being an intervention against digital art, in that it insists on an analogue
outcome.
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spaces, as I thought it might be a helpful way of visualising the process, suggesting that
linguistic capitalism as practiced by Google (and potentially other tech companies) might
compromise the integrity and security of communication in digital spaces just as much (if
not more) than cryptographic key exchanges and other technical approaches to Informa-
tion/Cyber security. I therefore decided to see how much my favourite poem ‘cost’ if I put
all the words through the Google AdWords Keyword Planner and output the results on a
mock-up of a receipt, which I thought might look nice on a poster. I began this process by
copying the text I wanted from a poetry site on the Web, and then manually ‘cleaned up’
the poem, taking away punctuation, pictures or annotations to make it possible to bulk
search the text through the keyword planner. I then created a comma-separated list of
the words in the poem (which is the format you can enter multiple words in the KWP),
and fed it through the main input bar of the Keyword Planner. The KWP outputs price
data in several formats, so I picked Excel, purely because it was what I was familiar with.
As well as giving the suggested bid price for each word in the poem, the spreadsheet also
gave an indication of search volume, and a competition score for each word. All this data
is specific to the date, time and market in which conducted the query. The KWP allows
advertisers to target specific geographical markets, ranging from ALL markets, to the US,
UK, London, or even smaller areas such as military bases or universities, as well as tar-
geting specific devices - i.e the mobile, tablet, or desktop markets.
The first challenge I faced with this data, is that the words on the spreadsheet are not re-
turned in the same order they are input, so the narrative order of the poem is immediately
broken in favour of an opaque algorithmic way of ordering; the power of metrics (Beer
2016) subsuming the power of the poetry, perhaps. For this first experiment, I therefore
had to put the poem back into its narrative order manually, and because I wanted the
result to look like a receipt, with a price for each word as if it were on a shopping list, I had
to calculate and aggregate the value of words used more than once, so that although the
poem read downwards in the correct order, as the poem progressed, the conjunctions and
more common words are missing. I thought this was important, as it recreates the poem,
but also makes the point that monetisation still has a hold over the linguistic narrative
function of the words. When I had manually calculated the poem/receipt in this way, I
discovered that, at 4:39PM on 7th May 2016, my favourite poem At the Bomb Testing Site
by William Stafford cost the princely sum of £45.88 (before tax) (see Figure 7.4, pp.153-4).
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Figure 7.4: William Stafford’s ‘At the Bomb Testing Site’ ({poem}.py 2016).
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I had, in effect, calculated the theoretical ‘value’ of the poem as it exists in digital space
(in this case flowing through the search engine), as opposed to the ‘value’ of the same
poem if it were to exist only on the printed page. My task then was to make the poem
look like a real receipt, so I played around with various free templates online, but none
of them would process a poem of that length without payment, so I gave up and created
my own template in Excel, which I saved as a PDF, and copied onto a Powerpoint slide
in order to make my poster. I took this initial idea - and the mocked up receipt - to my
(cryptographer) co-supervisor Prof. Keith Martin, and declared that my poster would
consist purely of the Stafford poem enlarged on a portrait-orientated poster. Prof. Martin
immediately raised several potential problems with my poster, although to his credit he
never said it was a bad idea, or that I should not do something so radically different from
the other posters. The first problem was orientation. The Stafford poem was long enough
to require a portrait-style poster, yet the required ISG template was landscape. A por-
trait poster would ‘look out of place’. The second issue Prof. Martin raised (and in doing
so solved the first issue), was that nobody would be familiar with At the Bomb Testing
Site, so it would not be immediately obvious it was a poem, which might make the poster
even more inaccessible to a technical (or indeed any) audience. I needed something ‘even
cryptographers’ would recognise, something like ‘I wandered lonely as a cloud’ So that is
what I did. I fed the first stanza of William Wordsworth’s Daffodils through the Google
AdWords keyword planner, and used those first few lines as a much shorter receipt which
fitted onto a landscape poster template.
Another issue raised by Prof. Martin was also perhaps disciplinary in nature. I had
initially wanted only the poem-receipt on the poster, so it stood up as a piece of con-
ceptual art (or political art, following Benjamin), to be ‘deciphered’ by an audience I
hoped might be intrigued by the receipt format, and I wanted to title it At the Bomb
Testing Site (2016), perhaps more of a caption than a title, in order to give it the air of
an artwork in a gallery.6 Quite rightly, Prof. Martin pointed out that the receipt needed
some explanation, and that the ‘conceptual art’ format was possibly a step too far for
an Information Security audience, and indeed any audience where the piece would have
been so out of place. So I wrote a brief explanation of my critique, now called Daffodils
(2016): A Critique of Linguistic Capitalism and added it to the (landscape) poster, re-
luctantly conformed to the background branding colours and logos required by the ISG
6I’ll be the first to admit that I was, at this point, being deliberately contrary, and railing against what
I saw as the structural constraints imposed by the ISG.
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SALE
1 i £0.28
1 wandered £0.00
1 lonely £0.91
1 as £0.42
1 a £0.46
1 cloud £2.12
£4.19
TAX: N/A
TOTAL: £4.19
THANK	YOU	FOR	SHOPPING	AT	GOOGLE
CUSTOMER	COPY
Daffodils
										by	William	Wordsworth
SUBTOTAL:
APPROVED
19th	May	2016											12:27	PM
BATCH	#:	CRC-32
APPR	#:	D25CE1BA
Daffodils	(2016)	:	A	Critique	of	Linguistic	Capitalism
Pip	Thornton	 (Dept of	Geography	/	ISG)
METHODS
To represent the process of Linguistic Capitalism, I
ran a poem through the Google Adwords Keyword
Planner. This ‘free’ tool provides a suggested bid
price for words and phrases so that advertisers can
manage their budgets and decide how much to pay
for the keywords which will propel their adverts to
the top of the ‘paid’ search results. Each time an
advert is clicked on, the advertiser pays the winning
bid price to Google. This is Google’s main source of
revenue.
I	then	created	a	receipt	 template	on	which	 to	display	the	output,	 adding:
a) a	date/time	 stamp	of	when	the	bid	prices	were	suggested,	as	they	are	
constantly	fluctuating	
b) a	checksum	hash	value	of	the	original	 poetic	text	 as	the	‘authorisation
code’.	When	decoded,	 the	poem	is	subjected	 to	laws	of	the	market
c) a	tax	‘not	 applicable’	 line	 to	represent	 the	Google	tax	situation
OUTPUTS
a) a quantitative longitudinal study of political and cultural influences on the
linguistic economy, recording the fluctuating prices of relevant poems and
texts as various national and world events unfold. For example, how does the
‘cost’ of Alan Ginsberg’s poem America vary in the run up to the US
Presidential e lection, or a war poemwhen the Chilcot report into the Iraq War
is released
b) an artistic intervention - making the politics of Linguis tic Capitalism more
visible by means of exhibiting ‘receipts ’ for poems. Following Walter Benjamin
(1936), the answer to an ‘aestheticisation of politics ’ (i.e. the near ubiquitous
control Google has over language and information) is to ‘make art political’.
Forming part of the f inal chapter of my thes is, this method is a way of taking
back control of poetic language – the re-appropriation of language as art
c) a project called {poem}.py - I have been working with CDT colleagues Ben
Curtis and Giovanni Cherubin on some Python code with which to process and
gather data and re-order text back into a narrative order with a view to fully
automating the process of ‘poem to receipt’.
CONTACT
pip.thornton.2013@live.rhul.ac.uk
www.linguisticgeographies.com
OBJECTIVES
This poster details a development in my PhD research project Language in the
Age of Algorithmic Reproduction, in which I aim to:
a) make visible the processes and implications of Linguistic Capitalism as
practiced by Google in its appropriation and monetisation of language
for profit.
b) assess how politica l and cultural events shape the exchange value of
language.
c) explore the linguistic and politica l implications of the subjection of
discourse and knowledge production tomarket forces under the control
of a private company.
RESULTS
What this method shows is the distance between the original
meaning of words and their economic value as
decontextualised commodities. In this example, the word
CLOUD is expens ive not because of its poetic value as
imagined by Wordsworth, but because of the advent and
market value of CLOUD technology. Further on in the poem,
the words HOST and CROWD are similarly expensive.
{poem}.py
Figure 7.5: Daffodils (2016): A critique of linguistic capitalism - poster for RHUL Infor-
mation Security Group Open Day.
and Royal Holloway, and submitted my poster. To my surprise and delight - and certainly
challenging any assumptions I had initially had about a ‘technical’ audience understand-
ing it - I ended up winning the prize for best poster at the Open Day. It is also worth
mentioning that while I was working on the poster, I also created an aesthetically very
different ‘non-ISG’ version, in portrait and with my own chosen colour scheme, and with
a longer extract of Daffodils, for submission to the Royal Holloway Humanities and Arts
Research Council (HARC) competition. That poster also won a joint first prize (both
versions of the poster shown here, see Figures 7.5 & 7.6). Although I was delighted to
win these poster prizes, and was lucky to have the means and resources to be able to
produce two versions, the difference in aesthetic and corporate presentation needed to do
so in two distinct disciplinary competitions, is an interesting example of the difficulties of
cross-disciplinary research, dissemination, and visualisation.
7.4.1 Coding Poetry
As I have described above, with my test poem, I had to order the words back into the
shape of the poem manually, which was time-consuming and fiddly, and severely limited
the scope and potential of the project. I decided to see if I could automate this process
using code, and as I was not (and am still not), a competent coder, I asked for help from
CDT colleagues. Ben Curtis, a mathematician who wanted to develop his basic coding
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Daffodils	(2016)	
A	Critique	of	Linguistic	Capitalism
Pip	Thornton	 (Dept of	Geography	/	ISG)
3.	RESULTS
What	this	method	shows	is	the	
distance	between	 	the	original	
meaning	of	words	and	their	
economic	value	as	decontextualised
commodities.	The	word	CLOUD	is	
expensive	not	because	of	its	poetic	
value	as	imagined	by	Wordsworth,	
but	because	of	the	market	value	of		
CLOUD	technology.
4.	OUTPUTS	
a) a	quantitative	 longitudinal	 study	
of	political	and	cultural	influences	
on	the	linguistic	economy,	
recording	the	fluctuating	prices	of	
relevant	poems	and	texts	as	various	
national	and	world	events	unfold.	
For	example,	 how	does	the	‘cost’	of	
Alan	Ginsberg’s	poem	America vary	
in	the	run	up	to	the	US	Presidential	
election,	or	a	war	poem	when	the	
Chilcot report	into	the	Iraq	War		is	
released.
b) an	artistic	 intervention - making	
the	politics	of	Linguistic	Capitalism	
more	visible	by	means	of	exhibiting	
‘receipts’	 for	poems.	Following	
Walter	Benjamin	 (1936),	the	answer	
to	an	‘aestheticisation of	politics’	
(i.e.	 the	near	ubiquitous	control	
Google	has	over	language	and	
information)	is	to	‘make	art	
political’.	 Forming	part	of	the	final	
chapter	of	my	thesis,	this	method	is	
a	way	of	taking	back	control	of	
poetic	language	– the	re-
appropriation	of		language	as	art.
c) a	project	called	{poem}.py - I	
have	been	working	with	ISG	
colleagues	Ben	Curtis	and	Giovanni	
Cherubin on	some	Python	code	
with	which	to	process	and	gather	
data	and	re-order	 text	back	into	a	
narrative	order	with	a	view	to	fully	
automating	the	process	of	‘poem	to	
receipt’.
CONTACT
pip.thornton.2013@live.rhul.ac.uk
www.linguisticgeographies.com
1.OBJECTIVES
This	poster	details		a	development	 in	
my	PhD	research	project		Language	
in	the	Age	of	Algorithmic	
Reproduction,	in	which	I	aim	to:
a) make	visible	the	processes	and	
implications	of	Linguistic	
Capitalism	 as	practiced	by	Google	
in	its	appropriation	and	
monetisation of	language	for	profit.
b) assess		how	political	and	cultural	
events	shape	the	exchange	value	
of	language.
c) explore	the	linguistic	and	political	
implications	of	the	subjection	of	
discourse	and	knowledge	
production	to	market	forces	under	
the	control	of	a	private	company.
2. METHODS
To	represent	 the	process	of	
Linguistic	Capitalism,	I	ran	a	poem	
through	the	Google	Adwords
Keyword	Planner.	This	‘free’	 tool	
provides	a	suggested	bid	price	for	
words	and	phrases	so	that	
advertisers	can	manage	 their	
budgets	and	decide	how	much	to	
pay	for	the	keywords	which	will	
propel	their	adverts	to	the	top	of	the	
‘paid’	search	results.	Each	time	an	
advert	 is	clicked	on,	the	advertiser	
pays	the	winning	bid	price	to	
Google.	This	is	Google’s	main	source	
of	revenue.	 I	then	created	a	receipt	
template	on	which	to	display	the	
output,	adding:
a) a	date/time	stamp	of	when	the	
bid	prices	were	suggested,	as	they	
are	constantly	fluctuating	.
b) a	checksum	hash	value	of	the	
original	poetic	text	as	the	
‘authorisation code’.	When	
decoded,	the	poem	 is	subjected	to	
laws	of	the	market.
c) a	 tax	‘not	applicable’	 line	to	
represent	 the	Google	tax	situation. {poem}.py
Figure 7.6: Daffodils (2016): A critique of linguistic capitalism - poster for RHUL Hu-
manities & Arts Research Institute poster competition
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skills, answered my call for assistance, and so began the co-production of the Python code
which gives {poem}.py its name. This union of poetry and code is where the project title
{poem}.py comes from .py being the file extension for Python (see Figure 7.7).
I wanted the code to serve two purposes; both to strip the poetry I copied and pasted
from the Web of punctuation and repetition, thus preparing it for processing through
the keyword planner, and then to reorder it back into readable narrative (downwards)
order once it has been monetised. This process involved a lengthy period of debugging
and discussion, made both more complicated and challenging, but also more interesting
and productive, by the cross disciplinary collaboration. Forced to read the entirety of an
Alan Ginsberg poem out loud so that we could work out which word the KWP had not
processed (and was therefore skewing the word prices), Ben read the poem like a shopping
list while I checked off each word as he spoke. It was a strangely prosaic way of read-
ing a poem, indeed, perhaps comparable to a machinic reading. We eventually realised
that the anomaly in the results was because (unless you check an opt-in button) certain
words are screened out by Google as ‘adult’ content. Only by reading the poem and the
spreadsheet in unison, could we work out that the word ‘fuck’ had been invisibly removed
from the KWP results. While the opt-in screening of obscenities might seem fairly obvi-
ous, and therefore avoidable, what was harder to avoid were the problems thrown up by
homonyms. When I processed Simon Armitage’s poem ‘A Vision’, through {poem}.py, a
similar corruption of the data occurred, but this time it was because the word strips had
been screened out. The context of the word in the poem had been ‘strip’ as in ‘portion of
a road’ (i.e. Sunset Strip), not ‘stripping/ stripper’, but that was an early indication both
of the importance of (de)context in these valuations, and of the hand that Google actually
has in this linguistic marketplace; silently screening out and censoring certain words from
the results.
With Ben’s code, the project progressed fairly rapidly, as I was able to process more and
more poems and texts. As part of this process, and to make the receipt format look more
visually authentic, I added a CRC32 checksum hash value to the receipt as an ‘authorisa-
tion code’. A checksum is a mathematical blueprint of a piece of text which is generated
to ensure that a transmitted text has not been altered, or more accurately, to ensure
that if it has been altered, then the recipient will know about it. The sender sends the
checksum with the text and the recipient generates the same checksum to make sure it
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Figure 7.7: Snippet of the original {poem}.py code, courtesy of Ben Curtis (2016).
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has stayed the same in transit. Using this as an authorisation code on the poem receipt
is therefore suggesting that when protected by code or encrypted, the poem retains its
narrative integrity, but when it is decoded, it is then subject to the laws of the market,
as shown on the receipt itself. At this point it might be important to reiterate arguments
from previous chapters. Language has of course always been bought and sold, whether as
poetry, novels, text books or newspapers, ever since words became written down, movable,
and therefore marketable. The difference I want to highlight between language that exists
on the printed page and the web page, is that digitised language (or language-as-data)
has become infused with a different kind of market value than paper based print, whereby
words themselves can be elevated beyond or outside both their material manifestation and
their narrative function in order to create capital. Thus one way in which the re-ordering
of words as they become subject to the varying metrics valued by Google’s algorithmic
systems can be resisted, might be by encryption, although that itself is not unproblematic.
The idea of encrypting poetry as resistance will be discussed further in the next section.
The final part of the construction of the {poem}.py project was buying a second-hand
receipt printer from eBay, and formatting the template to produce realistic receipts (see
Figure 7.8). I also added N/A to the tax field as a comment on Google’s tax situation
in the UK. The production of the physical receipt is an important part of my intended
critique of the way language is monetised. Outputting the critique as old-fashioned pa-
per receipts is my way of reclaiming poetry from the algorithmic market, and restoring
its literary narrative value as a piece of art. As they pass through the poem.py process,
words become quantifiable commodities, taken out of their poetic contexts, and reordered
according to their popularity on spreadsheets populated according to quantitative, rather
than poetic logics. The coded reconstruction of the poem back into it narrative order
is, however, still not a total reversal of the market logic that disrupted its lyrical flow.
The poem reads downwards - an unfamiliar format to human eyes - and I thought it was
important to keep the format of the receipt in the way it aggregates repeated words, which
has the effect that the poem tends to lose conjunctions and popular words as it progresses.
What I have done with {poem}.py is to work deliberately from inside the technology (but
hopefully without leaving a trace), exposing the workings and logics of linguistic capital-
ism, without becoming a fully paid up contributor in that marketplace. I work only with
the suggested bid prices, not the actual bid prices, to avoid having to become a part of
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Figure 7.8: {poem}.py receipt printer, AKA the Deconstruction Machine / Black Box.
Photo: Amy Freeborn.
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the market and also to avoid paying any money to Google as an actual advertiser. This
method is different to many other so-called ‘digital art’ projects, in that its outcome is
deliberately analogue. In an age when more and more shops issue receipts via email,
the old printed receipt is slowly becoming an artefact, which suits my project well. My
second-hand receipt printer in effect becomes my own physical, yet conceptual, black-box.
As I have said before (in Chapter 2), it is impossible to expose the workings of the black
box (at least in an understandable format), but what I can do is to show what is input (a
poem), and what is output (monetised data).
7.4.2 Context
As the project has progressed, and the more poems I processed through the {poem}.py
system, it became clear just how rich a method this would prove to be. As well as an
artistic statement (more of this later), {poem}.py also enables me to shine a light on the
opaque pricing system which facilitates Google AdWords, and consequently plays a part
in structuring so much digitised text. As I ran more and more poems through the sys-
tem, I began to realise that words relating to health, technology, litigation and finance
were particularly - and sometimes inexplicably - expensive in the context of the poem,
but once thought of in the context of an advert, their valuations became more obvious.
The words of the poem, as they are fed through Google’s algorithmic systems, have their
poetic context removed. Their value is instead imagined by the KWP in terms of their
tradable worth as commodities, a system reminiscent of the novel writing machines in
the Fiction Department in Nineteen Eighty-Four, where the literary value of language
was irrelevant, and ‘books were just a commodity that had to be produced, like jam or
bootlaces’ (2000: 149-150). The suggested bid price for the word ‘will’, for example,
which appears frequently in many poems, including for example William Blake’s lyrics
to the hymn Jerusalem, is relatively high in comparison with the other words around it.
On 12th July 2016, when I processed the poem, it was priced at £2.06 per click (in the
UK market); its value based not on the future tense of a verb, but on the legal docu-
ment. Likewise, other poems I processed revealed that the words ‘break’ and ‘receding’
are expensive because of holiday adverts and hair products rather than the more poetic
heartbreak and tides. William Wordsworth’s Daffodils is a particularly effective poem to
use to illustrate these contextual mismatches, as it is such a well-known poem to most
people, and because it includes the words ‘cloud’, ‘crowd’ and ‘host’ in the first stanza, all
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of which seem disproportionately valuable at first glance; £2.14, £2.02 and £3.14 per click
respectively on 23rd May 2016 in all markets. However, the suggested bid prices of these
words do not relate to how Wordsworth felt as he imagined the sky and the landscape on a
spring day in the Lake District, but to the far more prosaic variants of ‘cloud computing’,
‘crowd-sourcing/funding’ and ‘web hosting’. Perhaps unsurprisingly, it seems the cost of
a word to Google relates to the size and wealth of the industry it plays a part in advertising.
I was also initially puzzled as to why conjunctions such as ‘he’ and ‘it’ hold commercial
value, but it soon became apparent that their worth is as acronyms for ‘higher education’
and ‘information technology’. Even in Latin, or indeed any language, conjunctions and
acronyms can be valuable linguistic commodities in different geographical or historical
contexts. For example, the Latin word ‘uti’; in the line ‘Quando fiam uti chelidon’ (when
shall I be like the swallow) in T.S. Eliot’s The Wasteland has a high estimated bid price
because of the market around treatments for ‘UTIs’ (urinary tract infections) and the
advert and click-bait heavy sites that provide (sometimes questionable) online medical
advice. Not so poetic now, it seems. But what is so interesting in terms of the discursive
and political effects of linguistic capitalism, is that even if you wanted to search for the
Latin word ‘uti’, it is highly unlikely to be returned in that context in a Google search
engine results page, purely because irritating and potentially embarrassing medical condi-
tions earn more advertising revenue than Latin verse. Likewise, with the word ‘cloud’ in
relation to Wordsworth’s cloud, or indeed the meteorological or psychological renderings
of the word, if you type the word into the Google search bar, your intent is irrelevant. In
what is effectively a form of algorithmic governance (Rouvroy 2013, Danaher 2016), or a
technologically facilitated version of the classic literary ‘intentional fallacy’ (Jarrett 2014),
the version of the word appearing at the top of both the paid for and the organic results
will always be the most commercially viable version of the word, which is not necessarily
the version you intended. This is what Jobin & Glassey call Google’s power of ‘semantic
determinism’, by which ‘algorithms may prevent a user’s potential search queries from
escaping the lexicon with which they are familiar by suggesting words whose meanings
make sense for Google’ (2014: 158). Thinking back to ‘Nineteen Eighty-Four’, Orwell
describes a similar removal of linguistic intent in Newspeak:
The word free still existed in Newspeak, but it could only be used in such
statements as ‘This dog is free from lice’, or ‘This field is free from weeds’.
It could not be used in its old sense of ‘politically free’ or ‘intellectually free’
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(2000: 344).
Just as in Newspeak, the ‘world-view and mental habits’ of the searcher are thus subtly,
yet forcibly, shaped by linguistic mediation (2000: 343). A particularly stark example of
this digital intentional fallacy is the word ‘guttering’ in Wilfred Owen’s Dulce et Decorum
Est, which had a suggested bid price of £1.46 per click when I searched it in all markets on
2nd June 2016. When processed through {poem}.py, the word Owen coined to describe
soldiers choking on gas in the trenches of World War One - a beautifully constructed,
wonderfully alliterative and terribly evocative mixture of ‘mud’, ‘guts’ and ‘spluttering’ -
is reduced to the price of an advert for plastic drainpipes. It is difficult here not to be
reminded of Orwell’s Newspeak, a language ‘impossible to use for literary purposes’ (2000:
345).
7.4.3 Linguistic Geographies
As mentioned earlier, another factor in the algorithmic reckoning of the linguistic market
place is location. The Keyword planner allows the potential advertiser to pinpoint spe-
cific geographic markets to hone their campaigns, the price of keywords differs not only
temporally but also by location. To illustrate this point, I began creating receipts for the
same poems, but in different geographic areas, which led to some interesting observations.
Although I have argued in Chapter 6 that the knowledge producing capacity of an al-
gorithmic linguistic market is corrupted by Google’s constant interference in the system,
there are some interesting cultural and political reflections in the data gleaned from the
Keyword planner. At a conference in Ireland I had asked the chair to provide me with a
favourite poem to print out and use as an illustrative example of the geographic fluctu-
ations of price in AdWords. I processed the chosen poem, Sylvia Plath’s The Arrival of
the Bee-Box, though {poem}.py in three geographically decreasing market areas: firstly,
all markets, then the whole of Ireland, and then Galway City, which is where I was giving
the talk. Whereas as a general rule, words are worth less in smaller geographical areas,
I noticed that the word ‘god’ in the Plath poem was worth almost three times more in
Galway (£1.74 PPC) than in the whole of the AdWords market (£0.66 PPC). This is
despite the fact that the poem as a whole was worth less in Galway than in the wider
market. It seems ‘god’ is still a lucrative marketing tool in Catholic Ireland. Another
interesting example in the {poem}.py data is the word ‘lonely’, which seems always to be
worth more in urban environments than in rural ones. This perhaps reflects historical cul-
tural fears of the loneliness of the modern metropolis (Simmel 2012), and current research
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that suggests people are lonelier in crowded places such as cities than in the countryside,
and that dating sites targeting ‘lonely’ singletons might therefore have more competition
in urban areas, thus driving up the price of the keyword7.
Aside from the process of producing the poem/receipts, I have also been gathering the
suggested bid prices for over a thousand words every day since June 2016. Each of these
words have been valued by the KWP in the UK, US and in all geographical markets. Some
of these words belong to poems or texts which I thought threw a kind of linguistic net
around a particular event or subject, such as the lyrics to Billy Bragg’s Between the Wars,
which includes politically relevant words such as ‘voting’, ‘government’, ‘austerity’ and
‘prosperity’, or Margaret Atwood’s It is Dangerous to Read Newspapers which describes
the immersive terror of reading about war, bombings and atrocities in the media. With
this data, I can plot the price of whole poems on a geo-temporal scale, for example showing
the price of Alan Ginsberg’s poem America (in the US and other markets) throughout
the buildup and aftermath of the US presidential election in November 8th 2016. As show
in Figure 7.9, in the six months either side of the actual election, the overall price of the
poem was far more volatile in the US that in the UK market. In the UK and ALL markets,
the poem had a fluctuation of circa £50 (from around £285 to £240 in the UK), while
in the US the highest and lowest price of ‘America’ dropped by half in the months after
the election, ranging between circa £600 and £350 in a steady decline from July 2016 to
end of May 2017, with election day coming in at around £450, although there was a slight
rally in price just before my data ended.
But as well as showing the imagined ‘price of America’ over a politically turbulent time
as an artistic statement/intervention, I can also track the trajectory of the individual
words within the poems. I have also been gathering the suggested bid prices of another
group of words as part of a ‘word cloud’ made up of words likely to appear in online texts
and the media, such as ‘trump’, ‘blair’, ‘clinton’, ‘snowden’, or ‘brexit’, so am able to
map their suggested prices against world events on a geographical timeline. Although I
will have to leave full analysis of this data for a future project (see Chapter 9 on future
work), initial findings show how the word ‘chilcot’ achieved monetary value shortly after
the Iraq Inquiry was released on 6th July 2016, going from £0.00 to £1.86 in a period of
7 days. Likewise, the words ‘wags’ (as in the phrase wives and girlfriends which originally
7https://www.citymetric.com/horizons/why-living-big-city-so-isolating-lonely-isolation-loneliness-4210
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Figure 7.9: Suggested bid price (pounds) for complete text of Alan Ginsberg’s ‘America’
from 1 July 2016 to 31 May 2017 in US, UK and ALL Google AdWords markets.
launched the idea for this thesis), went from zero to £5.44 per click in the UK market
6 days after the start of the 2016/17 Premier League football season. If it is surprising
that such ostensibly unmarketable words have money generating potential in the digital
adverting market, then we might remember the run up to the 2017 UK general election,
when political parties, think tanks and charities found themselves competing on AdWords
for keywords such as ‘brexit’ and ‘dementia tax’, as I discussed in Chapter 6.
What is important to remember in all this is that lucrative and effective keywords, no
matter what their other contexts, or indeed the intent of those who search for them, are
more likely to be used in the language which exists on and flows through online spaces,
whether this is in AdWords advertising, in organic optimised text, or in the sites that
generate income through clicks and views on adverts. Their repeated use by advertisers
and confirmatory clicks by users, along with the encouragement of the Google community
in the form of SEO help pages and forums (see Chapters 5 and 6), serves to increase their
frequency within the wider database, and this is a process which I argue has an important
effect on the subsequent information generated by Google functions such as Search, Au-
tocomplete, and even Google Translate (see Chapter 4 and Thornton 2017). As keywords
and optimised text become the rules by which online language is organised, it follows
that in a world increasingly mediated by Google platforms and infused with the neoliberal
logic of the marketplace (see earlier in this Chapter), language which is non-normative,
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original, or creative becomes less prominent in the corpora of words available to Google’s
algorithms. As I discussed in Chapter 5, an important SEO tactic is to recycle content,
to reblog or rehash already popular content. Optimised text is rarely original, or new, or
it simply would not perform its function of being easily found. It is important here too to
think back to Cabell & Huff’s ‘American Psycho’ project, and to think of the words that
were stripped of their ‘narrative’ value and loaded with economic value as they circulated
via GMail. My {poem}.py project has shown that the words which are entered into the
portal of the search bar suffer a similar fate; de/re-contextualised and de/re-valued, as
they circulate through digital space.
7.5 Conclusion
This section has therefore looped back to the Benjaminian framework of imagining the
movement of language from its ‘original’ time/place on a page or in a poem, and making
visible the values that are lost and gained as it moves into a digital linguistic marketplace,
and into a new political sphere, facilitated by both economic and algorithmic markets and
by the embedded politics of proprietary technology. The chapter has also begun to extend
Benjamin’s framework, to imagine ways that the aestheticisation of politics by Google’s
search and advertising platforms and also specifically the commodification of language,
can be challenged by ‘making art political’. I have explained the genesis and development
of my {poem}.py project, which has picked up on the themes in previous chapters of
context, value and circulation. The next chapter will continue this productive synthesis
of theory and practice, and will detail some of the (accidental and deliberate) modes of
resistance to linguistic capitalism that have emerged/occurred in the development of the
project. With the {poem}.py project I have attempted to reverse the performative logic
(Lyotard 1984) of language in the age of algorithmic reproduction by reclaiming poetry
from the algorithmic marketplace, repoliticising it, and turning it back into art (Benjamin
2008). However, as I will explain in the next sections, in an age of linguistic capitalism
and algorithmic reproduction, resisting the logics and forces of the digital economy has
not been an easy task in either a methodological or conceptual way.
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Chapter 8
RESISTING LINGUISTIC
CAPITALISM: THEORY &
PRACTICE
Words forged by revolutionary critique are like partisans’ weapons: abandoned
on the battlefield, they fall into the hands of the counterrevolution and like pris-
oners of war are subjected to forced labor (Khayati, Situationist International
(1966) 1981).
8.1 Introduction
I have argued throughout this thesis that the curation of language through Google’s plat-
forms is an inherently and dangerously political issue. I am hoping that my methods and
insights have been innovative and constructive, but I am not the first to suggest or indeed
resist the ideas of linguistic, semantic and digital capitalism, and neither am I the first to
encounter difficulties in studying and critiquing such an embedded and ubiquitous system
of control and governance. Drawing on some of the difficulties of researching algorithms (as
in earlier Chapter 3), this next section will explore the specific technical, disciplinary, and
also the ethical problems and hurdles which became apparent in the course of my research
and, more specifically, as I tried to resist the powers and logics of linguistic capitalism, as
well as drawing on existing acts of resistance and documenting some of the ways I have
overcome or engaged with such difficulties to produce my own forms of resistance. As well
as my {poem}.py intervention, and following the example of existing creative fiction writ-
ers such as George Orwell, my methods here also draw on speculative theory and fiction in
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imagining the concept of Subprime Language, which I will expand upon later in the section.
As well as Christophe Bruno and Cabell & Huff, another early inspiration for my interven-
tion, and an example of political resistance to search technology, was an edited collection
published by the Institute of Network Cultures called Society of the Query. The Reader
brought together a range of contemporary research and creative critique with an aim to
making the invisible workings and influences of search algorithms visible by ‘ludic subver-
sion’, just as Debord and the Situationists had tried to expose and subvert the ‘Society of
the Spectacle’, their main aim being ‘to design visibility campaigns to make their influ-
ence apparent’ (Konig and Rasche 2014: 10). As Mahnke and Uprichard conclude in their
contribution to the book, ‘only thinking of algorithms in terms of control, surveillance and
hierarchy is to submit to that control’ (2014: 260), and is therefore to be actively resisted,
something echoed by Peter Olsthoom, who also advocates the resistance of the power of
technology companies through playful subversion and disobedience. He writes:
Through data collection, Facebook and Google are the most omniscient market
research bureaus in the world at present. Of course, this will only remain so if
we remain faithful to it, searching and commenting in the relevant boxes, like
good boys and girls (2013).
But just as with quasi- Situationist activism and acts of de´tournement, to critique the
‘Society of the Query’ is also to tread a fine line between subversion and cooption. For
example, the editors of ‘Society of the Query’, Mahnke and Upritchard, imagine what
would happen if you could get billions of users to enter specific search terms which ‘correct’
misconceptions or stereotypes in the database which appear through Autopredict. They
suggest that
perhaps the capacity to act collectively towards a common good is by actively
interacting with Google’s autocomplete in ways that are similar to activist
movements. If Google can shape our views, perhaps we can use Google to
change our views?’ (Mahnke and Uprichard 2014: 266)
Although it is entirely possible to ‘interact with’ Google’s algorithms (as many Google
Bombers and indeed any SEO expert would know), without becoming a paying partici-
pant in Google’s economy (although this is arguable, as many people/companies are part
of a wider ‘Google economy’ through paying for professional SEO, for example), it seems
unavoidable that any attempt to ‘change normative attitudes’ in this way will itself be too
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situated and nuanced a method to avoid criticism, and indeed, ‘changing people’s views’
by manipulating search results is exactly the kind of Orwellian action I have been arguing
against in previous chapters. Search results may be biased and controversial, but what
right does an individual or group have to impose their own interpretations on other users?
It is for reasons such as this that I have never actually used AdWords as a paying customer,
nor made any attempt to influence organic or paid search results, as I will elaborate on
later.
8.1.1 Co-option / Recuperation
One thing I should maybe stress in my use of Benjamin’s call to ‘make art political’, is that
of course there has always been political art. But one of the problems with political art -
and in particular digital art - is keeping it politically critical and not letting it be coopted
by the capitalist technologies from which it is made and which facilitate its dissemination
and continued existence in the world. There is so much ‘digital art’, but a lot is very
uncritical of the technologies which spawn it, and therefore, no matter what its artistic
or philosophical influences, it often runs the risk of losing any radical agency by being
recuperated into the spectacle of the digital economy. As Conor McGarrigle notes,
central to the SI theory of the society of the spectacle was the idea that the
spectacle had the power to co-opt or recuperate almost anything and that this
power could neutralise even the most radical ideas (2010: 59).
As I mentioned before, Google Poetics might be an example of this perhaps; poetry con-
structed from snippets of auto-completions that do not interrogate the economic mediation
of the form. In this way, digital poets have constructed works from Google results which
have been compared to surrealist or Dada-esque pieces. But for me such examples are de-
void of the really important political and economic structures which, ironically, construct
their ‘surrealist’ form. They take away from the radicality of surrealism, as any critique
is re-consumed again by the capitalism machinery of modern digital technology. Google
Poems are perhaps reminiscent of Tristan Tzara’s 1920 ‘How to write a Dadaist poem’,
and such deliberate subversion of traditional linguistic structures and norms was indeed
radical in its day. Tzara’s instruction for the creation of such ‘anti-art’ (as Dada was
known) is as follows:
To make a Dadaist poem:
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Take a newspaper.
Take a pair of scissors.
Choose an article as long as you are planning to make your poem.
Cut out the article.
Then cut out each of the words that make up this article and put them in a
bag.
Shake it gently.
Then take out the scraps one after the other in the order in which they left
the bag.
Copy conscientiously.
The poem will be like you.
And here are you a writer, infinitely original and endowed with a sensibility
that is charming though beyond the understanding of the vulgar.
(Tzara 2018: 39)
But as Google Poetry, and similar work shows (see Chapter 8), although they may have
the look, and indeed the method, of Dadaist poems, these forms run the risk of immediate
recuperation.1 Constructed of language that becomes data, which is monetisable as it
moves through digital platforms and spaces, de´tourned search results are thus almost
immediately coopted. As Sadie Plant writes on the problem of such cooption, ‘turned into
commodities, works of radical art and political criticism support the system of relations
they despised’ (2002: 79), and when the very words which construct radical art and
political criticism are themselves commodities in a linguistic market, it is surely impossible
to avoid recuperation into the ‘society of the spectacle’, or indeed, the ‘society of the query’.
It may well be ‘essential’ to capture the ‘accidental’ (Fuller and Goffey 2009) in order
to expose the failings of autocomplete, for example, but the moment of capture is brief;
perhaps only caught in the moment of the ‘glitch’ (Goriunova 2008, Jones 2017). As I will
go on to explain, these are all issues I have had when developing my own intervention and
resistance to Google search and advertising technologies.
1The similarity in method here is particularly obvious if we remember that early search engine tech-
nologies quite literally relied on ‘bags of words’ as methods of data retrieval.
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I want now to return to the unfolding development of the {poem}.py project, and to
the various forms of resistance it put up as a challenging and new emerging project, but
also the modes of resistance it presented as a method and intervention. With the help
I received from Ben Curtis with coding, I now had a system by which I could convert a
poem/text scraped from the web into a printed receipt in 2-3 minutes (I will elaborate
on why it takes this long in the next section). The first time I presented my new project
was at a workshop I co-organised with Mike Duggan in May 2016 which we called ‘Living
With Algorithms’. By then I knew that the poem-receipts were proving a very clear and
incisive way of explaining exactly what I was attempting to critique in my wider thesis,
and I had found that by processing poems which actually meant something to people,
the message became more personal and therefore even stronger. To this end, I emailed
the participants in advance of the workshop and asked them - without telling them why -
to provide me with a favourite poem. Some of the participants replied immediately that
they did not have a favourite poem, so I suggested a favourite lyric or quote would work
too. All but one of the participants sent me a poem/lyric, although interestingly several
felt they needed to add the caveat that poetry wasn’t really ‘their thing’. I processed all
of the poems in advance of the workshop and set the printer up in the workshop room
before anyone else arrived. In this way, I was able to explain the theory behind {poem}.py
as a critique of linguistic capitalism, and also show the small daffodils poem (from the
poster) on the screen and explain the various parts of the receipt, before pressing print
and watching everybody’s surprise when the receipt printer started whirring away and
churning out their own favourite poems as receipts. In this respect, from that moment,
the project became not only a novel method of analysis and critique, but had now also
become a performance. I realised that what had begun as a means of creative data visual-
isation, had also now become artistic practice. As mentioned in the previous chapter and
in Chapter 3, the exploratory method I have have used in asking for poem requests, rather
than basing my choices around existing anthologies or canons, was a deliberate attempt
to avoid perpetuating such literary structures, and so I decided to use the poems from the
workshop as the basis for a collection.
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Figure 8.1: {poem}.py exhibit at Inter/Sections, London 2017.
8.2.1 Framing and Fading
I had always thought that I would use the ‘collection’ of poem-receipts from the ‘Living
with Algorithms’ workshop as focus of my analysis, but as I became more interested in
them as pieces of art, I started to wonder about having them framed. I had the opportunity
to pursue this further when I was accepted as an exhibitor/presenter at the Inter/Sections
event run by the Media and Art Technology CDT at Queen Mary University of Lon-
don (QMUL), and held at the Mile End Arts Pavilion in London in August/September
2017 (see Figure 8.1). Two new (and critically interesting) developments arose from this.
Firstly, the framing of the receipts, and secondly, the use of a Raspberry Pi to power the
printer, thereby turning it into a centre piece of the exhibition, a black box mysteriously
churning out receipts at random intervals, giving an agency of its own to what up until
then had just been prop.
The idea of framing the receipts from the workshop was initially problematic on many
levels. On a practical level, I knew it would cost a considerable amount of money to
get them done, especially as they were such an unusual shape, and also therefore, quite
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delicate. I was also dubious about what kind of value I was adding by getting them framed.
I was making a bold statement by reconstructing the receipts as framed artworks, and I was
worried that, although I was trying to reclaim the poems from the algorithmic marketplace
and give them back their aesthetic value, in the act of framing I would essentially be
actively re-entering the poems into a different marketplace, with all the value judgments
that might entail. I was also very conscious that ‘fixing’ the poems behind a frame could
also be seen as just as violent an act of capture; tying the words for eternity to Google’s
suggested ‘derivative’ prices and values. In this way framing halts the iteration of language
- it is a violent capture of the words at a particular time, date and place, that echoes the
post-structuralist arguments of Lyotard and Derrida that I wrote about in Chapter 4
(Geographies of (con)text). In framing the poems with one economic value I have in effect
‘arrested’ their ‘meaning’, which is exactly what Google does constantly when auctioning
language. As I will explore later in the chapter, a post-structuralist view of language
is that its ‘value’ lies in its capacity for constant deferral of meaning depending on its
context, so in economic terms, the value of language is in its liquidity; its capacity to
change shape and meaning. However, with the words that flow through the search engine,
their primary ‘value’ is always an economic one, which makes them potentially illiquid,
or to extend the metaphor, they risk becoming toxic. The wider ‘violence’ of algorithmic,
calculative processes have been written about by Beer (2009; 2016), ONeill (2017), Owen
(2015), McQuillan (2015) and others, but I think there is also a specific violence of capture
in this non-consensual tying of an algorithmically generated economic value to language,
or indeed linguistic data. As Kitchin points out, there is also an inherent nominative
anomaly in how we even speak about the data that we harvest, scrape and crunch from
any source (2014: 2). Derived from the Latin dare meaning to give, the implication is
that data is freely given, rather than selected, ordered and taken as desired by the data
analyser. Quoting H.E. Jensen, Kitchin argues that ‘data are actually capta’:
[I]t is an unfortunate accident of history that the term datum rather than
captum should have come to symbolize the unit-phenomenon in science. For
science deals, not with ‘that which has been given’ by nature to the scientist,
but with ‘that which has been taken’ or selected from nature by the scientist
in accordance with his purpose (1950: ix, cited in Becker 1952: 278, cited in
Kitchin 2014: 2).
So as well as the algorithmic ‘capture of data’, by {poem}.py, I was also adding another
layer to this process by in effect freezing the ‘value’ of each word in time and space, and
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then physically capturing them behind a frame, which was something I felt might com-
promise the conceptual integrity of my own project. I was in effect capturing the ‘value’
of these words and subjecting them the gaze of yet another opaque, yet powerful market.
Indeed, resisting the further capitalisation of the poem-receipts has not been easy. People
have asked to buy the receipts, framed and unframed. I have had requests to process
receipts for people’s birthdays, and I have had to provide insurance costs to exhibitions.
Various people have suggested the poems would make lovely gifts; novelty toilet rolls or
scarves, but I felt that the framing question in particular was especially problematic. How
could I remain critical of Google and its system of linguistic capitalism, when I had not
only replicated the violence of the algorithmic capture of ‘value’, but also exploited that
data/capta in the name of artistic intervention, and in doing so run the risk of recupera-
tion into the spectacle of the digital art market.
An answer to these potential problems came in part during the actual framing process. I
wanted to keep the process as ethical and local as possible, so had approached the local
framing shop in Egham. It took quite some time to explain why I wanted to frame eleven
receipts ranging in length from 10cms to 180cms, and there were several practical hurdles
to overcome too. The longer poems needed extra large sheets of glass and backing, which
would have to be ordered in especially, but it was a frantic phone-call from the framer one
morning that really helped the project. I had left the eleven receipts at the shop for a cou-
ple of weeks until he had time to attempt to frame them, and I had told him that I could
always print off more if one got torn or damaged, for example. He had clearly forgotten
both this and the fact that he was working with thermal receipt paper, and so when he
put the first of the poems into the hot-press to bind it to the backing board, the heat
reacted with the paper, and the receipt turned almost black. Horrified that he had ruined
my ‘artwork’, he rang me immediately to apologise and to ask what to do. At first I said
I would print another one off and drop it round to him (to his relief), but then I thought
what a lovely example of resistance this was. Not of human resistance or intervention, but
of an unwitting mechanical intervention into the process of re-aestheticisation. I asked the
framer not to throw the darkened poem away, and when I saw it I decided to keep it as
the framed version, in all its prematurely aged glory, so Wilfred Owen’s Dulce et Decorum
Est is unique in that collection as being a different colour to the other receipts, perhaps
giving it another value, when in reality it is the product of a technological error. This
incident with the framer made me think further about the integrity and longevity of the
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materials I was working with. The paper I use is normal commercial thermal till roll, so
in hindsight it was no surprise that the heat process had that effect. But I then started
to think about the other poem-receipts, and how they also would fade with time, just like
any other receipt, and it became obvious this was also a serendipitous means by which I
could resist the violent ‘capture’ of the words at a particular algorithmic moment.
Yes, and as discussed above, I had frozen the ‘value’ of the poems in a specific time
and place and ‘enclosed forever behind the glass pane’2, but I could now be safe in the
knowledge that one day they would escape; liberated from their linguistic prison house
(see Chapter 4), and free to be liquid once more, as I will expand upon in the next section.
Several people who have {poem}.py receipts have been concerned - almost apologetic -
that they have faded while being stuck to a fridge door, or on a sunny windowsill (see
Figure 8.2), but I think that the process of fading must be part of the critique. The Open
Data Institute, where the ‘Living with Algorithms’ collection on display (now in its second
year there), originally asked me if I would replace the poems if they faded. I politely said
no.
But as with other attempts at subversion, there is also the possibility that a framed poem
becomes more ‘valuable’ in an aesthetic sense, the more yellowed it becomes. The recent
prank by Banksy at Sotherby’s, where he remotely shredded a piece of his own art the sec-
ond it was sold, shows just how ridiculous the art market can be in terms of the valuation
of individual pieces. Banksy’s ‘Girl with Balloon’ was bought for just over £1 million, but
since the shredding has now been estimated to be worth double that figure, some of this
extra value perhaps deriving from the revelation that the shredder malfunctioned on the
day, unintentionally creating a new work of art. I am not for a minute putting {poem}.py
on a scale with Banksy, but his shredding stunt definitely contextualises the difficulties I
have had with keeping my own intervention out of the marketplace.
As {poem}.py developed, another example of material resistance occurred when the first
receipt to be chewed up by the printer was, appropriately enough, a Public Enemy song
that a visitor to the Inter/Sections exhibition had requested (see Figure 8.3). The pre-
2A deliberate paraphrasing of a line from the anti-war folk song known variously as ‘No-Man’s Land’,
‘Flowers of the Forest’ or ‘Willie McBride’. The capture of the moment behind the glass has to me always
seemed a poignant juxta-position to the imagined violence of the young soldier’s death: And did you leave
a wife or a sweetheart behind / In some faithful heart is your memory enshrined / Although you died back
in nineteen sixteen / In that faithful heart are you forever nineteen / Or are you a stranger without even a
name / Enclosed there forever behind the glass pane / In an old photograph, torn and battered and stained
/ And faded to yellow in a brown leather frame.
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Figure 8.2: Paul Muldoon’s ‘Something Else’ ({poem}.py 2016). Photo: Rachel O’Dwyer.
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carious materiality of assembled parts of the {poem}.py process - from the algorithmic
pricing, the Google updates, the occasional problems in the code, to the printer itself, the
framing process and the paper inside it - can therefore perhaps all be seen as examples of
the ‘vitality’ and agency of ‘things’ that Jane Bennett describes in ‘Vibrant Matter’:
By ‘vitality’, I mean the capacity of things - edibles, commodities, storms,
metals - not only to impede or block the will and designs of humans, but also
to act as quasi-agents or forces with trajectories, propensities, or tendencies
of their own. My aspiration is to articulate a vibrant materiality that runs
alongside and inside humans to see how analyses of political events might
change if we gave the force of things more due (2009: viii).
If there has been one moment that embodies Bennett’s aspiration, it was when I took my
receipt printer from London to Boston for the 2017 American Association of Geographers
conference. At Heathrow the security scanners picked out the printer for further exami-
nation. Why was I taking a printer to Boston? They have printers in Boston, you know.
Why not use a dot matrix?, were some of the questions, but what stood out even more was
the way the security staff examined the black box of the printer itself. They swabbed it for
explosives inside and out, opening it up and pulling out the blank till roll, and swabbing
that too. As far as they were concerned it was a suspicious, potentially ‘vibrant’ object,
capable of its own trajectory, but their equipment could only test for one type of political
agency. As an object, the printer was benign; just a black box that eventually made it
through airport security. But what could not be detected was its capacity for political
agency once the chemicals within the thermal receipt paper were activated. The printer
uses no ink, as the text is activated by heat, so in this way, the till roll they were swabbing
at security already held the potential to say anything and everything. It really does act
as a black box which transforms input to output, which is why, as a ‘vibrant object’, it
has been such an effective way of demonstrating the project and making visible the pro-
cesses of linguistic capitalism and their political potential. In this way the printer, while
embodying the sensory regimes and materialities of the airport security process, manages
to subvert these security logics and also to resist what Lisa Parks calls the ‘venerating
capitalist modes of extraction and circulation’ of the airport screening site (Parks 2018).
But in subverting its everyday use, and viewing it as an object of ‘vibrant’ resistance,
the printer has itself also taken on its own agency as an almost fetishised black box. It
becomes a thing of mystery at conferences when I use it as part of a presentation. It has a
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Figure 8.3: Public Enemy’s ‘He Got Game’ ({poem}.py 2017). Photo: author’s own.
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Figure 8.4: {poem}.py printer. Photo: author’s own.
large yellow and black sticker on its side saying CYBER (courtesy of Phil Garnett), which
led to a fellow panelist in Boston asking if it was a ‘special Google machine’, rather than
just a shop-used retail machine so dated that it came with an old-school embossed strip of
tape with the word EPSON on it stuck to the plug (see Figure 8.4). As I have mentioned
before, my methodology for this project has always been exploratory, and I realised early
on that opening the algorithmic black box was not only impossible, but also perhaps not
desirable. Instead, I have found that the most effective way to reveal the politics behind
the system was to let its moving parts speak for themselves, and by moving parts I mean
the data, the markets, the printer and paper etc. This is what I mean by working with
the masters’ tools in order to reveal the imperfect structures they build.
8.2.2 Printing and Performing
Another important development at that time was the idea of the ‘printer as exhibit’.
Previously, the receipt printer, bought second hand from EBay, had been a prop; just
a novel means to create the receipts as poems. It is an old model receipt printer, it is
heavy and bulky, and has been an absolute pain to carry around, both for security reasons
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(see above) and physical ones. But at every opportunity I have carried my printer to
talks and conferences, because it has proved such an engaging way to offer an analogue
(and therefore understandable) critique of a digital (and therefore necessarily opaque)
technology. The printer has therefore become a way of translating between technical and
non-technical audiences. For the Inter/Sections exhibition I displayed the collection of
framed poem-receipts from the ‘Living With Algorithms’ workshop, but I wanted to also
have the printer on display as a kind of artifact/exhibit to compliment the frames. I was
discussing the exhibition with friends when one of them (Joe Shaw) suggested that I could
make the exhibition much more fun if I hooked the printer up to a hidden Raspberry Pi
computer which would make the printer print out receipts at random intervals, ‘as if by
magic’. I had never used a Raspberry Pi before, and had no idea how to program one or
connect it to the printer, so for the second time I fell back on the expertise and patience
of one of my CDT cohort, this time Feargus Pendlebury, who set the printer and Pi up to
work together and wrote some code to make it run. At this point we also had to adapt
the Excel templates I had been using previously, as Microsoft software is not compati-
ble with Raspberry Pi operating system, so we had to adapt and create a new style of
template. Learning to use the Pi, and to run Feargus’s code was a steep learning curve,
and involved another extended period of collaborative debugging, but we finally got there,
and I was able to take the printer and Pi to Mile End for the exhibition. I had asked in
advance for two plinths, in addition to the hanging system for the eleven frames. On one
plinth I put the printer, with the Pi and all the cabling hidden in the base, so it looked
unconnected to any power supply. I had printed out an exhibit label stating ‘THANK
YOU FOR SHOPPING AT GOOGLE, Please Take Your Receipt’, which I stuck to the
front of the plinth. On the other plinth I displayed the entire text of George Orwell’s
Nineteen Eighty-Four, which I had managed to run through {poem}.py (not without dif-
ficulty, as explained on the next section). On 26th June 2017, when I processed it, the
1984 receipt came to £58,318 and took almost a whole till roll (and 7 minutes) to print.
I had wanted to use 1984 because I use Orwell’s idea of Newspeak as a critique of the
political power of language (see earlier), so I thought it would be a good way of bringing
a overtly political message into the exhibition as a whole. I made another exhibit label :
‘Nineteen Eighty-Four (2017)’, with a quote from the book, and placed it on the plinth
in front of the rolled up receipt. I was quite lucky in that the gallery space I had been
allocated had a large round ventilation hole in the wall, which doubled up conceptually as
one of the ‘memory holes’ into which Winston Smith and the other employees at the Min-
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istry of Truth had to throw all their paperwork after altering the factual record in the book.
As the exhibition week went on, with the Raspberry Pi and printer churning out more and
more poem-receipts3 at intervals of between 10 and 30 minutes, I had to start thinking
about what to do with them. They were spooling all over the floor around the pedestal
which the printer was on, which looked really good, but quickly became messy. Despite
the label inviting visitors to ‘Please take your receipt’, the exhibition curators had told
me people were unsure as to whether they were actually meant to be interacting with
the display. At this point, another friend (Adam Badger) suggested using a receipt spike
- like the ones used in shops and restaurants - to collate the receipts in keeping with
the commercial retail theme of the exhibit. I thought this was a brilliant idea. I have
always wanted to avoid treating the receipts with kid gloves, as art not to be touched, and
have always given them away freely, as (as I mentioned above) I want as far as possible
to avoid re-capitalising them. I want them to be expendable, crumpled, lost, torn and
forgotten about in the bottom of bags and pockets. Because that is the point. The words
on the receipts are expendable, crumpled, lost, torn and forgotten too. I want fading
receipts to be pinned to fridges and notice boards, or blue-tacked to office doors until they
disappear completely, so skewering them on a spike if people were too slow to collect them
off the printer was a perfect way to highlight the expendability of the words to Google.
Incidentally, ‘To his Coy Mistress’ (see Figure 8.5) had been requested by a friend of mine,
Michael Flexer. He was about to get married at the time so I decided to give the poem-
receipt to him as a wedding present, presenting it to him on his stag night. It was only
months later that he admitted he had lost it that same night, probably somewhere on
Brighton beach where he had ended up at dawn. He was very apologetic, but I like that
one of the receipts was lost in that way. It was rolled up in a plastic tube, so might one
day be found. Once again, that is what receipts do.
8.2.3 Destruction and Encryption
The Inter/Sections exhibition also proved critical in tying together the idea of hashing -
or encrypting- the poems I fed through {poem}.py with a broader critique not only data
processing in an age of digital capitalism, but also of art and its different types of value.
One of the visitors to the exhibition had asked me to process a poem called Agrippa by
William Gibson (author of Neuromancer and coiner of the word ‘cyberspace’). I had had a
3The receipts coming out were from a database of all the poems I had processed up to that point, so
formed a kind of historiography of the project.
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Figure 8.5: {poem}.py receipt spike. Photo: author’s own.
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lot of requests during the week and I had processed them all, printing out a version of the
receipts from my laptop to give to the person who had requested them, but also saving a
Pi-friendly version to the database so that each poem became part of the evolution of the
project. But when I was asked to do Agrippa, and when I found out about the provenance
of the poem, for the first time I refused to do it.
‘Agrippa (Book of the Dead)’ (Gibson et al. 1992), to give it its full title, is a poem written
by Gibson in 1992. It it based around his reflections on finding an old photograph album
which had belonged to his father. Somewhat prosaically, Agrippa was the brand name of
the photo album, but the poem’s subject matter of memory and loss was not incidental.
It was part of an artistic project and was only ever meant to be an electronic poem, stored
on a floppy disk and designed to encrypt itself after its first execution, which happened
at a launch event in New York in December 1992, when the poem was shown on a screen
and read out by magician/entertainer Penn Jillette (later of Penn and Teller fame). The
disk itself had been hidden inside a book, the text of which had been designed to fade
when subjected to light, and had been designed as ‘a supposedly self-devouring floppy-disk
intended to display the text only once, then ‘eat itself’ (Gibson 2007) (see Figure 8.6).
Since the night of the poem’s first (and only) official performance there has been much
controversy over the project, not helped by Gibson and his collaborators Dennis Ashbaugh
and Kevin Begos’s hazy and often conflicting recollections of the event itself. In 2012 a
US university department launched an international call for cryptographers to decrypt the
poem, which was ultimately successful, but despite the supposed destruction of the poem,
its text was already in circulation, supposedly the result of a video taken of the poem on
screen at the original launch event (for full details see Liu et al. 2005).
Yet despite the original idea of the ephemerality of electronic text its destruction by en-
cryption, Gibson himself did not seem to mind that the conceptual element of the project
had not gone to plan, in fact he was pleased that the poem had ‘escaped to cyberspace and
a life of its own’, while also recognising that, in cyberspace, the poem might be subject to
‘bit-rot’, so he ended up publishing the poem on his website ‘with the correct line-breaks,
etc.’ (2007).
Gibson’s Agrippa therefore posed a dilemma to me. It was a poem designed specifically
to be unreproducible, yet since its performance and execution Gibson seemed to have had
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a change of heart. The encryption which ‘silenced’ the poem became restrictive rather
than redemptive, something to be broken free from, rather than cherished, thus echoing
the rich and conflicting history of cryptography itself; is it freedom or is it control, and in
whose hands? As I mentioned earlier, my {poem}.py project uses cryptography as a con-
ceptual tool with which to ‘protect’ poetry from the laws of the algorithmic marketplace,
thus maintaining its narrative integrity. It is very much a tool of resistance, rather than
of destruction. As one paper on the Agrippa case states, ‘encryption is not destruction
because enciphered text is necessarily subject to cryptanalysis (cracking)’ (DuPont 2013).
In the crypto wars of the 1990s, cryptography was considered a weapon, which is maybe
why the narrative of ‘destruction’ that DuPont aims to correct in the case of Agrippa
captured the public imagination. Indeed, cryptography is still regulated as a potential
threat to international security under the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for
Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods (Shehadeh 1999). But true to the original con-
ception of ‘Agrippa’, and indeed to my own project, encryption does not necessarily mean
destruction, but a means of preservation, and resistance. The words in {poem}.py are not
escaping from encryption, but from the market. My dilemma, therefore, was whether to
honour the original concept of ‘Agrippa’, and let it rest in peace, so to speak, or to add an-
other layer of intrigue/abstraction onto the poem by putting it through {poem}.py. At the
time, and before I had researched the matter, I decided against processing ‘Agrippa’, but
now knowing more about Gibson’s reasoning since the poem was first performed/executed
(and executed is such a good word here - they did try to kill it!), it might be something I
do in the future.
But in thinking about whether encryption is protector or destroyer, it would be wrong
to view the poems processed and hashed by {poem}.py as un-damaged by their capture,
whether that be by the Google algorithm, or by my framing. One of the things that has
most surprised me about the reception of my project, is how keen people are to have their
favourite poem monetised, or in effect butchered by the {poem}.py process. Only one
person has ever objected to the monetisation of their poem. At one event I had asked
participants (as I always do) to send me their favourite poems so I could use them in my
presentation and print them out. I do not explain why I ask for these poems. Before
the workshop one of the participants had responded to my request to send me a favourite
poem. Initially they had emailed me to ask if the poem had to be in English. I said it did
not matter what language the poem was in, as processing foreign language poems through
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Figure 8.6: ‘Agrippa: Book of the Dead’, William Gibson et al. (1992).
{poem}.py is often an excellent way of showing how far words are removed from their
contexts when they are ‘valued’ (see Chapter 7).
The poem they had sent me was, as I soon discovered, not even in the Roman alphabet,
which was a surprise that highlighted my own Westernised linguistic assumptions, thereby
also confirming the inherent privilege of certain scripts above others in the world linguistic
order, and also the economic supremacy of English on the web and specifically on Google
platforms. The chosen poem was in Russian Cyrillic script, so it was that version I pro-
cessed through {poem}.py. There is a lot more work I would have to do (perhaps another
thesis) to unravel the implications of word pricing between different languages, so apart
from some very basic analysis of the differing value of words in different regions/advertising
markets detailed in Chapter 7, and the data I have gathered in UK, US and ALL markets,
I have not delved into the nuances of actual different languages. Unless I have been pro-
cessing poems in different places (at conferences for example), I have kept the parameters
on the keyword planner to the geographical region, rather than changing the language.
This is perhaps another further area of research, the intricacies and implications of which
I cannot hope to unravel here, but the Russian version of the poem did indeed prove
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interesting. Even though it was processed in an ‘English’ marketplace, the Cyrillic script
was still ‘worth’ £8.13.
What is very relevant to this chapter about intervention and resistance, however, was the
participant’s reaction to their receipt. Although they had freely sent me their favourite
poem, they told me afterwards that while they were listening to my talk they realised why
I had asked for poems to use as examples, and had felt very strongly that they did not want
their poem ‘fed to the algorithms’. Unfortunately, at the moment they approached me
after the talk, I had just printed out the poem, and was busily explaining how interesting
it had been to process a Cyrillic poem, when they interrupted me and politely asked for
it to be destroyed. Although I would never wish to upset or offend anyone with my work,
this was a reaction I had been half-expecting since I started processing people’s ‘favourite’
poems. Throughout this project I have been amazed at how keen people have been for
me to commodify and exploit their treasured poems or lyrics and present them with a
version stripped of its original aesthetic value. To be fair, it has not stopped me from
processing my own favourite texts (although I have regretted doing one in particular), but
I really did think I would meet some kind of active resistance sooner. To some extent it
was the first recognition I have had that completely validated how strongly I feel about the
commodification of language, and that other people might share such a strong conviction.
We decided the best course of action was a ritual destruction of the Cyrillic receipt.
8.2.4 Dodging the Market
One of the initial reasons I decided against processing Gibson’s ‘Agrippa’ was that at first
I thought that the text of the poem was not freely available on the web. The person who
requested the poem had sent me the poem as a .txt file, rather than a link. The poems
I use are usually taken from poetry websites, or at least some kind of open source web
page. It is important to the creative vision of the project that the words being ‘valued’
by the KWP have in theory all been potentially exposed to monetisation in some way,
for example appearing on sites which also host adverts, or even merely by virtue of be-
ing openly indexed and available to be found by search algorithms. In order to ensure
this, I only use poems which have been cut and pasted from the web, or (as the project
progressed) have been sent through GMail and have therefore been made vulnerable to
the algorithms that scrape emails for targeted advertising purposes (as per Cabell and
Huff). As I have mentioned earlier, for the ‘Living with Algorithms’ collection, I had
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Figure 8.7: Jemima Foxtrot’s ‘Bog Eye Man’ ({poem}.py 2016). Photo: author’s own.
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asked participants to send me poems before hand, and two of the suggested poems turned
out to be extremely interesting in that they both, for different reasons, managed to resist
the process of commodification and the forces of linguistic capitalism, and were therefore
early indicators of the potential for other accidental and deliberate forms of resistance and
critical theorisation that I went on to explore as the project progressed.
The first of these disobedient texts was a poem called Bog Eye Man, by spoken word poet
Jemima Foxtrot (2015). The workshop participant, Sam Hind, sent me a Vimeo link to
the poem being performed, and the piece is also accessible on YouTube. What proved
interesting to my project is that the actual text of the poem does not appear on the web,
so I was unable to ‘scrape’ it and feed it through {poem}.py. The other poem which
resisted the process was contained within a jpeg file from which I could not copy and
paste. These examples served to provoke an early realisation of the inherent differences
and functions not only between words on paper pages as opposed to webpages, perhaps
evoking Socratic objections to the externalisation of knowledge, but also between words
which have been digitised as text, and those which exist online but in other digital for-
mats. The digitised words which are then monetised by Google carry a paratextual (as
opposed to contextual) commercial agency which the others do not. As I was effectively
unable to ‘price’ those poems, this was also an early indication of the potential ways to
resist and subvert the systems of linguistic capitalism.4 For the purposes of the workshop,
I therefore presented Sam Hind Bog Eye Man with a VOID receipt which stated YOU
HAVE NOT BEEN CHARGED FOR THIS TRANSACTION. This void receipt is thus a
key part of the collection (see Figure 8.7).
8.2.5 Reclaiming poetry from algorithmic market
As discussed previously, it is not possible (and maybe not even necessary) to be able to
open the black box to learn from the algorithmic processes that increasingly mediate and
control our lives. In this respect, the {poem}.py intervention has always been a means
of shining a light on the potential effects and consequences they might have in order to
critique, but also to raise awareness by making the processes more visible, and also more
personal - more close to home. Apart from showing {poem}.py at conferences and exhi-
4Although recent developments in the monetisation of speech data sent over Voice Over Internet Pro-
tocol (VOIP) platforms such as Apple’s Facetime or Facebook’s voice and video calling have already
challenged this mode of resistance.
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Figure 8.8: Engineering Fictions workshop, most expensive love poem, ‘Bondage’
({poem}.py 2017). Photo: Jessica Foley.
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bitions, one way I have tried to do this was by conducting an interactive workshop where
I invited people to write what they thought was expensive and cheap poetry. The work-
shop took place after a seminar I gave at Trinity College Dublin in February 2017 as part
of the Engineering Fictions series at CONNECT. After explaining how AdWords works
and demonstrating {poem}.py, I then conducted a smaller workshop where I invited par-
ticipants to write what they thought would be the cheapest and most expensive poems.
It was Valentine’s Day so myself and Jessica Foley (who had invited me), decided they
should be love poems, each 13 words long, with no repetitions. Participants had access
to some poem-receipts I showed them as examples, but were not allowed to use the Key-
word planner for help. I just asked them to think about all the things I told them about
geographical markets, the time of year, the value of out of context words to advertisers
and so on. Once they had composed their poems, I asked them to email them to Jessica’s
GMail account. This was in order to maintain the conceptual integrity of the project only
processing words which have technically been potentially ‘exposed’ to Google’s algorithms
in some way. The workshop was great fun and also extremely interesting methodologi-
cally. By creating poetry manually, and in the firm knowledge that the words which pass
through Google’s advertising and search platforms are always already infused with algo-
rithmically and economically mediated ‘values’, it felt like we were able to reclaim some
of the artistic agency from the algorithms that increasingly second guess our linguistic
intentions. We were in effect able to second guess the second guessers, and it felt really
liberating! The participants really engaged with the task in hand, trying to work out the
‘value’ of the words they used to construct their poems. When they had composed and
sent the poems through GMail, I then processed them through {poem}.py and printed
them out and we held a mini results ceremony. The results were fascinating. Some of the
poems were really beautifully written, but it was these ones which held the least economic
value. The expensive poems, in contrast, were (in my opinion) ugly and brash. It was
therefore a great way to visualise poetic value in direct tension with economic value (see
Figures 8.8 & 8.9).
Another way I have tried to ‘reclaim poetry’ is with a kind of reverse engineering of Google
algorithm. Once again, I cannot know know exactly how it works, but I can show what
goes in the black-box, and what comes out, which is arguably more important than the
technical workings anyway. To do this, I returned to the poem that started this whole
project off, my favourite poem, William Stafford’s ‘At the Bomb Testing Site’ (1960),
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which was the first poem I ‘valued’ as part of my {poem}.py project, and I fed the whole
poem (unprepared by code) through the KWP. When you feed whole phrases (or lines of
poetry in this case), through the KWP, Google provides an AdGroups function, which in
effect tries to second guess what you are trying to market, and suggests other keywords,
phrases and topics which might help enhance your advertising campaign. The results are
an interesting insight into what the algorithms think you mean, and also what the words
mean to Google. When I first ran the poem through AdWords, references in the poem
to a curved desert road, hands gripping and tense elbows, generated suggestions that I
was trying to advertise road biking. The phrase ‘ready for change’ had the algorithms
thinking I was planning a well-being or recruitment campaign. But these results are as
dynamic as the suggested bid price system. When I tried the experiment more recently,
the road biking suggestions had gone (perhaps we were out of biking season), but other
even more fascinating semantic assumptions had appeared. ‘At the Bomb Testing Site’
was now conjuring up references to Carl Jung (presumably because of the image of the
midday sun and the reference to ‘self’, gastric bands (the Mexican desert is apparently
popular for weight loss surgery, and bikinis (as in the Bikini Atoll bomb testing site). So
in the spirit of reclaiming the poetry from the algorithmic marketplace, I decided to re-
construct Stafford’s algorithmically interpreted poem using only the suggested advertising
categories and potential related search queries offered to me by Google when I put the
poem through the keyword planner. With apologies to the estate of William Stafford, here
is the original version of the poem, along with Google’s interpretation.
At the Bomb Testing Site
by William Stafford
At noon in the desert a panting lizard
waited for history, its elbows tense,
watching the curve of a particular road
as if something might happen.
It was looking at something farther off
than people could see, an important scene
acted in stone for little selves
at the flute end of consequences.
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There was just a continent without much on it
under a sky that never cared less.
Ready for a change, the elbows waited.
The hands gripped hard on the desert.
At the Bomb Testing Site (2017)
by Google AdWords & Pip Thornton (after William Stafford)
Im feeling stuck.
Atomic trinity: anger, depression, ego
and archetype elbow pain after fall.
California republican
delegates latest nuclear test.
Popeye syndrome.
Who invented the hydrogen bomb?
Carl Jungs shadow?
I dont like myself.
Business goals, data entry jobs,
weight loss surgery in mexico.
I am ready to change my life
Self referral, mental health
define psyche.
Inner self crossword clue.
Feel joy! Wellbeing,
core beliefs,
gastric bypass,
bikini island.
Ready steady: be yourself.
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Figure 8.9: Engineering Fictions workshop, cheapest love poem, ‘Ode-Love’ ({poem}.py
2017). Photo: Jessica Foley.
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8.3 Resistance and Persistence
As I mentioned in Chapter 3, there are significant methodological barriers in any research
into dynamic and opaque digital algorithmic systems. What I have attempted to do with
{poem}.py is to accept these barriers as important pieces of the black-box jigsaw, docu-
menting active and passive modes of resistance and subversion as the project progressed,
and weaving the theory in to the practice of developing the artistic intervention as I have
gone on. But even accepting the hurdles in this method as part of the creative process,
there have been some less prosaic spanners in the works that have also added to my overall
critique and also to the investigation of wider questions about the difficulties of researching
opaque and proprietary digital technologies. Raging against the machine can sometimes
be exhausting, especially when the machine is as powerful and embedded in society as
Google is today. To make progress against such hurdles requires persistence. This section
will therefore detail some of the methodological problems I have encountered along the
way, perhaps detailing a resistance of another kind; the resistance built into the system to
deter those seeking to game or hack it, but also those seeking merely to understand and
research it.
The artists and academics I have mentioned in these last two chapters have all come up
against such problems. Researching black-boxed algorithms is methodologically challeng-
ing in many ways, not least due to ethical considerations (Hinman 2008; Sandvig 2014;
Ananny 2016), but because the information on the Web is inherently unstable and mal-
leable (Kitchin 2017), and because personalised search has made it near impossible to
collect empirically sound, geographically and temporally stable data. As Feuz et al. point
out, obtaining reliable empirical data from search engines is almost impossible as there is
effectively no control or baseline to work against (2011). Added to the problem of curated
and ever changing results and ever-tweaked algorithms, is the fact that at any given time
Google or other search engines could be conducting A/B type controlled test experiments
on users. The recent furore over the Facebook ‘emotion’ experiments (Flick 2016; Panger
2016) show the ease and propensity with which users of networked technologies can be
experimented on, and Google are constantly assessing and tweaking their algorithms to
maximise profit through ‘successful’ clickstreams. But as well as monitoring for improve-
ments, the Google crawlers are constantly on the look out to block spam and automated
searches and ‘link farms’ which are used to boost search rankings, which means that legiti-
mate research or investigation gets caught up in these purges too. Feuz et al.’s philosopher
209
8.3 Resistance and Persistence
experiment (as detailed earlier), for example, ran into trouble when Google blocked sev-
eral IP addresses they were using assuming that they were processing automated requests
from a virus or spyware application. Similarly, Christophe Bruno’s Adwords ‘Happen-
ing’ (2002), during which he experimented with buying keywords which linked to abstract
poetry was taken down by Google because it perceived that the adverts were not being
successful enough as Google polices AdWords to make sure that commercial profit is the
only motive for the purchase of keywords, rather than ideological or political motivations
(Diaz 2008). Poorly written, and under-performing adverts are flagged up by the algo-
rithms. Luckily for his budget at least, only a few users clicked on Bruno’s poem-adverts
while they were ‘live’. His keywords may have had poetic, or creative capital, but they
had no commercial context, and therefore earned Google little money.
8.3.1 De-bugging {poem}.py
The development of {poem}.py and my other AdWords data gathering exercises were not
without their own methodological and systemic problems. Keeping the project going often
feels like a continuous battle against ever-changing and resistant technology. It has, for ex-
ample, been impossible to make the processing of each poem any quicker than 2-3 minutes
because Google does not provide an Application Planning Interface (API) for non-paying
AdWords users, and I have always maintained I did not want to enter the marketplace and
end up paying into Google’s pockets. The code developed by Ben Curtis, and thereafter
Feargus Pendlebury is therefore a 2-step manual process, which it has so far been impos-
sible to speed up. Even using a automation tool like Selenium was unsuccessful, because
as a non-paying Google user, I am constantly (but randomly) being prompted to start an
active campaign. So each time an unexpected prompt or info box pops up in the middle
of the automated program, the sequence is interrupted and therefore useless.
There are also occasional (unannounced) changes in the format of the KWP data. As
mentioned earlier, the data can be downloaded on spreadsheets in normal column/row
format, which makes it easy for the code to locate and extract the necessary information.
Until the columns switched around, that is. And then switched back again a few months
later. It also took a long time to work out why at one stage in late summer 2016, the
poem-receipts were coming out truncated, and with the prices of words not corresponding
to the data on the spreadsheet. It transpired that this was due to the ‘close variant’ update
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which stopped AdWords users receiving suggested bid prices for exact matches of the words
they were searching through the KWP interface. Warning users that ‘some keywords that
you entered and their close variants have been grouped into one row’, Google’s update
was met with consternation by the SEO industry, as such unannounced changes can have
huge effects on campaign budgets, as well as being a fairly obvious attempt by Google to
harvest more hits and clicks by widening the potential for searches to match keywords.
One article explained that:
the Keyword Planner now seems to combine many search variants, including:
plurals with non-plurals for any word in the keyword phrase, acronyms with
longhand version, stemming variants: -er, -ing, -ized, -ed etc keywords (i.e.
designer, designing, designed), words that can be spelled with or without space
(ie. car park and carpark), [and] words with and without punctuation (ie. kid
toys and kids’ toys) (The SEM Post 2016).
What this tweak meant to my project became apparent when I tried to process John Mase-
field’s ‘Seafever’ through {poem}.py. The poem has the possessive words sail’s and wind’s
in it, which under the updated KWP revert to the words sail and wind. The resulting
spreadsheet therefore (with multiple ‘sail’ and ‘wind’ rather than sail’s and wind’s on it),
did not match up to the original .txt poem file, so the code could no longer match the
inputted words with the list outputted by the KWP. The list of words was therefore less
than the list of prices on the spreadsheet, so the receipt template was cut short and the
words which did appear were skewed in terms of their corresponding prices. I eventually
found a work-around for this problem by saving each group of words as an individual
‘plan’, rather than inputting them as a string in the main search bar. For some reason
doing it this way, although more time consuming, meant that the integrity of the words
was retained, although I am also very much aware of the precarity of my project should
Google also force the close variant update on individual plans. It was a similar method-
ological hurdle as experienced early in the project with the adult filter on the KWP, which
removed the word ‘strips’ from Simon Armitage’s ‘A Vision’, and ‘fuck’ from Ginsberg’s
‘America’, which had the same skewing effect on the data.
I have already mentioned an early problem before we realised that the KWP censors cer-
tain words as ‘adult’ unless you actively opt in, but there have been other bugs to get over
too. The code has been instrumental in automating the project and returning the words
of a poem or text to their narrative order once they have been revalued by Google in
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terms of their search volume, suggested price and competition rating, but even with this
help, there are still more para-textual technical anomalies. The code works on the Excel
spreadsheets provided by the Keyword planner, but Excel (and other Microsoft products)
are notoriously frustrating for the hidden formulas that can seemingly distort the whole
format of simple Word document, or randomly turn a money value into a decimal, or a
date. The Excel characteristic that flummoxed me for a long time (and I still have not
managed to correct), is that the words TRUE and FALSE in a spreadsheet automatically
stand for a formula in a table, so if they appear in a poem, their ‘value’ is once again
compromised and they disrupt the execution of the {poem}.py code.
8.4 Speculative resistance
In the final section of this chapter, I want to turn to a method of resistance, the power of
which I have already harnessed as a means to critique linguistic capitalism (with Orwell),
and that is the use of creative writing. Books like Orwell’s 1984 and Huxley’s Brave
New World have proved both useful and prescient in contextualising and popularising
the narrative and debate around the political implications of the power and ubiquity of
digital technologies and economies, while science fiction films such as Minority Report
(2002), (one of many based on the novels of Philip K. Dick), with its predictions of pre-
crime technology and predictive policing, are quickly becoming ‘future fact’ (Kitchin and
Kneale 2001). Science fiction, or speculative fiction, is becoming an increasingly popular
means of theorising and conceptualising critical reactions within academia too, although
it is a method long championed by cross-disciplinary scholars such as N. Katherine Hayles.
Indeed, more than simply reflecting reality and the anxieties of technology, with ‘influ-
ence flow[ing] from science into literature’, Hayles uses writers such as Philip K. Dick and
William Gibson to demonstrate how literary fiction actually has a reciprocal relationship
with science, playing an active role in ‘shap[ing] what technologies mean and what scien-
tific theories signify in cultural contexts’ (2008: 21). More recently, Will Davies’ edited
collection of ‘Economic Science Fictions’ (2018), and Rob Kitchin et al.’s forthcoming
‘Running a City Like a Company and Other Fables’ (2019) are examples of this recipro-
cal and productive approach. Conceptually imaginative work has always been important
political critique, but I think it is even more important today in age of algorithmic repro-
duction, when art and culture, and the words we use to live/communicate are virtually
all mediated/tainted/manipulated by systems such as linguistic capitalism. Although my
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{poem}.py project ‘exposes the grain’ (Rogers 2013) of the process by working with the
idiosyncracies of the system, while companies like Google hold the power they do, there
seems very little means of actual redress or effective resistance, although perhaps we can
hope for more active resistance from Google employees and technicians themselves in the
future (as we are beginning to see in some resistance to Project Maven, see Chapter 5), or
for a break up of the Google monopoly, or for viable alternatives, but those are subjects
for other theses.
In Chapter 6 I explored the concept of linguistic capitalism through the lens of Hayek’s
knowledge argument in order to suggest that digital linguistic capitalism has created a
kind of hybrid market that manifests itself as a form of algorithmic governance, with
dangerously political side effects. But what if we take this further? If it is some kind of
market that is governing us on the sly, then what would happen if that market grew and
consolidated into a more overt system, and then what would happen if that system were to
crash? In his analysis of Frederic Kaplan’s original ‘Linguistic Capitalism and Algorithmic
Mediation’ piece (2011), Franco Bifo Berardi discusses the effects of the commodifiction of
language, and insists that ‘insolvency is the line of escape from the reduction of language
to exchange’ (2012: 17), but linguistic insolvency has severe consequences. It might spark
creativity in the short term, but it is ultimately destructive. Indeed, perhaps linguistic
insolvency is even more damaging than financial insolvency, a proposition I am now going
to explore through a creative conceptual provocation and an accompanying short piece of
speculative fiction. Exploring the idea of ‘Subprime Language’ and the potentially dis-
aterous effects it might have on the digital economy, the combined speculative theoretical
and creative fiction approaches also serve to pull together several of the strands of the
thesis so far.
8.4.1 Subprime language
[T]he failure of the financial system in 2007-8 in the United States was primar-
ily a failure of language. This argument does not deny that greed, ignorance,
weak regulation, and irresponsible risk-taking were important factors in the
collapse. But the new role of language in the marketplace is the condition of
possibility for all these more easily identifiable flaws (Appadurai 2015: 1).
In the last section of this chapter I take Kaplan’s concept of linguistic capitalism (2014),
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around which much of the thesis revolves, and extend the financial metaphor into the
realms of speculative fiction, imagining that the language flowing through the portals and
platforms of the web has become so infused by the logics of the neoliberal market, that
it risks becoming ‘subprime’. As Berardi writes, the monetisation of language through
Google’s AdWords platform has meant that the economy has become the new ‘universal
grammar’ (2012), and the argument I make in this thesis is that in a digital age, it is this
monetised grammar that increasingly both constructs and deciphers language. The way
the web works at the moment, with Google (an its subsidiaries) mediating and exploiting
the circulation of monetised words, the potential for political and social influence comes
often as a side effect of the economic incentive; through Macedonian teenagers exploiting
AdSense with lucrative ‘fake news farms’ (Graham 2017: 12-13), through advert-heavy
unofficial YouTube channels (Bridle 2017), or through manipulation of the organic and
paid SEO industry, as I concentrate on in this thesis. In this respect, the economically
optimised words circulating via these platforms and systems run the risk of creating dan-
gerous and damaging stories. This is in part due to the platform facilitated circulation
of cultural capital and ideas made possible by the data-isation of language (see Chapter
4), and new forms of ‘digital economic circulation’ (Langley & Leyshon 2017: 17). While
concentrating on exploiting language for money, Google have in effect let money control
the narrative.
As tech companies such as Google increasingly mediate and monetise the informational
landscape through search and advertising platforms such as AdWords and AdSense, the
ongoing effects on and of the language they auction, sell and exploit are becoming more
and more palpable. In the viral spreading of fake news, political and cultural click-bait
and in the daily battles for exposure, it seems that words are being lent against a narrative
so tenuous as to make their linguistic function negligible. Infused with a neoliberal logic
which favours advertising dollars over truth and the systemic bias of algorithmic process-
ing, the discursive side-effects of this semantic shift reveal a deep-rooted weakness in a
linguistic marketplace in which the value of language has shifted from conveyor of meaning
to conveyor of capital. In this marketplace, words have taken on their own economic value
and circulate as commodities, or more accurately as derivatives, giving rise to new levels
and types of performative agency, whereby potentially dangerous narratives and content
are created and spread as collateral side effects to the ad revenue and SEO industry. In
this respect, companies like Google have taken on the role of language brokers - a situation
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which has potentially grave linguistic and political consequences.
My aim with the speculative argument developed in this section is therefore to question
and expose the new neoliberal and dystopian narratives being created in this process, ask-
ing questions such as how much and how often language can be bought, sold or ‘borrowed’
before it becomes exhausted of meaning and restrictive of expression and understanding?
Has language become so infused with economic logic that it has lost the liquid qualities
of creative language? How resilient is language to a quasi-capitalist operating system?
Can language in this way be seen as ‘subprime’, ‘illiquid’ or ‘toxic’, and - perhaps more
provocatively - what happens if/when this linguistic bubble bursts?
As I have explained in the thesis, Google’s wealth and power as a company is primarily
a result of the success of its AdWords platform, which auctions keywords and phrases to
advertisers in return for the top spots on the search engine results page. This is a process
which Frederic Kaplan has called ‘linguistic capitalism’ (2014), where Google monetises -
or commodifies - language in a way which perhaps elevates the exchange value of words
ahead of any underlying aesthetic, or ordinary value it might have. While not entirely
unproblematic, I want to extend the financial metaphor of linguistic capitalism further.
In his 2015 book ‘Banking on Words: : The failure of language in the age of derivative
finance’, Arjun Appadurai argues that the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 was ‘primarily
a failure of language’ facilitated by the ‘new role of language in the marketplace’. By this
he is talking about the language of finance, and the words used to perform finance, as
having derivative value. In such a way words become promisary notes, or contracts, which
‘systematically and contagiously’ failed to deliver (2008: 1).
Appadurai is talking here about the performative effects to language (Austin 1975), point-
ing out ‘the critical link between the numerical force of money and the linguistic force of
what we say we will do with it’ (2015: back cover). What I want to do is to take the
synthesis of language and capital in a different, perhaps deeper direction, proposing that
in addition to performative agency, in an era of digital linguistic capitalism, words have
now taken on their own economic value, as commodities, or more accurately as derivatives.
Taking Appadurai’s suggestion that the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 was ‘primarily a
failure of language’ (2015: 1) in a different direction, I want to start thinking about what
terms such as value, derivative, liquidity, velocity and subprime mean in an age of digital
215
8.4 Speculative resistance
linguistic capitalism, using them both as tools of critique and also perhaps as means of
metaphorical redemption. Following Derrida, I argue that the underlying value of lan-
guage is ‘diffe´rance’. In other words, the value of language lies in its liquidity - a constant
deferral and transferability of meaning. It is this polysemic quality that gives language the
capacity and richness for argument, ambiguity, wordplay, or poeticism, for example. In
this way it could be said that language has always been derivative, its value is, as Roland
Barthes and others have concluded (see Chapter 5), always realised in a particular context
that is not necessarily the one in which it was written. Franco ‘Bifo’ Berardi states that
‘debt is an act of language’ (2012: 31). It is, like Appadurai suggests, performative. But
it works the other way around as well. Language is an act of debt. Its value is realised
through a spectrum of debt and credit, and is as such always already a derivative based
on a precarious system of trust.
The concern here then, is what happens to this performative value when the word is
transformed into an economic derivative, which is what happens when language becomes
digitised and monetised in the linguistic marketplace? Governed by an economic derivative
value, the fluidity of words, or what we might call their linguistic liquidity, is on the one
hand increased by virtue of its dissolution into data (which accelerates its circulation), but
is at the same time tied to an economic promissory transaction that becomes indifferent to
the underlying value of language. And this is where the risk lies. As Randy Martin writes,
‘disaster ensue[s] when derivatives escape[d] from their rightful place and inundate[d] other
quarters’ (2013: 85). So we might say therefore say that the economic derivative value of
words has become indifferent to their underlying value just as housing bonds (and those
that traded them) became indifferent to the underlying value of the real estate market
before the Global Financial Crisis in 2007-8. Always already derivative, digitised words
have now taken on economic derivative value (a kind of hyper-diffe´rance perhaps), but
the problem comes when the economic value takes over; when words become illiquid, tied
to the version of themselves which promises the most profit rather than conveys the most
accurate information, a process that brings into existence dangerous narratives as collat-
eral consequence.
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8.4.2 Derivative value and indifference
As I have explained throughout the thesis, one of the integral parts of Google’s AdWords
platform is how it ‘value’ - or capitalises - language by assigning an algorithmically gen-
erated ‘suggested bid price’ to each word or phrase. This is a projection based on several
variables. Historic search volume is one of them, but like Google’s other opaque algorith-
mic calculations, it is impossible to know exactly what data points are being used. While
these bid prices are just meant to provide potential advertisers with enough knowledge to
plan budgets and enter the market at a reasonable level, and are not necessarily the same
as the actual cost per click, they are in effect the front-end valuations, and therefore have a
degree of performative agency, value, and power in how they influence the words selected
to populate the web as adverts, as articles or other optimized text and tags. Whether
as data points for paid advertising or for organic search engine optimisation, as Louise
Amoore states about the data derivative, they are ‘score[s] that will go on to live and act
in the world’ (2011: 27). But this is the disconnect of language in linguistic capitalism;
commodified words become ‘indifferent’ to their underlying performative value. As seen
through {poem}.py, when you type the word ‘cloud’ into Google (see Chapter 7), the
results will relate not to clouds in the sky, or a Cumbrian vision, but to cloud computing,
even if you had intended to search for the meteorological cloud. The only thing the search
result is ‘different’ to, is the economic value of the words it displays.
Another example which illustrates this ‘indifference’ of language monetised in this way
is Cabell & Huff’s ‘American Psycho’ intervention, in which they sent each page of the
novel American Psycho to each other via GMail. Knowing that Google scrapes GMail
messages for the purpose of targeted advertising, they then recorded the adverts triggered
by the words in the text using phantom footnotes, thus showing that scenes of torture and
violent misogyny featuring the skinning and dismemberment of women, and the cooking
of various body parts generates adverts for skin tightening products, teeth whitening, and
microwave meals. I have mentioned their intervention several times during the thesis, but
here it serves to speak to the idea of algorithmic cognition, or algorithmic reading. The
‘meaning’ or ‘value’ scraped from the pages of Ellis’s words is defined purely in terms of
what they might be converted to economically in the future, or to put it another way,
their derivative value.
I want to turn now to another of Google’s advertising platforms, AdSense, and its role
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in the fake news scandals that dominated the narrative of social media platforms such as
Facebook in the run up to the US Presidential Election in 2016.
In January 2017, the New York Times reported the story of an American college graduate
who needed money to pay off his loans - and how he fabricated and published a fake news
story which went viral and earned him thousands of dollars of ad revenue from Google
(The New York Times 2017; see Figure 8.10).Although he identified as a Republican, the
man who did this admitted that politics was not his primary objective. He knew that with
every visit to his website he earned money from the Google ads displayed on it - this is
how AdSense works; you submit your website to Google and get paid for each time Google
are able to serve an advert on it. The advertiser pays Google, and Google pays a small
amount to website hosts, and keeps the difference. In order to generate clicks to his site,
he used Facebook as a means to spread the story which then gained traction among Trump
supporters and spread through Facebook through likes, comments and shares, eventually
reaching 6 million people. By this method, the link clicks to his website from the Face-
book generation, and the resulting adverts served to its visitors by Google, earned him
over $20,000. Furthermore, the popularity of the website and its revenue earning potential
(which he had bought for $5 and which was made up of purely fake news stories) gave it
a resale value of $100,000 within weeks.
Obviously some of what is now being called fake news has political motives, for example
the Trump dossier, and other historical political propaganda campaigns, but the point
I am making here is that in today’s digital economy, language can have economic value
that is completely detached from what the words actually say, i.e. the value is purely
financial. And not all the misinformation spread unwittingly by Google advertising before
the US election was ‘home grown’. The Guardian, and other outlets have reported how
small towns in Macedonia and other Eastern European countries had in effect become a
pro-Trump fake news factories (The Guardian 2016b; BBC News 2016, see also Graham
2017). Teenagers in these towns had realised how much money they could make from
Google AdSense and set about creating websites with sensationalist content that they
knew would spread. Unfortunately for the Clinton campaign, the stories which generated
most traffic and most links (and thereby infecting the rest of the news content on the web),
were full of pro-Trump right-wing propaganda. The important thing about these examples
is they illustrate the disconnect between the value of the words - or content - which make up
218
8.4 Speculative resistance
Figure 8.10: The New York Times, 18 January 2017.
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these dodgy websites, and the value they accrue through the adverts they bear. Monetised
language becomes indifferent to any other value or meaning the words might have. This is,
however, not necessarily a new thing if we think about how clickbait stories have developed
over the last few years - made up, or twisted, celebrity gossip or shock value stories written
purely to gain clicks, eyeballs and advertising revenue. But when the so-called information
changes from celebrity gossip to the campaign trail, then the political fallout becomes a
very dangerous by product. James Bridle has highlighted the cultural damage that can also
be done by this indifference of value (2017). He points to print-on-demand merchandise
spreading misogynist messages via Amazon (see Figure 8.11), and to the thousands of
fake or morally dubious children’s cartoons on YouTube which are made up of violent or
sexualised content in order to generate more views and more advertising revenue for their
makers. There are also the numerous examples of the racist, sexist or extremist search
results and auto-completions that shape what is ‘knowledge’ according to Google, but are
in effect byproducts of the digital economy, producing an excess of language that releases
new and dangerous narratives into the discourse. As discussed in earlier chapters, what
comes out of the search engine can have serious social and political effects (Thornton 2018,
Noble 2018).
8.4.3 The Circulation of Economic Value
What I have been trying to show with these examples is that in an era of digital capitalism,
words have become financially valuable in a way disconnected from their linguistic func-
tion/agency. As commodities, or derivatives, the way they move and circulate as capital
therefore becomes an important issue, especially as they now have more than one agential
function (i.e. linguistic and economic). The important point to make here is that, as
David Harvey writes, capital is a process of circulation, or, following Marx, it is ‘value
in motion’ (2017: 74). Fixed capital will depreciate in value, so to work it needs to be
in ‘perpetual movement’, and the physical liquidity and potential velocity of language as
data facilitates this movement in both an economic and narrative way. But this physical
liquidity of digitised language is at odds with the liquidity of language as in Derrida’s
diffe´rance. In linguistic capitalism there is a risk that words become ‘toxic’, or ‘illiquid’,
in some ways like the illiquid subprime mortgage securities that no one was able to value
or wanted to trade in 2008. They might wear out as keywords, or they might become
so that they cannot be liquid anymore; their meaning/value realisable in economic terms
only, as I demonstrate with {poem}.py and the ‘cloud’ example.
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Figure 8.11: Amazon ‘Keep Calm’ image (Bridle 2017).
The argument here is that the underlying performative (linguistic/narrative) value, and
the derivative economic value of language, have different velocities of circulation. For
example, as the toxic, economic values of fake news content (or the disturbing advert
carrying narratives that appear on YouTube) increasingly circulate, the underlying value
of words is lost - it becomes illiquid. The liquidity of one value is predicated on the illiq-
uidity of the other value. And for one to thrive and be totally liquid, the other must have
a crunch (Thornton and Morris 2017). My thesis is primarily about linguistic capitalism
as relates to Google, so in conclusion to this section, I have to ask: What is Google’s role
in all this? To continue with what I think is a very productive method of speculative
and conceptual imagination, I suggest that Google, with its power, reach and now near
ubiquity in everyday life, is both bank, merchant and broker of language. It has a ‘bank
like’ ability to create money and value in the form of economic and linguistic debt, and it
auctions and markets language it does not own. Google gives language economic deriva-
tive value through AdWords and linked systems because it bases future transactions not
on underlying value, but on commercial, derivative value. So language becomes illiquid,
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untransferable, and less resilient. What is important to Google is how lucrative the words
are, it has no concern with (and is indifferent to) the other values (we might say the values
of diffe´rance) they might have. Google only makes money if the most commercially viable
version of a word is returned in the search results - whether that is as a paid advert,
an optimised text carrying adverts, or fake news spreading impressions and clicks. The
liquidity of language is not what makes Google money, and therefore it is in their inter-
ests to keep ordinary language illiquid, defined primarily by its commercial value. I argue
that this is subprime language, and Google are in effect betting against the liquidity of
ordinary words. To take this to its logical conclusion, it could then be said that Google
is in effect shorting the linguistic marketplace, recreating the precarious economic and
linguistic (Appadurai 2015) conditions which have historically predicated global financial
crises. While imagining the bursting of the linguistic bubble in this way might indeed
be speculative, it is a technique that carries on a tried and tested tradition of using cre-
ative fiction as a means of contemporary and future (geo)political and economic critique
(Kitchin and Kneale 2001; Davies 2018; Kitchin et al. 2019). In order to elucidate the
concepts described above, I have also written a short piece of speculative fiction set in the
future and imagining the build up to and aftermath of the crash of the global linguistic
economy (Thornton 2019, and Figure 8.12). The piece is also reproduced as a postscript
to the thesis.
8.5 Conclusion
This chapter has approached the idea of resistance from two angles: examining and exper-
imenting with ways to actively resist the forces of linguistic capitalism, but also acknowl-
edging how such resistance can be problematised - and itself resisted - by technological
and disciplinary factors. In the spirit of my post-digital auto-ethnographic approach, how-
ever, there have been several important insights to be gained from closely documenting
the critique of such digital systems, while also working with and through the resistant
technologies themselves. Insisting on the power of creative and speculative fiction as an
incisive tool to critique both the present and the future (Hayles 2008, Kitchin and Kneale
2001), the chapter ended with a piece of speculative theory and fiction, a method that will
be discussed further in the concluding chapter.
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Subprime Language and the Crash 
Google’s thirst for keywords caused the 2041 Global Linguistic Crisis, says 
government report. Bust tech giant ignored warnings its AdWords empire was a 
threat to language and the economy.  
WIRELESS 1st May, 2044 
The government has today released the results of the 
official enquiry into the causes of the Global Linguistic 
Crisis (GLC) which brought down the digital economy 
in late 2041 and threatened the stability of human 
communication.  
The report was written by researchers from the 
University of London in collaboration with officials 
from the banking sector and the Royal Society for the 
Preservation of Digital Media. As well as expert 
sources, the report draws heavily on the archive of 
digital-era paper print-outs found in a bunker beneath 
a garage in Mountain View, Ca. shortly after the 
collapse of now defunct internet provider Google.  
Described as a ‘shrine to the printed word’, and stored 
in defiance of the 2020 International Paperless Society 
Act (IPSA), the documents included printed copies of 
internal memos, ‘blog’ posts, and the hand-written 
diary of an unidentified Google employee who appears 
to have predicted the linguistic crash as far back as 
2025.  
Mountain View woman  
‘All we know is that she was a woman’, the report 
states, ‘who very early on raised concerns about the 
consequences of Google’s project to link their digital 
advertising platform AdWords, with real estate 
investment and their global takeover of internet service 
provision and data storage’. These concerns appear to 
have fallen on deaf ears.  
‘This is linguistic capitalism gone mad’, wrote the 
woman in a diary entry from 2025, ‘It’s not enough that 
we wring every last penny out of words by auctioning 
them every time we put them through the internet. Now 
we have to agree for everything we SAY to be 
monetised!’  
Researchers say the diary entry refers to Google’s 
move from serving adverts as search results based on 
the auctioning of keywords, to harnessing and 
exploiting the language circulating in physical spaces. 
This was a switch in tactics made possible at first by 
Google’s growing dominance as gatekeeper to the 
internet and latterly as the landlord of vast swathes of 
land and property.  
Crisis  
The 2041 GLC prompted the collapse of the modern 
digital economy, put an end to internet connected 
communication, and led to the mass destruction of 
every piece of information held on Google’s custom-
built server island in the North Atlantic. Its effects are 
still being felt today, and like the last Global Financial 
Crisis in 2008, its roots can be traced to the property 
market.  
At the height of the crash, Google controlled access to 
every Wifi network in the world, owned 95% of all real 
estate in the UK, Europe, and North America, and was 
responsible for the digital-urbanisation of much of 
Africa and the global south. It was a property and data 
empire financed purely by the monetisation of words.  
According to the researchers, sometime in 2020 
Google had what they call a ‘material turn’. Bosses at 
the tech giant began to realise that their monopoly of 
digital space could seriously limit further expansion of 
profits in the future. They needed to start exploiting 
physical space too. Google’s successful monetisation 
of digital space had begun to fund a mass property 
purchase and construction scheme.  
Pilot schemes such as in Canadian cities in the late 
2010s had been so successful that Google was fast 
becoming the dominant landlord of physical sites as 
well as web sites, networks and web space. ‘What if we 
build real sites as well as web sites?’, reads one excited 
internal electronic message found in the bunker, ‘We 
could advertise on buildings, OMG we could make 
buildings out of adverts!’  
And that is ultimately what Google did. They built 
cities out of electronic adverts based on their old highly 
successful web-based system of AdWords. These cities 
were constructed of keywords, built into the material 
fabric of the architecture, but also into the virtual fabric 
of the infosphere via Wifi permissions and the growing 
trend for web-based ‘personal assistants’, which, after 
the demise of competitors such as Amazon Digital 2.0 
and Faceswipe, became the ubiquitous eyes and ears at 
the frontier of Google’s expansion.  
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Linguistic bubble  
‘They say it’s saving the rain forests’, reads another 
diary entry, apparently in reference to the IPSA of 
2020, ‘but that’s just a cover. What they’re really doing 
is making us into walking, talking adverts. They’re 
creating a linguistic bubble’.  
Etienne Smith, from the University of London’s 
department for Critical Analogue Humanities, was one 
of the co-authors of the report. He told WIRELESS: 
‘It’s sometimes hard to believe, but there came point in 
the 2020s, when in some predominantly urban 
environments, it became physically impossible to 
communicate, in writing and face to face, without 
every word being monetised by Google’.  
‘People know that if they use certain words, they get 
more data and cheaper WiFi bills, and this changes in 
different areas, so if you talk about how wonderful 
Google is here in the Bay area, you end up with loads 
of money. And if you talk about rival products in a 
building sponsored by a particular advertiser, you get 
less data at a higher price.’  
Google’s use of speech for advertising began in the 
data-rich catchment areas of central business and 
commercial districts of major global cities, where 
skyscrapers, complexes, parks and roads were 
constructed around the advertising space they could 
display digitally and dynamically. But what the report 
calls the ‘AdWords effect’ quickly spread to other 
areas, infecting everyday speech in local 
neighbourhoods and in people’s homes.  
‘The value of language changed’, says Smith, a 
specialist in critical forensic banking and the linguistic 
economy. ‘It became unsustainable. Nobody could 
trust anything anybody else said’. ‘Tranches of 
language developed in different areas, and the poor 
became poorer as their language became worthless’.  
Urban Collapse  
As with the GFC of 2008, it was in these poorer 
communities that the worst effects of the trouble began 
to show. ‘In the early 2000s it was low income 
Americans being sold property they couldn’t afford 
that started the crisis’, says Smith, ‘but by the late 
2030s the cloud-based internet schemes launched by 
the early tech giants in the 2010s had facilitated the 
construction of thousands of towns and cities across the 
global South, all of them built on the apparent stability 
of the linguistic economy’.  
The government report makes for sobering reading. 
While the GLC caused widespread economic and 
social hardship in the US and Europe, in the newly 
urbanised areas of East and Central Africa alone it is 
estimated that up to a million people lost their lives in 
the civil wars and famines that followed the crash.  
According to Smith, the Google AdWords effect had 
already begun to polarise these new communities by 
decimating indigenous languages in favour of English, 
creating hierarchies based on linguistic skill, and also 
physical access. ‘Those with a better command of 
English basically began to command physical space as 
well. The less educated and poorer occupants of these 
new urban spaces were denied access to the richest 
linguistic areas, so they couldn’t earn anything from 
speaking there’.  
Even the 2038 AdWords Riots in New Sahara didn’t 
make Google stop what they were doing, says Smith. 
‘The tech companies got greedy. They didn’t care that 
these new developments were turning into deeply 
segregated areas. They were making billions from 
these new markets. In my opinion, yes, they did have 
blood on their hands.’  
Linguistic Liquidity  
So, what became of Mountain View woman and her 
archive? Did her bubble burst? ‘Yes, it did’, says 
Smith. ‘We lost the ability to communicate. Language 
in effect became subprime, and once the advertising 
industry imploded, the digital economy collapsed like 
a house of cards.’  
Smith’s favourite part of the archive is a diary entry 
from August 2033 which simply reads ‘Words are 
worth more than money’. ‘I think she was right’, he 
says. ‘In financial terms we would say that language 
had become so tied to an economic value, rather than, 
say, a poetic one, that words had in effect become 
illiquid. Their only meaning – or value – was what they 
were worth in an advert, and when advertising became 
part of the infrastructure, this had horrific 
consequences’.  
‘It’s possible she’s still alive and reading this article, 
but as most former Google employees went to ground 
after the crash, it’s unlikely we’ll ever know who she 
was’.  
Also found in the bunker was a collection of poetry, an 
English translation of a short story by French author 
Alain Damasio, Les Hauts Parleurs, and a heavily 
annotated paper copy of George Orwell’s Nineteen 
Eighty-Four, one of only a handful of pre- crash copies 
known to be in existence.  
 
Do you know Mountain View woman? Call WIRELESS with any information.
Figure 8.12: Subprime Language and the Crash (Thornton 2019)
224

Chapter 9
CONCLUSION
9.1 Contributions
This thesis has made unique contributions across a number of academic and artistic fields,
recognising and researching the new modes of circulation of value and capital in an age
of linguistic capitalism, and creating new disciplinary, theoretical, creative and method-
ological contexts in which to engage, critique, and resist them. I have developed the
idea of ‘geographies of (con)text’ (Chapter 4) as a means of theorising and explaining the
geo-linguistic spaces of the web, and the different actors and motives that construct it. I
have also put forward a conceptual theory based around the idea of ‘subprime language’
(Chapter 8) which imagines the potential dystopian consequences of linguistic capitalism.
I have built on the growing amount of literature and critical debate around the social,
economic and political workings and effects of data and algorithms (Thatcher et. al 2016;
Dalton & Thatcher 2016; Noble 2018; Shaw & Graham 2017; Crawford 2013), but have
foregrounded the importance of adding language to these debates; the commodification
of words being a crucial underlying driver of the digital economy, and in particular of
technology companies such as Google (Kaplan 2014; Berardi 2012). By highlighting the
importance of language to the digital economy, while at the same time insisting on the
existential importance of language in terms of its potential power over people and places,
and as tool of communication, creative expression and resistance, my thesis has identified
fundamental tensions in terms of the differing ‘values’ of language in a digital age.
The economic value of decontextualised and data-ised words might be the life-blood of
companies such as Google, but my thesis has shown the significant social and political
consequences this might have. Further to this, with my innovative quantitative and quali-
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tative methods in researching Google’s AdWords by harvesting the price data of keywords,
I have made a important and empirically incisive step in the study of the political economy
of digital technology, which has had a significant impact across several disciplinary fields,
including digital geography, digital sociology, web science, cyber security, digital human-
ities, literary and media studies and critical data/algorithm studies. This method has
also offered a means of exposing and resisting the power of linguistic capitalism through
artistic intervention. As well as contributing to the academic conversation around dig-
ital technology and algorithmic power and governance, my {poem}.py project has been
successful as an artwork that has the ability to translate the sometimes obscured and
obfuscated politics of technology to a wide range of audiences. As my project progressed
(somewhat unexpectedly) from theory to practice, I have also been able to develop a new,
slightly experimental and definitely collaborative process of research that I have called a
post-digital auto-ethnography. The concepts of value, context, and circulation have been
central to the thesis, flowing through every chapter, and informing the theoretical debates
of Part One, before finally coming together in the practical interventions detailed in Part
Two. With these concepts very much in mind, I want to conclude by returning to and
addressing the research questions set out in Chapter 1.
9.1.1 Language in the age of linguistic capitalism
Research Question 1: How is language affected by digitisation, data-isation, monetisation
and algorithmic processing (broadly speaking the system of linguistic capitalism), and what
social and political effects/consequences does that have?
This thesis has argued that the digitisation, data-isation and monetisation of the words
that flow through the search engine has significant linguistic, social, economic and po-
litical effects. In Chapter 4, I put forward and developed the concept of ‘geographies of
(con)text’ in order to show how language represented as data, and the way it is algorith-
mically processed and circulated in various ways through the digital economy, becomes
decontextualised, or deconstructed, as narrative text. Words-as-data in this way become
tools for the flow and accumulation of capital through digital space, assuming new con-
texts dependent on their value as commodities to a range of actors, although perhaps most
lucratively, to large technology companies such as Google.
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Although this digital decontextualisation might indicate a post-structuralist and even
post-modern theoretical reading of language in a digital age, I have instead argued that
as a binding grammar, the data-isation and monetisation of words is in effect imposing
new types of spatial and structural logic on language, be this through search results and
digital advertising, autocompletions, online translation tools, or how language online is
manipulated, and indeed policed, for profit by various actors for a variety of motives.
These sometimes conflicting motives lead to a wide array of actors competing for exposure
and for money in the contextual spaces of the web, for example advertisers/SEO experts,
copyright infringers and the big tech companies, their users and misusers, all manipulat-
ing language in some way as a means to create capital. These linguistic exploitations are
exacerbated by the sheer volume of text now uploaded to the internet, much of it also
in pursuit of economic gain, as I discuss with reference to Walter Benjamin in Chapter
5. The proliferation of these algorithmically and economically optimised corpora of words
contributes to the pools of data available for search algorithms to work on, meaning that
certain configurations and densities of linguistic data begin to magnify certain messages
and stories within what I have called the ‘searchable database’ (Thornton 2017), which
means they are then more likely to be reproduced through the search engine.
I have argued that this tainting of online discourse with economic and algorithmic logics
leads to the collateral (re)construction of unintended, and often damaging new (and old)
narratives, such as stereotypical or extremist search results and autocompletions, polit-
ically infused advertising, or viral fake news stories. The way words are (mis)used and
exploited as capital generating pieces of data, and they way they are processed, ordered
and extracted in digital space, can therefore be theorised as a geography of (con)text,
within which language is on the one hand constrained by its economic coupling and al-
gorithmic reproduction, but on the other hand, due to its its (perhaps negated) primary
use as a means of human narrative communication, also has the capacity to tell dangerous
stories on a global (geo)political, cultural and social scale.
Having established some of the substantial effects that language in the age of algorithmic
reproduction can have on online discourse and society, the thesis also examines the politi-
cal undercurrents and structures of power and control that provide the conditions in which
linguistic capitalism flourishes largely unchecked. Using Walter Benjamin’s concept of the
aestheticisation of politics through the cooption of technologically advanced culture in the
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volatile and authoritarian era of 1930s Germany, I have argued that there is a politics
lurking behind Google’s search and advertising platforms that is similarly obscured - or
aestheticised - by the unprecedented reach and influence enjoyed by Google today. When
examined in this way, Google’s dominance in the technology market, its near blanket role
as mediator of culture and commerce, its political influence, and near ubiquity in every-
day life, private and public discourse, becomes extremely problematic, and itself verges on
authoritarian, or even ‘micro-fascist’ (Gilge 2016) forms of power.
Against this backdrop of Google’s power and influence, the thesis is concerned primarily
with two specific aspects: the influence of algorithmic (as opposed to mechanical) repro-
duction of art and culture, and the specific importance of the monetisation of language,
which, through search and advertising, provides Google with its main stream of income.
As I argue throughout the thesis, control over language is historically a tool of power over
people and places, and this is a power that can only become stronger when the mediation
and dissemination of language is structured and magnified by algorithmic processes, as
well as being a fundamental part of the digital economy and Google’s lifeblood. Just as
in Benjamin’s day, the technologically facilitated evolution of language is never devoid of
politics and inequalities, although as I demonstrate in Chapter 6, Google goes to great
lengths to foster the idea that the linguistic market it has created with its AdWords plat-
form is an unmediated, ‘organic’ and ‘free’ marketplace. Far from it, I argue that linguistic
capitalism does not, and cannot, operate as a quasi-Hayekian free marketplace because of
its algorithmic method, and because of the array of opaque distortions and manipulations
that construct the political economy of such a marketplace. Rather than market gover-
nance of language, linguistic capitalism, and the power it wields, is in reality a heavily
mediated centrally-planned form of algorithmic governance with substantial political con-
sequences for the control of our lives and actions (Danaher 2016; Rouvroy 2013; Yeung
2018).
Building on the Benjaminian critique of the aestheticisation of politics, the potentially au-
thoritarian nature and effects of this algorithmic governance is hidden behind free market
rhetoric as a means of justification and abrogation of responsibility. But it would be too
easy to conclude that linguistic capitalism sits somewhere between a political economy
binary of either free market or interventionist governance, as some recent critiques have
done (Bratton 2016; Ezrachi &Stucke 2016), as if categorisation is somehow the answer
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to temper and tame the wider effects of this new form of governance. Indeed, if this is a
new form of hybrid algorithmic governance, then it needs new forms of transparency and
scrutiny, and indeed, new forms of intervention and resistance. As I will go on to discuss
in relation to the second two research questions, power and control over language are -
for good reason - often subjects of dystopian theory and fiction, and the fact that both
economic and cultural/social/political power stem from Google’s control of language is at
the heart of the thesis. Language is power, but is also a powerful method of critique and
resistance, as I have shown in the second part of the thesis.
9.1.2 Raging against the machine
Research Question 2: What are the difficulties of studying/critiquing language mediated
by digital technologies?
As discussed in Chapter 3, in depth and empirical study of digital technologies can be chal-
lenging, if not impossible. Problems of accessibility to systems and private tech companies,
secretive proprietary algorithms, lack of technical expertise and the unreproducibility and
unreliability of dynamic and opaque data make critical research difficult across the disci-
plines (Kitchin 2017; Duggan 2017b). These are all methodological problems I encountered
in trying to uncover and show the workings of linguistic capitalism and Google’s search
and advertising platforms. Google is famously protective of its algorithms precisely be-
cause they hold the key to its success and continued wealth. Without becoming a paid
customer of Google (which I always wanted to avoid), or indeed paying for the services
of a commercial SEO company, there is no API available to gather data from AdWords,
which has meant a constant battle against tweaks, upgrades, internal system policing and
censorship. Indeed, in the final few weeks of writing this thesis, I received an email from
Google to say my account (the one I use for {poem}.py) has been cancelled ‘due to no
spend’ (see Figure 9.1). Staying ‘outside’ the system by not becoming a paying customer
is thus a significant problem, as indeed is remaining an ‘outside’ or objective observer of
technologies such as the Google search engine when results are constantly personalised
and localised. Indeed, these difficulties and subjectivities are what drove my post-digital
auto-ethnographic approach. Instead of insisting that opening the black box is the only
way to reveal the workings of linguistic capitalism (Pasquale 2015; Amoore 2018), I in-
stead worked with the grain (Rogers 2013) of the often disobedient, and always vibrant
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(Bennett 2009) technology.
More political than methodological, one of the other big difficulties in studying and cri-
tiquing language mediated by digital technologies, and especially Google, is its near uni-
versal embeddedness in our everyday lives. This not only makes is hard to research from
‘within’, but it also means that any potential problems within the technology, such as
privacy issues, biased search results etc, are often seen as acceptable consequences when
Google’s platforms have become indispensable in how we function. How we communicate
with each other, access information, find our way around, recreate, and buy essential com-
modities, is all now in some way mediated through various Google platforms, and it has
become almost impossible to live and work without them. As I argued in Chapters 5 and
6, as the seemingly benign provider of all these facilities, Google holds an unprecedented
power in society, which must be recognised as a system of governance in order for its power
to be rightly checked and challenged (Shaw & Graham 2017). Yet the power Google holds,
and the politics that lurk beneath its highly lucrative platforms, are obscured by its nor-
malisation into everyday live, its utility, reach and an aesthetic that gives a false feeling
of agency to its users. But further to that, and as I argue with reference to authoritarian
and dystopian examples in the thesis (Kitchin et al. 2019; Davies 2018), when this opaque
and obfuscated power is propped up by the exploitation of language - our very means of
expression, communication and redress, the power becomes far more insidious, and the
need for recognition and resistance becomes ever more urgent.
Notwithstanding all the blips, hurdles and brick walls I encountered in the course of this
thesis, there have been times when these difficulties have themselves been important lenses
of discovery and critique. By using the development of {poem}.py as a kind of practice
based auto-ethnographic method, I have confirmed and consolidated some of the difficul-
ties in studying algorithmic/digital processes described in Chapters 3 and 8, but I have also
identified that some of those difficulties, especially the issues involving cross-disciplinary
research, have also been positively instrumental in the development of the project and
therefore added to the insights and observations I have been able to draw from my thesis.
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Figure 9.1: Email received from Google, 30 November 2018. Screenshot: author’s own.
9.1.3 Exposition / intervention
Research Question 3: What can be done to expose, mitigate, or resist the effects of lin-
guistic capitalism? Is it possible to resist/intervene?
This thesis has acknowledged the methodological, political and disciplinary difficulties in
researching linguistic capitalism and other digital technologies, and has accepted that gain-
ing access to the (perhaps mythical) black box is not necessarily either possible or useful
as a method of inquiry. In terms of mitigating the power of companies such as Google,
there are today growing calls for the company to be either broken up as a monopoly, or
regulated as a pubic utility, but these are concerns and approaches beyond the scope of
this project. My own approach has been one of mitigating the power of Google by making
visible its workings and effects to as many audiences as possible. I have done this through
the development and exposition of my {poem}.py project, an artistic intervention that has
been successful in translating the opaque and often technical debates around the problems
of digital technology into an accessible and engaging format. My project was inspired
by existing creative interventions into linguistic capitalism, and in particular Christophe
Bruno’s work on AdWords (2002, 2012) and Cabell and Huff’s American Psycho (2013)
project. More than any other attempt to critique the often opaque and powerful structures
of language in the age of algorithmic reproduction, for me, these types of creative projects
succeed as incisive and important interventions, not only because they serve as effective
means of translation between often polarised and partite disciplines and backgrounds, but
because they critique from within, harnessing the power of language and literature to ex-
pose its vulnerability as commodity in the global digital economy.
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As I argued in Chapter 7, in the current discourse and debate around AI, machine learning
and computational language techniques quite often takes digital technology as an assumed
starting point, rather than the (often humanistic) object that technology is meant to be
fixing, analysing or controlling. Drawing on what I consider to the successes of projects
such as Bruno, Cabell and Huff’s, my own project has gone against much of the current
research on digital technology, in that it has also harnessed the power of words to anal-
yse and critique digital technology, rather than just using digital technology to analyse
language and literature, which seems to be more common in digital humanities and data
science these days (Liu 2012; Berry 2017). My approach of using existing poetry, and all
the memories and emotions it contains, as a vehicle of critique, is an attempt to reclaim
language from digital technology and the algorithmic market, restoring in it its inherent
capacity for political resistance.
Another reason I think my {poem}.py project has been successful and popular across a
diverse range of audiences, is that it critiques digital technology with a primarily analogue
intervention. The poem-receipts generated by {poem}.py are tactile, vibrant, and unsta-
ble. They are familiar, but made strange by their recomposition, and as such have been
extremely effective in helping people to understand and engage with the deeper debates. In
Chapter 8, I argued that using digital technologies to critique digital technology runs the
risk that any output will be recuperated into systems of digital capitalism. In this respect
I think there lies a fundamental problem in how academics and artists are encouraged
to engage in critical interventions, which is increasingly through digital formats. I refer
here to the many digital art exhibitions that perhaps run the risk of reproducing systemic
problems, as well as trying to critique them, for example The Victoria & Albert’s (2018)
Digital Futures program with its emphasis on ‘electronic visualisation’, and in particular
to a recent $225,000 funding competition for critical art and advocacy projects launched
by Mozilla which aimed ‘support people and projects that examine the effects of AI on
society’. As the competition site explains: ‘[i]n a world of biased algorithms and broken
recommendation engines, art and ideas that educate internet users about AI are more im-
portant than ever’ (The Mozilla Blog 2018). While these sound like admirable concerns,
only proposals that are ‘native to the internet’ and digital in output are considered worthy
to take up these important tasks. Analogue critiques of the affects of AI on society (in-
cluding my own project) are necessarily excluded from the process, as only digital ones are
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submittable, despite their medium effectively reenrolling them into the marketised digital
and algorithmic systems the funding purports to be challenging. This again goes back a
central argument of the thesis, that of the aestheticisation of the political effects of digital
technology by big tech companies such as Google, and indeed Mozilla in this case. Google
also has its own funding and exposure programs for art, which also foreground digital tech-
niques over analogue. Following Benjamin, the antidote to the aestheticisation of politics
is through the politicisation of art, but when the means of production and dissemination
of art is controlled by the very institutions which necessitate redress and resistance, then
it is surely to analogue forms of resistance we must turn, which is what I have tried to
do with {poem}.py. The answer to the second two research questions might therefore be
that yes, despite the inherent difficulties, it is possible to resist and/or intervene to expose
and mitigate the effects of linguistic capitalism, but the most incisive ways of doing so
must be aware - and wary - of having any message recuperated by the systems it tries to
critique. One way to do this might be to insist on analogue outputs, or, as I have done
with {poem}.py, to self-reflexively and critically (even tactically) examine these structures
from within, taking care not to contribute to, or rely upon their exploitative platforms
wherever possible.
9.1.4 Context / Value / Circulation
As I set out from the start, there were three conceptual threads running through this the-
sis: those of context, value and circulation. These delightfully ambiguous concepts have
allowed me to question both implicitly and explicitly how words (as datafied commodities)
move through the structures and processes of the web, and what happens to them on the
way. Chapter 4 dealt explicitly with (con)text, but the decontextualisation of language
in an age of algorithmic reproduction also informed the Benjaminian critique in Chapter
5, the empirical analysis of AdWords data in Chapter 6, and indeed forms the basis for
the artistic intervention and resistance in the final chapters. Context here is both literal
(or literary) and physical, in terms of how linguistic data is stored, ordered and moved
through digital spaces. While on the one hand, digital technologies seem to liberate lan-
guage and fuel creativity, I have shown how context can also been restrictive. Circulation
too, can be seen physically and figuratively - linguistic data is exploited as it circulates as
commodity, but there is also a much wider political economy of circulating values going
on under the systems of digital capitalism, as I have shown especially in Chapters 6 and
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Figure 9.2: Orwell’s 1984 (beginning) ({poem}.py 2017).
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8 (Langley & Leyshon 2017; Srnicek 2016). Lastly, the thesis has highlighted the tension
between the economic and the ‘narrative’ - and even artistic - values of language in an age
of linguistic capitalism.
9.2 Future work
My PhD research has taken me into such unexpectedly exciting and productive areas that
I really dont want to stop. While the research I put forward in this thesis has been based
primarily on exploring and making visible the impact of the digitisation/data-isation and
monetisation of language (and specifically English text), there is great scope to expand
these methods, critiques and interventions into projects exploring digital images, espe-
cially Google images, for example. While there has been recent research on the racial
and gendered bias within text and image based search technology (Noble 2018), I think a
very productive line of future inquiry is the exploration of the relation between text based
search engines and the corresponding images returned with the same search terms. I can
see the results of such an inquiry having important implications politically and socially,
and also presenting another exciting chance at creative visualisation. This kind of research
could perhaps be conducted in association with a gallery or museum, or other digitalised
databases of artwork and images. Another potential further research strand would be to
extend my critique of ‘linguistic capitalism’ to other languages. At the moment I use pri-
marily English texts for my {poem}.py project (although there have been exceptions when
people have asked my process their favourite poems in their own languages), but I can see
an extremely interesting project in adding non-English languages, and also non-Roman
based script to this critique, and measuring the data against geo-located news stories and
events. This is a project with great potential for collaborations between disciplines such
as Modern Languages and Geography, as well as data science and visualisation. There is
also much potential future work to be done comparing the way linguistic capitalism af-
fects other search engines, in particular Duck Duck Go, which markets itself on its privacy
credentials. This kind of comparative study could perhaps lend itself to a more activist
and/or policy based approach in trying to find solutions and alternatives to challenge
Google’s monopoly in search industry and beyond.
I have several specific plans for future work, including a book length project which develops
the linguistic and political economy aspects of subprime language. There is also a much
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Figure 9.3: Larkin’s ‘This be the Verse’ ({poem}.py 2016).
needed focus to be brought to how linguistic capitalism and the commodification of lan-
guage in general relates to debates around security and surveillance. In this respect, areas
of future work might develop the links between linguistic capitalism and surveillance cap-
italism (Zuboff 2016), the ontological (in)securities of search engine results (Noble 2018)
and the idea of cyberwar as a process of deconstruction (Jocque 2018).
A piece of future work I am particularly excited to begin is to develop the concept of
a digital e´criture fe´minine. In the course of researching the thesis I became interested
in a feminist post-structuralist analysis of word values as suggested by Google. I began
noticing that ‘male’ words such as boyfriend, dad, or husband seemed to be worth more
(in monetary value) than ‘female’ ones such as girlfriend, mum, or wife, and that white
was the most expensive colour (see Figure 9.3). These embedded binary value judgements
reminded me of Helene Cixous’s 1976 essay ‘The Laugh of the Medusa’, in which she iden-
tified in the hierarchical phallogocentricism of language a certain kind of ‘automatism’
which she believed ‘conceals an invincible adversary, because it’s the language of men and
their grammar’. My proposed research area adds a deeper layer to this critique by com-
bining the pre-existing structural inequalities in language with their algorithmically and
economically compounded gendered and racial biases and nuances, and the role they play
in the construction and conversation around digital technology today. A digital e´criture
fe´minine could therefore become a tool of analysis and critique into how digital technology
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is constructed and marketed, and could also include research into feminist coding tech-
niques and alternative technologies.
I would also like the project to follow Cixous in her call to take back some of the power
that lurks within the ‘libidinal and cultural - hence political, typically masculine-economy’
of language that digital technologies tend to serve to reify, magnify and justify, by actively
turning the insights of the data analysis into new forms of politicised texts, creative writ-
ing, artistic statements and interventions, thus breaking the ‘automatisms’ which structure
language, and instead exploring the creative potential of a digital e´criture fe´minine.
As well as the digital e´criture fe´minine project, I would also like to develop {poem}.py
into a dynamic digital art installation that projects the poem-receipts onto an outside or
interior wall of a building or public space. The receipts would update according to the
fluctuating suggested bid prices on Google AdWords. As the bid prices can change every
day, regular commuters or tourists would be able to see the poems changing in value in
real-time. I would need help to work out how to make this type of installation happen
both technically and logistically, and would also need to spend time choosing texts that
might be more volatile or mobile within the market due to their currency in the current
media environment.
9.3 Last words
This thesis has set out to be both provocation and intervention, while also documenting
and offering means of resistance into the processes and the real and potential consequences
of linguistic capitalism as manifested through Google’s search and advertising platforms.
Provocative in that its critical analysis is conducted through the lens of fictional dystopia,
yet the power and resilience of creative language is also at the heart of the intervention.
The provocation in that sense becomes part of the intervention; art imitates life, and is
turned back to art again. As Feuz et al. say, it may be almost impossible to ‘study a
distributed machinery that is both willfully opaque and highly dynamic one, which reacts
to being studied and takes active steps to prevent such studies being conducted on the
automated, large-scale level required’ (2011). Google does all these things, so what I have
done with {poem}.py is to accept these barriers as important pieces of the jigsaw. I do
not have access to the black-boxed workings of Google’s algorithmic platforms, but I can
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Figure 9.4: Orwell’s 1984 (end) ({poem}.py 2017).
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see (and show) what goes into the search portal, and what comes out the other side. My
receipt printer in this way takes on the role of the black box, exposing the contextual
transitions of language, while at the same time embracing the performative logic of lin-
guistic capitalism via the material aesthetics of print on paper. This has meant working
with (rather than against) the idiosyncrasies of the system to expose its underlying logics;
discovering not only what they can tell us about the world, but also what part they play
in constructing the narrative, and infusing cultural and political discourse with the neolib-
eral logic of the linguistic market in a way unimaginable before the modern digital age.
It is of course an unprovable curiosity that - in theory - Orwell’s ‘Nineteen Eighty-Four’
could earn Google £58,318.14 each time it passes through one of its algorithmic portals,
but it is a point I think needs making (see Figures 9.2 & 9.4). In processing Orwell’s text
through poem.py, I am of course executing a double-flanking critical manoeuvre against
the political and linguistic consequences of linguistic capitalism; highlighting the power of
language as exemplified by Newspeak (both as described by Orwell and as deployed in a
contemporary context), while also exposing the similarly ‘Orwellian’ authoritarian power
that Google has today by virtue of its control over the commodification and exploitation
of language. Although all kinds of data are monetised in the modern digital economy,
exposing the potential consequences of the monetisation and manipulation of linguistic
data is especially important not only because of the fundamental role language plays in
our everyday lives as a means of communication and expression, but also in the politics
and power relations it embodies. As I mentioned earlier, and as imagined by Orwell and
in my own work of speculative fiction, language is power, and those who control it - by
whatever means - hold an extraordinary amount of influence over both people and places.
In an age of linguistic capitalism, our very means of communication has been compromised
by the all-pervasive, yet opaque, logics of the algorithmic neoliberal market. The theories,
provocations and interventions described in the thesis are therefore my attempt to shine
a light on Google’s algorithmic and economic distortions of language; critiquing, resisting
(and subverting) linguistic capitalism by harnessing and mobilising the power of the very
tools on which its empire is built: the power of words.
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POSTSCRIPT
WIRELESS Magazine
May 1, 2044
Subprime Language and the Crash
Google’s thirst for keywords caused the 2041 Global Linguistic Crisis, says government
report. Bust tech giant ignored warnings its AdWords empire was a threat to language and
the economy.
The government has today released the results of the official enquiry into the causes of
the Global Linguistic Crisis (GLC) which brought down the digital economy in late 2041
and threatened the stability of human communication.
The report was written by researchers from the University of London in collaboration
with officials from the banking sector and the Royal Society for the Preservation of Digital
Media. As well as expert sources, the report draws heavily on the archive of digital-era
paper print-outs found in a bunker beneath a garage in Mountain View, Ca. shortly after
the collapse of now defunct internet provider Google.
Described as a ‘shrine to the printed word’, and stored in defiance of the 2020 International
Paperless Society Act (IPSA), the documents included printed copies of internal memos,
‘blog’ posts, and the hand-written diary of an unidentified Google employee who appears
to have predicted the linguistic crash as far back as 2025.
Mountain View woman
‘All we know is that she was a woman’, the report states, ‘who very early on raised
concerns about the consequences of Google’s project to link their digital advertising plat-
form AdWords, with real estate investment and their global takeover of internet service
provision and data storage’. These concerns appear to have fallen on deaf ears. ‘This
is linguistic capitalism gone mad’, wrote the woman in a diary entry from 2025, ‘It’s not
enough that we wring every last penny out of words by auctioning them every time we put
them through the internet. Now we have to agree for everything we SAY to be monetised!’
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Researchers say the diary entry refers to Google’s move from serving adverts as search
results based on the auctioning of keywords, to harnessing and exploiting the language
circulating in physical spaces. This was a switch in tactics made possible at first by
Google’s growing dominance as gatekeeper to the internet and latterly as the landlord of
vast swathes of land and property.
Crisis
The 2041 GLC prompted the collapse of the modern digital economy, put an end to internet
connected communication, and led to the mass destruction of every piece of information
held on Google’s custom-built server island in the North Atlantic. Its effects are still being
felt today, and like the last Global Financial Crisis in 2008, its roots can be traced to the
property market.
At the height of the crash, Google controlled access to every Wifi network in the world,
owned 95% of all real estate in the UK, Europe, and North America, and was responsible
for the digital-urbanisation of much of Africa and the global south. It was a property and
data empire financed purely by the monetisation of words.
According to the researchers, sometime in 2020 Google had what they call a ‘material
turn’. Bosses at the tech giant began to realise that their monopoly of digital space could
seriously limit further expansion of profits in the future. They needed to start exploiting
physical space too. Google’s successful monetisation of digital space had begun to fund a
mass property purchase and construction scheme.
Pilot schemes such as in Canadian cities in the late 2010s had been so successful that
Google was fast becoming the dominant landlord of physical sites as well as web sites,
networks and web space. ‘What if we build real sites as well as web sites?’, reads one
excited internal electronic message found in the bunker, ‘We could advertise on buildings,
OMG we could make buildings out of adverts!’
And that is ultimately what Google did. They built cities out of electronic adverts based
on their old highly successful web-based system of AdWords. These cities were constructed
of keywords, built into the material fabric of the architecture, but also into the virtual
fabric of the infosphere via Wifi permissions and the growing trend for web-based ‘per-
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sonal assistants’ which, after the demise of competitors such as Amazon Digital 2.0 and
Faceswipe, became the ubiquitous eyes and ears at the frontier of Google’s expansion.
Linguistic bubble
‘They say it’s saving the rain forests’, reads another diary entry, apparently in reference
to the IPSA of 2020, ‘but thats just a cover. What they’re really doing is making us into
walking, talking adverts. They’re creating a linguistic bubble’.
Etienne Smith, from the University of London’s department for Critical Analogue Hu-
manities, was one of the co-authors of the report. He told WIRELESS: ‘It’s sometimes
hard to believe, but there came point in the 2020s, when in some predominantly urban
environments, it became physically impossible to communicate, in writing and face to face,
without every word being monetised by Google’.
‘People know that if they use certain words, they get more data and cheaper Wifi bills,
and this changes in different areas, so if you talk about how wonderful Google is here in
the Bay area, you end up with loads of money. And if you talk about rival products in a
building sponsored by a particular advertiser, you get less data at a higher price’.
Google’s use of speech for advertising began in the data-rich catchment areas of central
business and commercial districts of major global cities, where skyscrapers, complexes,
parks and roads were constructed around the advertising space they could display digi-
tally and dynamically. But what the report calls the ‘AdWords effect’ quickly spread to
other areas, infecting everyday speech in local neighbourhoods and in people’s homes.
‘The value of language changed’, says Smith, a specialist in critical forensic banking and
the linguistic economy. ‘It became unsustainable. Nobody could trust anything anybody
else said’. ‘Tranches of language developed in different areas, and the poor became poorer
as their language became worthless’.
Urban Collapse
As with the GFC of 2008, it was in these poorer communities that the worst effects of
the trouble began to show. ‘In the early 2000s it was low income Americans being sold
property they couldnt afford that started the crisis’, says Smith, ‘but by the late 2030s the
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cloud-based internet schemes launched by the early tech giants in the 2010s had facilitated
the construction of thousands of towns and cities across the global South, all of them built
on the apparent stability of the linguistic economy’.
The government report makes for sobering reading. While the GLC caused widespread
economic and social hardship in the US and Europe, in the newly urbanised areas of East
and Central Africa alone it is estimated that up to a million people lost their lives in the
civil wars and famines that followed the crash.
According to Smith, the Google AdWords effect had already begun to polarise these new
communities by decimating indigenous languages in favour of English, creating hierarchies
based on linguistic skill, and also physical access. ‘Those with a better command of En-
glish basically began to command physical space as well. The less educated and poorer
occupants of these new urban spaces were denied access to the richest linguistic areas so
they couldnt earn anything from speaking there’. Even the 2038 AdWords Riots in New
Sahara didn’t make Google stop what they were doing, says Smith. ‘The tech companies
got greedy. They didn’t care that these new developments were turning into deeply segre-
gated areas. They were making billions from these new markets. In my opinion, yes, they
did have blood on their hands.’
Linguistic Liquidity
So, what became of Mountain View woman and her archive? Did her bubble burst? ‘Yes,
it did’, says Smith. ‘We lost the ability to communicate. Language in effect became sub-
prime, and once the advertising industry imploded, the digital economy collapsed like a
house of cards.’
Smith’s favourite part of the archive is a diary entry from August 2033 which simply reads
‘Words are worth more than money’. ‘I think she was right’, he says. ‘In financial terms
we would say that language had become so tied to an economic value, rather than, say, a
poetic one, that words had in effect become illiquid. Their only meaning or value was
what they were worth in an advert, and when advertising became part of the infrastruc-
ture, this had horrific consequences’.
‘It’s possible she’s still alive and reading this article, but as most former Google employees
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went to ground after the crash, it’s unlikely we’ll ever know who she was’.
Also found in the bunker was a collection of poetry, an English translation of a short story
by French author Alain Damasio, ‘Les Hauts Parleurs’, and a heavily annotated paper
copy of George Orwells ‘Nineteen Eighty-Four’, one of only a handful of pre-crash copies
known to be in existence.
Do you know Mountain View woman? Call WIRELESS with any information.
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